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  Both the executive branch and Congress claim the final word in 
oversight disputes. Congress asserts its subpoenas are legally binding. 
The executive branch claims the final authority to assert executive 
privilege and, accordingly, to refuse to comply with a subpoena without 
consequence. These divergent views stem in large part from the relative 
absence of any judicial precedent, including not a single Supreme Court 
decision on the privilege in the context of congressional oversight. In 
that vacuum—unconstrained by precedent—the executive branch has 
developed a comprehensive theory of executive privilege to support 
and implement prophylactic doctrines that render Congress largely 
powerless in oversight disputes.  
  For the first time, this Article sets out the full extent of the executive 
branch’s doctrine, the various pieces of which have been expressed in 
OLC opinions, letters to Congress, and court filings. Existing 
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scholarship largely ignores this doctrine and addresses executive 
privilege on the basis of two unexamined premises: first, that the 
privilege is an affirmative constitutional authority belonging to the 
president, and, second, that the privilege is akin to an evidentiary 
privilege that protects specified categories of information. Moreover, 
existing scholarship rarely distinguishes between executive privilege in 
the context of judicial proceedings and congressional oversight. 
  Rejecting those premises, this Article proposes an understanding of 
executive privilege specific to congressional oversight that better reflects 
history and first principles of constitutional interpretation. Executive 
privilege in the context of congressional oversight is not an affirmative 
constitutional authority based on specific types of information but a 
limited presidential immunity from compelled congressional process—
the Executive’s privilege. Both Congress’s oversight authority and 
executive privilege are recognized as implied constitutional authorities. 
But rather than infer two competing affirmative authorities, this Article 
proposes to infer a limit—presidential immunity—on the first. Doing 
so is more consonant with first principles of constitutional 
interpretation, more consistent with history, and more conducive to the 
proper balance of power between the branches. The Executive’s 
privilege, as set out in this Article, is an immunity contingent upon a 
president’s finding that concrete, identifiable harm would result from 
the disclosure of specific information to Congress. Understanding 
executive privilege as a limited immunity—and severing the privilege 
from the undifferentiated confidentiality interests and broad categories 
of information with which the executive branch has conflated it—
eliminates the prophylactic doctrines on which the executive branch 
relies to thwart legitimate congressional oversight. Further, this 
understanding of the privilege provides a theoretical foundation to 
explain why it does not apply in impeachment, a position consistent 
with the historical understanding of Congress’s broad powers of 
inquiry during impeachments and subsequent trials.  
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[Executive privilege] in its modern form was born of honorable intent, 
the desire of the Eisenhower administration to protect its officials from 
the attacks of the late Senator McCarthy. The “cure,” however, has 
proven to be as deadly as the disease, as executive privilege, both 
formally and informally invoked, has ripened into a highly effective 
means of nullifying the investigatory function of Congress. In neither 
logic, law, or practice can there exist simultaneously an effective power 
of legislative oversight and an absolute executive discretion to withhold 
information. Inevitably, one must give way to the other and the only 
question is which one is to be dispensed with. 
—Senator J. W. Fulbright, 19711 
INTRODUCTION 
The “[a]bility to control what information to disclose and when to 
disclose it is a potent political weapon,” wrote Archibald Cox, the 
special prosecutor in the Watergate scandal and the victim of the 
Saturday Night Massacre, in 1974.2 In the digital age—where fleeting 
thoughts or statements become “information” that is preserved and 
searchable—those words have only become more true. When used by 
the executive branch, this potent political weapon is currently known 
as executive privilege. The executive branch claims that executive 
privilege is an affirmative constitutional authority belonging to the 
president to control the dissemination of certain information.3 
Congress, on the other hand, understands executive privilege to be a 
limited evidentiary privilege, “a relatively nebulous, constitutional 
privilege that protects [only] the confidentiality of presidential 
 
 1. Executive Privilege: The Withholding of Information by the Executive: Hearing on S. 1125 
Before the Subcomm. on Separation of Powers of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d Cong. 24 
(1971) [hereinafter Executive Privilege Hearings] (statement of Sen. J.W. Fulbright).  
 2. Archibald Cox, Executive Privilege, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 1383, 1433 (1974); Evan Andrews, 
What Was the Saturday Night Massacre?, HIST. (Oct. 18, 2019), https://www.history.com/news/what-
was-the-saturday-night-massacre [https://perma.cc/3Y7A-EB8N]. 
 3. See Attempted Exclusion of Agency Couns. from Cong. Depositions of Agency Emps., 
43 Op. O.L.C., slip op. at 2 (May 23, 2019) [hereinafter Attempted Exclusion of Agency Couns.] 
(suggesting the doctrine of executive privilege includes “the President’s constitutional authority 
to control the disclosure of privileged information”); Auth. of Agency Offs. To Prohibit Emps. 
from Providing Info. to Cong., 28 Op. O.L.C. 79, 81 (2004) [hereinafter Auth. of Agency Offs.] 
(recognizing the President’s authority to supervise “the disclosure of any privileged information, 
be it classified, deliberative process, or other privileged material” and “to supervise and control 
the dissemination of privileged government information”).  
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communications.”4 This longstanding constitutional disagreement has 
never been resolved by the Supreme Court. 
Existing scholarship generally approaches executive privilege as 
both an affirmative constitutional authority belonging to the president 
and a type of evidentiary privilege. Mark Rozell, perhaps the 
preeminent authority on executive privilege, for example, defines it as 
“the right of the President and high-level executive branch officers to 
withhold information from Congress, the courts, and ultimately the 
public.”5 He notes that the privilege applies only to certain categories 
of information.6 Other scholars similarly characterize executive 
privilege as an affirmative, evidentiary authority belonging to the 
president that allows him to withhold certain types of information and 
rarely distinguish between information requests from Congress, the 
public, and the judicial branch.7 Rozell, among others, demonstrates 
how the executive branch has transformed the historically limited 
concept of executive privilege into a much more significant 
 
 4. TODD GARVEY, CONG. RSCH. SERV., LSB10094, DOES EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE APPLY 
TO THE COMMUNICATIONS OF A PRESIDENT-ELECT? 1 (2018); see also Andrew McCanse Wright, 
Congressional Due Process, 85 MISS. L.J. 401, 444–45 (2016) (describing Congress’s view that 
executive is coterminous with the presidential communications privilege).  
 5. Mark J. Rozell, Executive Privilege and the Modern Presidents: In Nixon’s Shadow, 83 
MINN. L. REV. 1069, 1069 (1999). See generally MARK J. ROZELL, EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE: 
PRESIDENTIAL POWER, SECRECY, AND ACCOUNTABILITY (3d ed. 2010) [hereinafter 
EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE] (providing an in-depth history and analysis of executive privilege and its 
relation to the proper scope and limits of presidential power). Rozell’s work began as a 
response—and counter—to Raoul Berger’s claim that executive privilege is a myth. See Rozell, 
supra, at 1071–72 (citing RAOUL BERGER, EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE: A CONSTITUTIONAL MYTH 
1–2 & n.3 (1974)).  
 6. Rozell, supra note 5, at 1070 (“Executive privilege is an accepted doctrine when 
appropriately applied to two circumstances: (1) certain national security needs and (2) protecting 
the privacy of White House deliberations when it is in the public interest to do so.”). 
 7. See, e.g., Todd David Peterson, Contempt of Congress v. Executive Privilege, 14 U. PA. J. 
CONST. L. 77, 81, 96 (2011) (noting that “documents subject to such a presidential claim of 
privilege relate to several different categories of executive branch information” and describing 
executive privilege as “the implied power of the executive branch to maintain the confidentiality 
of executive branch documents”); Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, A Critical Comment on the 
Constitutionality of Executive Privilege, 83 MINN. L. REV. 1143, 1143 (1999) (“From the earliest 
days of the Republic . . . chief executives have precluded Congress and/or the courts from probing 
particular executive branch conversations and documents on the grounds that the Constitution 
grants the President an ‘executive privilege’ to suppress at least some communications.” (footnote 
omitted)); Andrew McCanse Wright, Constitutional Conflict and Congressional Oversight, 98 
MARQ. L. REV. 881, 948 (2014) [hereinafter Constitutional Conflict] (defining executive privilege 
as “an assertion of presidential authority to withhold information from a judicial or congressional 
proceeding”).  
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constitutional authority.8 But he and others ultimately conclude that 
resolution of the constitutional dispute between the branches is either 
impossible or unwise.9 And scholarly commentary largely analyzes 
executive privilege as a constitutional doctrine by focusing on formal 
assertions of privilege, the ensuing litigation, and resulting judicial 
decisions.10 Existing scholarship leaves unexamined the manner in 
which the executive branch’s comprehensive doctrine of executive 
privilege, in practice, can be used to nullify congressional oversight 
entirely, even without formal assertions of privilege. Indeed, the 
executive branch’s sweeping doctrine of executive privilege is the 
unspoken foundation on which almost all responses to oversight are 
based.11  
This Article sets out for the first time the full extent of the 
executive branch’s constitutional theory of executive privilege and its 
tremendous consequences for the balance of power between the 
executive and legislative branches. It does not suggest the development 
of this theory has necessarily been purposeful or nefarious; much of it 
 
 8. See EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE, supra note 5, at 148–94 (discussing “the major executive 
privilege controversies” during the George W. Bush and early Barack Obama administrations). 
 9. See id. at 196–208; Neal Devins, Congressional-Executive Information Access Disputes: 
A Modest Proposal—Do Nothing, 48 ADMIN. L. REV. 109, 110 (1996); Peter M. Shane, Legal 
Disagreement and Negotiation in a Government of Laws: The Case of Executive Privilege Claims 
Against Congress, 71 MINN. L. REV. 461, 465–66 (1987).  
 10. See generally Heidi Kitrosser, Secrecy and Separated Powers: Executive Privilege 
Revisited, 92 IOWA L. REV. 489 (2007) [hereinafter Secrecy and Separated Powers] (discussing the 
use of executive privilege during the administration of President George W. Bush and arguing, as 
a matter of democratic theory, that the executive branch should provide information to 
Congress); Eric Lane, Frederick A.O. Schwarz, Jr. & Emily Berman, Too Big a Canon in the 
President’s Arsenal: Another Look at United States v. Nixon, 17 GEO. MASON L. REV. 737 (2010) 
(contending that the Supreme Court should not have recognized a presumptive constitutional 
privilege for the president’s internal communications because such secrecy is inconsistent with 
the Constitution’s structural checks); Nelson Lund & Douglas R. Cox, Executive Power and 
Governmental Attorney-Client Privilege: The Clinton Legacy, 17 J.L. & POL. 631 (2001) (arguing 
that the judicial decisions on privilege during the Clinton administration empowered the 
executive branch in matters of executive privilege); Peterson, supra note 7, at 96 (arguing that 
calls for reform to the practice of executive privilege after the George W. Bush administration 
were overreactions); Constitutional Conflict, supra note 7, at 948 (analyzing the practice of 
congressional oversight and executive privilege through the lens of President Obama’s formal 
assertion of privilege and subsequent litigation).  
 11. See e.g., EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE, supra note 5, at 7. Rozell does recognize that “because 
of the taint of Watergate, some modern presidents have crafted strategies to withhold information 
without resorting to executive privilege.” Id. at 6. But Rozell does not examine the constitutional 
theory under which they have done so or the ways in which that theory affects Congress’s 
oversight authority. See id.  
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has developed in response to aggressive congressional committees 
seeking what Cox described as “splendid political ammunition”12 and 
“political capital,”13 rather than seriously pursuing oversight for 
purposes of legislating. The executive branch’s doctrine has developed, 
in part, as a means of checking Congress’s increasingly aggressive 
exercise of its implied constitutional authority to access executive 
branch information and to probe the internal workings of the executive 
branch, including the White House itself. But, when understood as a 
whole, the expansive authority now exercised by the executive branch 
bears little relation to the narrow, historical privilege the executive 
branch claims it to be. Instead, the executive branch doctrine has 
become an absolute prophylactic privilege, designed to protect the 
asserted absolute authority of the president to control information.  
Both the practice of and scholarship on executive privilege today 
arise out of a shared doctrinal and theoretical foundation that conflates 
judicial proceedings, congressional oversight, and public disclosure and 
prioritizes the nature of the information as opposed to the authority of 
the relevant constitutional actors. This Article resets that theoretical 
foundation based on first principles of constitutional interpretation and 
historical practice. It proposes that executive privilege, in the specific 
context of congressional oversight, is best understood as a presidential 
immunity from compelled congressional process—the Executive’s 
privilege. It is not an affirmative power but a lack of congressional 
power, a presidential immunity or “privilege” in the original sense of 
the word.14 But history demonstrates this constitutional immunity is a 
narrow one.  
In other words, Congress lacks the implied authority to compel the 
president to provide information in the context of oversight. The 
president enjoys a privilege against such process, but one contingent 
on an explicit and public presidential determination that the disclosure 
would cause concrete, identifiable harm to a specific interest of the 
United States. The Executive’s privilege provides no authority to the 
president to direct the dissemination of information more broadly. Nor 
 
 12. Cox, supra note 2, at 1428.  
 13. Id.  
 14. See Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306, 307 (1973) (noting that the Speech and Debate 
Clause, Article I, Section 6, Clause 1 of the Constitution, grants Senators and Representatives an 
“official immunity in the legislative context” and establishes “congressional immunity”); 
Privilege, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (defining “privilege” as a “special legal 
right, exemption, or immunity granted to a person or class of persons”).  
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does it allow for the withholding of information based on generalized 
confidentiality interests protected by evidentiary privileges applicable 
to judicial proceedings. And the Executive’s privilege, as historically 
understood, has no applicability to impeachment, which is a separate 
source of congressional authority to demand information that requires 
distinct analysis.15  
This Article unfolds in three parts. Part I details the executive 
branch’s doctrine of executive privilege and illustrates how the 
evolution of that doctrine has left Congress virtually impotent to 
enforce its oversight authority. Part II describes how this doctrine, as 
implemented, has resulted in a new “prophylactic” executive privilege 
that has largely dispensed with the situational, fact-specific balancing 
of congressional interests that historically defined executive privilege.16 
Part III proposes the Executive’s privilege—a constitutional theory of 
executive privilege as a presidential immunity from Congress’s implied 
legislative authority that has no application to impeachment. 
I.  THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH DOCTRINE 
Since Watergate, executive privilege has received scant attention 
from the judiciary, particularly in the context of disputes between the 
executive branch and Congress.17 Consequently, a robust debate over 
its nature, scope, and even existence has gone largely unaddressed by 
appellate courts and completely unaddressed by the Supreme Court. 
Over thirty years ago, Professor Peter Shane outlined the disagreement 
among the three branches about the doctrine of executive privilege.18 
He recognized that Congress asserted plenary authority to demand 
information, the executive branch asserted the authority to withhold 
all information that fell under its doctrine of executive privilege, and 
 
 15. See infra Part III.B. 
 16. See HEIDI KITROSSER, RECLAIMING ACCOUNTABILITY: TRANSPARENCY, EXECUTIVE 
POWER, AND THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 88–91 (2015) [hereinafter RECLAIMING 
ACCOUNTABILITY]. 
 17. Appellate courts have addressed a privilege dispute between a congressional committee 
and the executive branch only twice, in Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign 
Activities v. Nixon, 498 F.2d 725, 726 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (en banc), and United States v. AT&T, 551 
F.2d 384, 385 (D.C. Cir. 1976), appeal after remand, 567 F.2d 121, 122–23 (D.C. Cir. 1977). Only 
Senate Select resolved the merits of the dispute, and the unique facts of that case are unlikely to 
ever be repeated. See Senate Select, 498 F.2d at 733. An impeachment inquiry into President Nixon 
had begun in the House, and the Senate Select Committee was seeking tapes that had already 
been turned over to the House. Id. at 732.  
 18. Shane, supra note 9, at 471–84. 
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the judiciary, in its limited opportunities, had established a 
presumptive, qualified privilege that remained ill-defined.19 Those 
fundamental disagreements remain true today. 
What has changed since Watergate, however, is that the executive 
branch has developed a comprehensive constitutional theory of 
executive privilege, laid out in White House statements, Office of 
Legal Counsel (“OLC”) opinions, letters to Congress, and court filings. 
At the core of the doctrine is the tenet that executive privilege is not 
an evidentiary privilege or a presidential authority tied to the potential 
harm caused by the disclosure of specific information. Instead, 
executive privilege, in the executive branch’s view, is an affirmative 
constitutional authority belonging to the president to control the 
dissemination of particular categories of information.20  
The constitutional law that currently governs information disputes 
between the executive branch and Congress, in practice, is the doctrine 
of executive privilege as developed by the executive branch. As then-
Assistant Attorney General William H. Rehnquist recognized in 1971, 
“the Executive Branch has a headstart in any controversy with the 
Legislative Branch, since the Legislative Branch wants something the 
Executive Branch has, and therefore the initiative lies with the former. 
All the Executive has to do is maintain the status quo, and he 
prevails.”21 Given that “headstart,” the executive branch’s law governs 
unless Congress has some means to counter it. Congress has contested 
the application of that law in court successfully on occasion.22 But the 
judicial process takes too long to be effective in the context of 
congressional oversight except in limited circumstances and, in 
practice, the limited judicial successes have never resulted in a final 
victory for the Congress that began the oversight inquiry and filed the 
litigation, as opposed to a subsequent Congress.  
 
 19. Id. at 471, 476, 479–80, 482–83. 
 20. See Jonathan Shaub, ‘Masters from Two Equal Branches of Government’: Trump and 
Congress Play Hardball, LAWFARE (Apr. 27, 2019, 10:00 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/
masters-two-equal-branches-government-trump-and-congress-play-hardball [https://perma.cc/
2SHD-5Y86]. 
 21. Memorandum from William H. Rehnquist, Assistant Att’y Gen., Off. of Legal Couns., 
U.S. Dep’t of Just., to John D. Ehrlichman, Assistant to the President for Domestic Affs., Power 
of Congressional Committee to Compel Appearance or Testimony of “White House Staff” 6–7 
(Feb. 5, 1971) [hereinafter Rehnquist Memorandum] (emphasis omitted), https://
www.justice.gov/olc/page/file/1225961/download [https://perma.cc/TX6S-VS56]. 
 22. See infra Part II.B.2.c. 
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In his foundational article on executive privilege, Cox wrote that 
“[i]f the Executive Branch were left to itself, the practice [of executive 
privilege] would surely grow” because “[s]ecrecy, if sanctified by a 
plausible claim of constitutional privilege, is the easiest solution to a 
variety of problems.”23 His words are prescient. In the context of 
congressional oversight, the executive branch has largely been “left to 
itself.”24 And the practice of executive privilege has not only grown, as 
Cox predicted, it has transformed into an absolute, multifaceted, 
affirmative presidential authority to control the dissemination of a 
broad swath of information and to issue directives about the 
dissemination of that information. 
This Section sets out that expansive executive branch doctrine. 
That doctrine, in practice, grants the executive branch virtually 
unlimited ability to “maintain the status quo”25 and retain any 
information it does not want to provide to Congress. And, conversely, 
it renders Congress virtually impotent to compel disclosure of such 
information.26  
A. A Single, Constitutional Privilege Composed of Multiple 
“Components” 
The executive branch view is that the president, and only the 
president,27 may assert a qualified executive privilege,28 and that she 
may do so over any materials that fall within any one of the recognized 
“components” of executive privilege.29 For the executive branch, there 
 
 23. Cox, supra note 2, at 1433. 
 24. See id.  
 25. Rehnquist Memorandum, supra note 21, at 7 (emphasis omitted).  
 26. See infra Part II.B. 
 27. Cong. Requests for Confidential Exec. Branch Info., 13 Op. O.L.C. 153, 161 (1989) 
[hereinafter Barr Memorandum] (“[E]xecutive privilege cannot be asserted without specific 
authorization by the President . . . .” (citing Memorandum from Ronald Reagan to the Heads of 
Exec. Dep’ts & Agencies, Procedures Governing Responses to Congressional Requests for 
Information 1 (Nov. 4, 1982) [hereinafter Reagan Memorandum], https://www.justice.gov/
ola/page/file/1090526/download [https://perma.cc/FVD7-F827]); see Peterson, supra note 7, at 109 
(“By requiring that the President himself assert the claim of privilege, it forces the President to 
be accountable for the decision to withhold documents from Congress and pay the political cost 
for such a decision.”). 
 28. See Assertion of Exec. Privilege Over Documents Generated in Response to Cong. 
Investigation into Operation Fast & Furious, 36 Op. O.L.C., slip op. at 2–3 (June 19, 2012) 
[hereinafter Fast & Furious Assertion].  
 29. For example, former George W. Bush White House Counsel Fred Fielding argues, with 
Heath Tarbert, that the “modern doctrine of executive privilege is best understood as a body of 
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is a singular executive privilege that includes within it a collection of 
“components,” which individually track common law privileges and 
core constitutional functions of the president.30 These components 
include (1) presidential communications; (2) national security and 
foreign affairs information, including classified information and 
diplomatic communications, also known as state secrets; (3) internal 
executive branch deliberations; (4) sensitive law enforcement or 
investigatory information, particularly, but not solely, information 
from open criminal investigations, and (5) attorney-client and attorney 
work-product information.  
Many of these components reflect an evidentiary privilege 
applicable in judicial proceedings and is accompanied by a specific 
balancing test to determine when the privilege is overcome. But the 
executive branch views these components as part of a singular, 
qualified privilege to which a single, stringent balancing test applies. 
Under the executive branch’s view, to overcome a presidential 
assertion of privilege, Congress must demonstrate that the information 
it has demanded is “demonstrably critical to the responsible fulfillment 
of ” its constitutional functions.31 
 
several related, yet distinct, components—or individual ‘privileges,’ as the courts have commonly 
referred to them.” Fred F. Fielding & Heath P. Tarbert, Principled Accommodation: The Bush 
Administration’s Approach to Congressional Oversight and Executive Privilege, 32 J.L. & POL. 95, 
101 (2016). For other examples, see Attempted Exclusion of Agency Couns., supra note 3, at 8 & 
n.2 (discussing the president’s authority to control the dissemination of all information protected 
by executive privilege and listing the components); Assertion of Exec. Privilege Over Commc’ns 
Regarding EPA’s Ozone Air Quality Standards & Cal.’s Greenhouse Gas Waiver Request, 32 
Op. O.L.C. 1, 3 (2008) (noting the documents over which the President was asserting privilege 
implicated “both the presidential communications and deliberative process components”); and 
Letter from Bradley Weinsheimer, Assoc. Deputy Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Just., to Robert S. 
Mueller, III, former Special Couns. 2 (July 22, 2019), https://s.wsj.net/public/resources/
documents/MuellerLetter07222019.pdf [https://perma.cc/8Z4A-JGWL] (informing Mueller that 
“matters within the scope of [his] investigation were covered by executive privilege, including 
information protected by law enforcement, deliberative process, attorney work product, and 
presidential communications privileges”).  
 30. See, e.g., Auth. of Agency Offs., supra note 3, at 82–83 (discussing the presidential 
communications and deliberative process “components” of executive privilege); Barr 
Memorandum, supra note 27, at 154. 
 31. This is the standard adopted by the D.C. Circuit to determine whether President Nixon 
had to give the Watergate tapes to a Senate committee investigating Watergate. See Fast & 
Furious Assertion, supra note 28, at 5 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Letter from Michael B. 
Mukasey, Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Just., to President George W. Bush, Assertion of Executive 
Privilege Concerning the Special Counsel’s Interviews of the Vice President and Senior White 
House Staff 11 (July 15, 2008) (quoting Senate Select Comm. on Presidential Campaign Activities 
v. Nixon, 498 F.2d 725, 731 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (en banc)), https://www.justice.gov/
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1. The Emergence of “Components.”  In 1971, then-Assistant 
Attorney General William H. Rehnquist, who led OLC, explained the 
doctrine of executive privilege before a congressional subcommittee.32 
He explained that “[t]he doctrine of Executive privilege has historically 
been pretty well confined” to three main areas: (1) foreign relations 
and military affairs; (2) pending law enforcement investigations; and 
(3) “intragovernmental” deliberations.33 Those areas correspond to the 
types of information presidents and executive branch officials had 
withheld from Congress historically.34 
As Rehnquist and State Department Legal Adviser John R. 
Stevenson explained in a 1969 memorandum, “national security and 
foreign relations considerations have been considered the strongest 
possible basis upon which to invoke the privilege of the executive.”35 
The need for secrecy in such pursuits has ample support in judicial 
precedent and in historical practice.36 The Supreme Court has 
explained that the president’s “authority to classify and control access 
 
file/482156/download [https://perma.cc/E6W6-QF6G]; Barr Memorandum, supra note 27, at 159; 
Defendant Motion for Summary Judgment at 36–37, House Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t 
Reform v. Holder, 156 F. Supp. 3d 101 (D.D.C. 2016) (No. 1:12-cv-1332), 2014 WL 298660. The 
executive branch has also, at times, quoted the standard from United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 
713 (1974), which found that the presumptive privilege for presidential communications had been 
overcome by the grand jury’s “demonstrated, specific need” for the Watergate tapes. See Exec. 
Order No. 13,233, 66 Fed. Reg. 56,025, 56,026 (Nov. 5, 2001).  
 32. Executive Privilege Hearings, supra note 1, at 429–35 (statement of William H. 
Rehnquist, Assistant Att’y Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, United States Department of Justice). 
 33. Id. at 431. 
 34. Id. at 431–35. See generally Hist. of Refusals by Exec. Branch Offs. To Provide Info. 
Demanded by Cong. (Part I), 6 Op. O.L.C. 751 (1982) [hereinafter Hist. of Refusals I] (describing 
“incidents in which a President personally directed the withholding of information from 
Congress”); Hist. of Refusals by Exec. Branch Offs. To Provide Info. Demanded by Cong. (Part 
II), 6 Op. O.L.C. 782 (1983) [hereinafter Hist. of Refusals II] (describing “refusals by officials 
within the Executive Branch to disclose information or produce documents requested by 
Congress”).  
 35. Memorandum from William H. Rehnquist, Assistant Att’y Gen., Off. of Legal Couns., 
U.S. Dep’t of Just., & John R. Stevenson, Legal Adviser, U.S. Dep’t of State, The President’s 
Executive Privilege To Withhold Foreign Policy and National Security Information 7 (Dec. 8, 
1969) (on file with the Duke Law Journal) [hereinafter Rehnquist & Stevenson Memorandum]. 
 36. Nixon, 418 U.S. at 710 (noting the President had “not place[d] his claim of privilege on 
the ground they [were] military or diplomatic secrets . . . areas of Art[icle] II duties [to which] the 
courts have traditionally shown the utmost deference to Presidential responsibilities”); see also 
Gen. Dynamics Corp. v. United States, 563 U.S. 478, 484 (2011) (“[P]rotecting our national 
security sometimes requires keeping information about our military, intelligence, and diplomatic 
efforts secret.”); United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 6–8 (1953) (“[T]he privilege . . . protects 
military and state secrets . . . .”); Totten v. United States, 92 U.S. 105, 106–07 (1875) (preventing 
an action against the government concerning a secret contract for clandestine wartime service). 
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to information bearing on national security . . . flows primarily from 
th[e] constitutional investment of [the Commander-in-Chief] power in 
the President” and that the “authority to protect such information falls 
on the President as head of the Executive Branch and as Commander 
in Chief.”37 Recognizing these confidentiality interests has led to 
relatively few controversies between the executive branch and 
Congress over such information.38 No president has formally asserted 
executive privilege since Watergate over national security or military 
information.39 The only formal assertions falling into this category 
involve diplomatic negotiations.40  
The confidentiality of law enforcement investigations also has a 
venerable history in the context of congressional oversight,41 with early 
 
 37. Dep’t of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 527 (1988); see also N.Y. Times Co. v. United 
States, 403 U.S. 713, 728–30 (1971) (Stewart, J., concurring) (per curiam) (“[T]he successful 
conduct of international diplomacy and the maintenance of an effective national defense require 
both confidentiality and secrecy . . . it is the constitutional duty of the Executive . . . to protect the 
confidentiality necessary to carry out its responsibilities in the fields of international relations and 
national defense.”). 
 38. Rehnquist & Stevenson Memorandum, supra note 35, at 1. 
 39. See TODD GARVEY, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R42670, PRESIDENTIAL CLAIMS OF 
EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE: HISTORY, LAW, PRACTICE, AND RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 24–28 (2014) 
[hereinafter PRESIDENTIAL CLAIMS OF EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE] (outlining claims of executive 
privilege from the Kennedy through Obama administrations).  
 40. See Presidential Certification Regarding the Provision of Documents to the House of 
Representatives Under the Mexican Debt Disclosure Act of 1995, 20 Op. O.L.C. 253, 269 (1996) 
[hereinafter Mexican Debt Disclosure Act] (“The President’s constitutional authority to control 
the disclosure of documents and information relating to diplomatic communications has been 
recognized since the beginning of the Republic.”); Assertion of Exec. Privilege for Documents 
Concerning Conduct of Foreign Affs. with Respect to Haiti, 20 Op. O.L.C. 5, 6 (1996) (stating 
that the history of the country “is replete with examples of the Executive’s refusal to produce to 
Congress diplomatic communications and related documents because of the prejudicial impact 
such disclosure could have on the President’s ability to conduct foreign relations”).  
 41. The executive branch’s position on the disclosure of law enforcement information to 
Congress—and the concerns it raises—are summarized in the “Linder letter,” a letter sent to John 
Linder, the Chairman of the House Subcommittee on Rules and Organization, in response to 
hearings the subcommittee held on congressional oversight of the executive branch. See Letter 
from Robert Raben, Assistant Att’y Gen., Off. of Legis. Affs., U.S. Dep’t of Just., to John Linder, 
Chairman, House Subcomm. on Rules & Org. of the House 3–5 (Jan. 27, 2000) [hereinafter Linder 
Letter], https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/oip/legacy/2014/07/23/linder.pdf [https://
perma.cc/9UD7-XN29]. 
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historical examples dating back to 182542 and 1859.43 The most 
frequently cited precedent involving the law enforcement component 
of executive privilege is Attorney General Robert Jackson’s response 
in 1941 to a congressional committee request for all Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (“FBI”) reports for the prior two years and all future FBI 
reports concerning investigations into labor disputes involving 
companies with naval contracts. “[W]ith the approval of and at the 
direction of ” President Roosevelt, Jackson informed the committee of 
the Justice Department’s position “that all investigative reports are 
confidential documents of the executive department of the 
Government, to aid in the duty laid upon the President by the 
Constitution to ‘take care that the laws be faithfully executed,’ and that 
congressional or public access to them would not be in the public 
interest.”44 He stated that  
[d]isclosure of the reports could not do otherwise than seriously 
prejudice law enforcement. Counsel for a defendant or prospective 
defendant, could have no greater help than to know how much or how 
little information the Government has, and what witnesses or sources 
of information it can rely upon. This is exactly what these reports are 
intended to contain.45  
By contrast, the “intragovernmental” discussions component has 
relatively little historical basis, first recognized judicially as a common 
law privilege in Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp. v. United States46 
in an opinion by Justice Reed sitting by designation.47 Although some 
 
 42. In 1825, President Monroe refused to provide information about particular charges 
against a naval officer, reasoning that “the publication of those documents might tend to excite 
prejudices which might operate to the injury” of the ongoing investigations of the charges against 
the officer. Hist. of Refusals I, supra note 34, at 755–56. 
 43. The Senate had requested information about the investigation into a slave ship that had 
landed off the coast of Georgia. Id. at 765. President Buchanan provided a report from the 
attorney general about his investigation of the offense, but he refused to provide the internal 
correspondence with the officers because doing so would be “incompatible with the public 
interest.” Id. (quoting James Buchanan, To the Senate of the United States (Jan. 11, 1859), in 5 
A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 1789–1897, at 534 (James 
D. Richardson, ed., Washington, Gov’t Printing Off. 1897) [hereinafter MESSAGES AND PAPERS 
OF THE PRESIDENTS]). 
 44. Position of the Exec. Dep’t Regarding Investigative Reps., 40 Op. Att’y Gen. 45, 46 
(1941) [hereinafter Jackson Memorandum] (quoting U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3). 
 45. Id.  
 46. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. United States, 157 F. Supp. 939 (Ct. Cl. 1958).  
 47. Id. at 940, 945–47.  
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have traced its origins to English common law,48 the confidentiality of 
intergovernmental deliberations, known today as the deliberative 
process privilege, appears to have been first recognized by President 
Eisenhower in instructing executive branch officials not to provide 
information to Senator Joe McCarthy.49 In fact, the Eisenhower 
administration is credited with coining the term “executive privilege” 
to cover these internal deliberations50 and, until recently, the privilege 
for those deliberations was thought to be the executive privilege.51 
2. The Expansion of the Components and Separation of 
Presidential Communications.  These three types of information—
involving national security and foreign affairs, pending law 
enforcement investigations, or internal deliberations—continued to be 
the “components” of executive privilege through the Reagan 
administration.52 In 1989, for example, only a few days before leaving 
office, President Reagan issued an executive order implementing the 
Presidential Records Act which required the Archivist of the United 
 
 48. See Mauro Cappelletti & C.J. Golden, Jr., Crown Privilege & Executive Privilege: A 
British Response to an American Controversy, 25 STAN. L. REV. 836, 836–37 (1973); Russell L. 
Weaver & James T.R. Jones, The Deliberative Process Privilege, 54 MO. L. REV. 279, 283–85 
(1989) (tracing the development of the privilege from the “crown privilege” and common law). 
 49. In the face of the McCarthy inquiries, Eisenhower issued a letter to the secretary of 
defense stating that  
[b]ecause it is essential to efficient and effective administration that employees of 
the Executive Branch be in a position to be completely candid in advising with each 
other on official matters, and because it is not in the public interest that any of their 
conversations or communications, or any documents or reproductions, concerning such 
advice be disclosed, you will instruct employees of your Department that in all of their 
appearances before the Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Government 
Operations regarding the inquiry now before it they are not to testify to any such 
conversations or communications or to produce any such documents or reproductions. 
This principle must be maintained regardless of who would be benefited by such 
disclosures.  
Letter from Dwight D. Eisenhower to the Secretary of Defense Directing Him To Withhold 
Certain Information from the Senate Committee on Government Operations (May 17, 1954), in 
PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES: DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER, 1954, 
at 483–84 (1960); see also Gerald Wetlaufer, Justifying Secrecy: An Objection to the General 
Deliberative Privilege, 65 IND. L.J. 845, 856–60, 865–68 (1990) (describing the origin and 
development of the privilege in the United States as a result of President Eisenhower’s legal 
positions and describing the English law on which the President relied).  
 50. See BERGER, supra note 5, at 1–2 & n.3; EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE, supra note 5, at 40–41.  
 51. See Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d 700, 713–16 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (en banc) (per curiam); infra 
Part I.A.2. 
 52. See Barr Memorandum, supra note 27, at 153–54 (noting that, as of 1989, there were “at 
least three generally-recognized components of executive privilege: state secrets, law 
enforcement, and deliberative process”).  
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States, upon deciding to disclose presidential records, to notify the 
president and to “identify any specific materials, the disclosure of 
which he believes may raise a substantial question of Executive 
privilege.”53 The order defined a “substantial question of Executive 
privilege” as existing in the same three scenarios Rehnquist had 
identified: when disclosure would impair (1) “national security 
(including the conduct of foreign relations),” (2) law enforcement, or 
(3) “the deliberative process of the Executive branch.”54 Although 
United States v. Nixon55 had recognized that the president’s 
communications were presumptively privileged,56 the executive branch 
did not separate presidential communications from intergovernmental 
deliberations at this time, probably because no party in Nixon had 
argued the information was not presumptively privileged and both the 
Supreme Court and the lower courts relied on the general privilege for 
intergovernmental deliberations.57 Nor was attorney-client 
information considered a separate component from deliberative 
information.58 
 
 53. Exec. Order No. 12,667, 54 Fed. Reg. 3403, 3403 (Jan. 18, 1989). 
 54. Id. 
 55. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974). 
 56. Id. at 708. 
 57. See id. (referencing the privilege discussed in the D.C. Circuit’s en banc opinion in Nixon 
v. Sirica, 487 F.2d 700 (1973) (en banc) (per curiam)); Sirica, 487 F.2d at 713 (noting the 
confidentiality interests of the executive branch in “intra-governmental documents reflecting . . . 
deliberations comprising part of a process by which governmental decisions and policies are 
formulated” (quoting Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. V.E.B. Carl Zeiss, Jena, 40 F.R.D. 318, 324 (D.D.C. 
1966))); Brief for the United States at 55–56, 59 & n.41, Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (Nos. 73-1766 & 73-
1834), 1974 WL 174854, at *55–56 (arguing that the nascent privilege for “intra-agency advisory 
opinions” was a “relatively recently articulated version of ‘executive privilege’” and agreeing that 
communications were presumptively privileged (quoting Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. 
United States, 157 F. Supp. 939, 946 (Ct. Cl. 1958))).  
 58. For example, in 1986 the Office of Legal Counsel clarified: “The interests implicated 
under common law by the attorney-client privilege generally are subsumed by the constitutional 
considerations that shape executive privilege, and therefore it is not usually considered to 
constitute a separate basis for resisting congressional demands for information.” Response to 
Cong. Requests for Info. Regarding Decisions Made Under the Indep. Couns. Act, 10 Op. O.L.C. 
68, 78 (1986) [hereinafter Indep. Couns. Act]; see also Cong. Requests for Info. from Inspectors 
Gen. Concerning Open Criminal Investigations, 13 Op. O.L.C. 77, 80 (1989) (“There are three 
generally-recognized components of executive privilege: state secrets, law enforcement, and 
deliberative process.”); Confidentiality of the Att’y Gen.’s Commc’ns in Counseling the 
President, 6 Op. O.L.C. 481, 490 n.17 (1982) [hereinafter Confidentiality of the Att’y Gen.’s 
Commc’ns] (noting that a past OLC memorandum opined that the “constitutional privilege 
against the compelled disclosure of executive branch deliberations have special force when legal 
advice is involved” (quoting Memorandum from John Harmon, Assistant Att’y Gen., Off. of 
Legal Couns., U.S. Dep’t of Just., to Benjamin Civiletti, Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Just., The 
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Over time, however, both presidential communications and 
attorney-client and attorney work-product information were separated 
out from the larger category of internal deliberations and considered 
to be separate components with distinct scopes.59 That progression is 
seen, among other places, in President George W. Bush’s Executive 
Order 13233, which updated Reagan’s 1989 order and noted its 
purpose as establishing policies for the release of presidential records 
with respect to “constitutionally based privileges.”60 The order stated 
that  
[t]he President’s constitutionally based privileges subsume privileges 
for records that reflect: [1] military, diplomatic, or national security 
secrets (the state secrets privilege); [2] communications of the 
President or his advisors (the presidential communications privilege); 
[3] legal advice or legal work (the attorney-client or attorney work 
product privileges); and [4] the deliberative processes of the President 
or his advisors (the deliberative process privilege).61 
The separation of presidential communications from the 
deliberative process of the president, even with respect solely to 
presidential records, reflected the severance of the two components 
within executive branch doctrine. This was likely driven in part by the 
D.C. Circuit’s opinion in In re Sealed Case (Espy),62 which construed 
Nixon to establish a separate constitutional privilege for presidential 
communications distinct from the common law privilege for internal 
governmental deliberations.63 The order grounded all of these 
privileges in Nixon, equating the presidential communications at issue 
in Nixon with all the other components of executive privilege.64  
As Rehnquist’s testimony and other executive branch writings 
during the initial post-Watergate period demonstrate, the attorney-
client privilege and work-product doctrine were not regarded as 
 
Constitutional Privilege for Executive Branch Deliberations: The Dispute with a House 
Subcommittee Over Documents Concerning Gasoline Conservation Fee 26 (Jan. 18, 1981))). 
 59. See infra note 66 and accompanying text. 
 60. Exec. Order No. 13,233, 66 Fed. Reg. 56,025, 56,025 (Nov. 5, 2001). 
 61. Id. 
 62. In re Sealed Case (Espy), 121 F.3d 729 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (per curiam). 
 63. Id. at 744–45. Most importantly, the D.C. Circuit determined the presidential 
communications privilege, unlike the privilege for deliberative information, covered the 
“entirety” of documents falling within its scope, no matter whether they contained deliberative 
material or not. Id. at 745. 
 64. Exec. Order No. 13,233, 66 Fed. Reg. 56,025, 56,025–26 (Nov. 5, 2001).  
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distinct “components” of executive privilege.65 But gradually, the 
executive branch came to consider the information protected by these 
privileges to constitute a separate component of the constitutionally 
based executive privilege.66 And, although President Obama revoked 
Executive Order 13233 on his first day in office and issued a new 
executive order using the language of Reagan’s original order,67 his 
administration regarded the attorney-client privilege and work-
product doctrine as distinct categories of confidential information.68 
The Trump administration continued this practice.69 The executive 
branch thus currently considers attorney-client privilege and the 
attorney work-product information to be protected by a distinct 
component of executive privilege, even if the information they protect 
would also be protected under the deliberative process privilege.  
 
 65. See Indep. Couns. Act, supra note 58, at 78 (“[F]or the purpose of responding to 
congressional requests, communications between the Attorney General, his staff, and other 
Executive Branch ‘clients’ that might otherwise fall within the common law attorney-client 
privilege should be analyzed in the same fashion as any other intra-Executive Branch 
communications.”).  
 66. See, e.g., Constitutionality of the OLC Reporting Act of 2008, 32 Op. O.L.C. 14, 16 (2008) 
[hereinafter Reporting Act of 2008] (listing “the deliberative process, attorney-client, and . . . 
presidential communications components” as a separate basis for withholding the documents); 
Assertion of Exec. Privilege Regarding White House Couns.’s Off. Documents, 20 Op. O.L.C. 2, 
3 (1996) [hereinafter White House Couns. Assertion] (“Both the attorney-client privilege and the 
work-product doctrine are subsumed under executive privilege.”). 
 67. See Exec. Order No. 13,489, 74 Fed. Reg. 4669, 4669 (Jan. 26, 2009). 
 68. See, e.g., Fast & Furious Assertion, supra note 28, at 2–4 (“Congressional oversight of 
the process by which the Executive Branch responds to congressional oversight inquiries would 
create a detrimental dynamic that is quite similar to what would occur in litigation if lawyers had 
to disclose to adversaries their deliberations about the case.”); Document Product Status Update: 
Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform, 114th Cong. 12 (2016) (statement of 
Peter J. Kadzik, Assistant Att’y Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, United States Department of 
Justice) (providing categories of confidential information and separating out “attorney-client 
communications, attorney work product, and internal deliberations”). 
 69. See, e.g., Letter from Stephen E. Boyd, Assistant Att’y Gen., Off. of Legis. Affairs, U.S. 
Dep’t of Just., to Elijah E. Cummings, Chairman, House Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform 2 
(June 12, 2019) [hereinafter Boyd-Cummings Letter], https://int.nyt.com/data/documenthelper/
1110-2019-6-12-census-documents-not/21a262dafd7e6f6b7f12/optimized/full.pdf#page=1 
[https://perma.cc/WWF3-CVAZ] (citing the “attorney-client communications [and] attorney 
work product components of executive privilege” as part of the basis for the president’s assertion 
of privilege over documents subpoenaed by the committee related to the administration’s plan to 
include a citizenship question on the census); Letter from William P. Barr, Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t 
of Just., to President Donald J. Trump 3–5 (June 11, 2019) [hereinafter Census Assertion], 
https://int.nyt.com/data/documenthelper/1110-2019-6-12-census-documents-not/21a262dafd7e6f
6b7f12/optimized/full.pdf#page=1 [https://perma.cc/WWF3-CVAZ] (separating attorney-client 
communications and attorney work-product from deliberative process as a distinct component of 
executive privilege). 
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3. Defining the Scope of the Components.  There is almost no 
judicial precedent addressing executive privilege, let alone the 
appropriate scope of the various components developed by the 
executive branch. Each component, however, is to some degree based 
on an evidentiary privilege that arises in litigation, particularly in the 
context of requests under the Freedom of Information Act 
(“FOIA”).70 The executive branch defines the scope of each of the 
components of executive privilege by looking to the judicial doctrine 
on the evidentiary privilege, as well as historical practice. For example, 
the scope of the common law deliberative process privilege and the 
presidential communications privilege have been litigated frequently 
under FOIA,71 and the executive branch relies on these decisions to 
define the scope of those components of executive privilege.72 
Similarly, the parameters of the attorney-client and work-product 
component are defined by the executive branch through reference to 
case law.73 And the executive branch has often pointed to judicial 
precedents to establish the necessity or scope of the component 
protecting national security information and diplomatic material.74 
The law enforcement component is unique, however, because 
FOIA litigation involving law enforcement information is not readily 
 
 70. See, e.g., McKinley v. Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency, 739 F.3d 707, 709–10 (D.C. Cir. 2014); Jud. 
Watch, Inc. v. U.S. Secret Serv., 726 F.3d 208, 224–26 (D.C. Cir. 2013); Loving v. Dep’t of Def., 
550 F.3d 32, 37–38 (D.C. Cir. 2008); Jud. Watch, Inc. v. Dep’t of Just., 365 F.3d 1108, 1109–10 
(D.C. Cir. 2004). 
 71. See, e.g., NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132, 151 (1975); McKinley, 739 F.3d 
at 709; Jud. Watch, Inc. v. U.S. Secret Serv., 726 F.3d at 224–26; Loving, 550 F.3d at 37–38; Jud. 
Watch, Inc. v. Dep’t of Just., 365 F.3d at 1109–10; Landry v. FDIC, 204 F.3d 1125, 1135–36 (D.C. 
Cir. 2000); Dow Jones & Co. v. Dep’t of Just., 917 F.2d 571, 573–74 (D.C. Cir. 1990). 
 72. See Assertion of Exec. Privilege Concerning the Special Couns.’s Interviews of the Vice 
President & Senior White House Staff, 32 Op. O.L.C. 7, 9 n.2 (2008) [hereinafter Special Couns. 
Assertion] (noting the Justice Department’s position on deliberative process “finds strong 
support in various court decisions recognizing that the deliberative process privilege protects 
internal governmental deliberations from disclosure in civil litigation”). 
 73. See Fast & Furious Assertion, supra note 28, at 4 (relying on the work-product doctrine 
as described in Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 510–11 (1947)); Confidentiality of the Att’y 
Gen.’s Commc’ns, supra note 58, at 494–97 (relying on Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 
(1981), and others to analyze the attorney-client privilege between the president and attorney 
general). 
 74. See Reporting Act of 2008, supra note 66, at 14–15 (citing Dep’t of the Navy v. Egan, 484 
U.S. 518, 527 (1988), for the proposition that the President has authority to control the 
dissemination of classified information); Whistleblower Prots. for Classified Disclosures, 22 Op. 
O.L.C. 92, 94 n.6 (1998) [hereinafter Whistleblower Prots.] (collecting cases that establish the 
president’s power over national security and foreign affairs).  
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transferrable to the corresponding “component” of executive privilege. 
A form of common law evidentiary privilege for law enforcement 
information in civil litigation arose in judicial decisions toward the 
second half of the twentieth century, about the same time as the 
recognition of the deliberative process privilege. It appears to have first 
originated with theories proposed by executive branch officials outside 
the judicial context.75 But, whereas the common law deliberative 
process privilege is simply incorporated wholesale by FOIA under the 
general exemption for evidentiary privileges recognized in litigation,76 
the exemption for law enforcement information is delineated not by 
the common law or history but by the statutory language of FOIA 
itself.77 Moreover, unlike national security and diplomatic information, 
there is not a robust body of judicial precedent about the scope of the 
privilege.78  
Thus, although the scope of the deliberative process component 
of executive privilege has been somewhat defined, and circumscribed, 
by FOIA precedent,79 the same is not true for the law enforcement 
component. That component has been largely defined by reference to 
historical examples of the executive branch resisting congressional 
attempts to gain access to law enforcement files and first-principles 
 
 75. A general executive evidentiary privilege for law enforcement investigatory files did not 
exist at common law, only a limited privilege to withhold an informer’s identity. Roviaro v. United 
States, 353 U.S. 53, 59 (1957) (citing Scher v. United States, 305 U.S. 251, 254 (1938); In re Quarles, 
158 U.S. 532, 535–36 (1895); Vogel v. Gruaz, 110 U.S. 311, 316 (1884)); Stephen Wm. Smith, 
Policing Hoover’s Ghost: The Privilege for Law Enforcement Techniques, 54 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 
233, 243 & n.94 (2017); see also Scher, 305 U.S. at 254 (noting that “public policy forbids disclosure 
of an informer’s identity unless essential to the defense”); William V. Sanford, Evidentiary 
Privileges Against the Production of Data Within the Control of Executive Departments, 3 VAND. 
L. REV. 73, 75–78 (1949) (discussing the application of informers privilege in civil and criminal 
cases). FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover advocated for a general privilege, however, see John Edgar 
Hoover, The Confidential Nature of FBI Reports, 8 SYRACUSE L. REV. 2, 2–3 (1956), and 
Congress adopted a FOIA exemption for investigatory files, Freedom of Information Act, Pub. 
L. No. 90-23, § (b)(7), 81 Stat. 54, 55 (1967) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7) (2018)).  
 76. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5). 
 77. Id. § 552(b)(7); Off. of Info. Pol’y, FOIA Guide, 2004 Edition: Exemption 7, U.S. DEP’T 
OF JUST. (2004), https://www.justice.gov/oip/foia-guide-2004-edition-exemption-7 [https://
perma.cc/7C4K-5EUN].  
 78. Perhaps because criminal law enforcement as a significant federal pursuit arose later in 
the history of the country, the recognition of a need for confidentiality in law enforcement 
investigations is a more recent addition to the common law of government privileges that protects 
national security information and diplomatic material. 
 79. See supra notes 70–72 and accompanying text.  
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reasoning about the need to restrict access to these documents.80 One 
area in which the scope of the doctrine has been controversial is in 
prosecutorial documents, particularly the determination of whether or 
not to prosecute individuals,81 and the executive branch has relied on 
both the deliberative process and law enforcement component to claim 
authority to withhold those documents.82 There has also been 
substantial controversy over whether the law enforcement component 
is limited to “pending investigations,” as articulated by Rehnquist,83 or 
whether—as the executive branch now contends—it extends equally to 
closed matters.84 
4. Showing of Need Necessary To Overcome Various Components.  
Each of the evidentiary privileges on which the components of 
executive privilege are based has a distinct balancing test. For example, 
in the judicial context, the deliberative process privilege is analyzed 
pursuant to an “ad hoc” balancing test that weighs a number of 
factors.85 The privilege is generally not that difficult to overcome.86 
Attorney-client privilege, however, is absolute when it applies and 
cannot be overcome by any showing of need.87 Attorney work-product 
information must be disclosed only if the party seeking the information 
 
 80. See Assertion of Exec. Privilege in Response to Cong. Demands for L. Enf’t Files, 6 Op. 
O.L.C. 31, 32 (1982) (“[I]t has been the policy of the Executive Branch throughout this Nation’s 
history generally to decline to provide committees of Congress with access to or copies of law 
enforcement files except in the most extraordinary circumstances.”); Linder Letter, supra note 
41, at 3–5 (describing the Department’s position on oversight over open law enforcement 
matters). 
 81. See Assertion of Exec. Privilege with Respect to Prosecutorial Documents, 25 Op. O.L.C. 
1, 1–2 (2001). 
 82. Id. at 2–3.  
 83. Executive Privilege Hearings, supra note 1, at 431 (statement of William H. Rehnquist, 
Assistant Att’y Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, United States Department of Justice); see also 
Linder Letter, supra note 41, at 3–5 (discussing the rationale for protecting information in “open 
matters”).  
 84. See Special Couns. Assertion, supra note 72, at 10 (“Although the law enforcement 
component of executive privilege is more commonly implicated when Congress seeks materials 
about an open criminal investigation, the separation of powers necessity of protecting the 
integrity and effectiveness of the prosecutorial process continues after an investigation closes.” 
(citing Indep. Couns. Act, supra note 58, at 77)). 
 85. In re Sealed Case (Espy), 121 F.3d 729, 737–38 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (per curiam). 
 86. See Texaco P.R., Inc. v. Dep’t of Consumer Affs., 60 F.3d 867, 885 (1st Cir. 1995) 
(discussing the discretionary nature of the deliberative process privilege). 
 87. See Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399, 407–11 (1998) (explaining the 
importance of attorney-client privilege and declining to narrow its application). 
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can show “substantial need and inability to obtain the equivalent 
without undue hardship.”88 The state secrets privilege has also been 
described as absolute, no matter the needs of the other side; a litigant 
who cannot prove a claim without access to classified national security 
information is simply out of luck.89 
The executive branch discards these respective balancing tests in 
the context of executive privilege, however, and asserts that a single 
balancing test applies to every invocation of executive privilege against 
Congress no matter the specific component of privilege on which the 
assertion is based. When the president invokes his constitutionally 
based executive privilege against a congressional demand, neither the 
specific component into which the information falls nor the judicial 
precedent establishing the balancing inquiry matters. The fact that 
each of the components of executive privilege exists as an independent 
evidentiary privilege in the context of judicial proceedings is irrelevant. 
In the executive branch’s view, to overcome an Executive’s assertion 
of his constitutional privilege, a congressional committee must meet 
the high standard adopted in Senate Select Committee on Presidential 
Campaign Activities v. Nixon90 by demonstrating that the documents 
are “demonstrably critical to the responsible fulfillment of the 
Committee’s functions.”91  
If the president has determined the information cannot be 
disclosed without harming the public interest, then that determination 
carries the same constitutional weight. The relative strength of the 
interest he is protecting—such as national security versus deliberations 
over how to respond to a congressional request for information—is 
irrelevant to the showing necessary to overcome that privilege. For 
example, the executive order on presidential records issued by 
President Bush stated that Nixon required any party seeking to 
overcome any of these constitutional privileges to “establish at least a 
 
 88. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 400 (1981). 
 89. See generally Laura K. Donohue, The Shadow of State Secrets, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 77 
(2010) (cataloging the development and doctrine of the state secrets privilege and describing it as 
“cast[ing a] longer and broader” shadow “than previously acknowledged”). 
 90. Senate Select Comm. on Presidential Campaign Activities v. Nixon, 498 F.2d 725 (D.C. 
Cir. 1974) (en banc). 
 91. Special Couns. Assertion, supra note 72, at 11–12 (emphasis added) (quoting Senate 
Select, 498 F.2d at 731). The Senate Select standard applies to all claims of executive privilege, no 
matter the specific component implicated. See id. at 9–12 (applying the Senate Select standard to 
“presidential communications and deliberative process components of executive privilege” as 
well as “the law enforcement component of executive privilege”). 
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‘demonstrated, specific need’” for particular records.92 And each 
invocation of executive privilege by Presidents Obama and Trump 
made the same claim.93 The standard is a high one, and every assertion 
of executive privilege has concluded that the relevant congressional 
committee has not met that standard because the committee could 
have theoretically performed its legislative task without access to the 
specific information over which the president had been asserting 
privilege.94  
B. The President’s Sole Prerogative: Asserting Executive Privilege 
and Controlling Information 
The next doctrinal pillar of the executive branch’s doctrine of 
executive privilege is the assertion that the president—and the 
president alone—has inherent constitutional authority to control all 
information that potentially fits within the scope of these 
components.95 Presidential control appears to have originated as a 
matter of procedure and policy but has since expanded into a claim of 
absolute constitutional authority. In 1962, President Kennedy provided 
a letter to a congressional committee stating that “executive privilege 
can be invoked only by the President and will not be used without 
specific Presidential approval.”96 Presidents Johnson and Nixon 
 
 92. Exec. Order No. 13,233, 66 Fed. Reg. 56,025, 56,026 (Nov. 5, 2001) (quoting United States 
v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 713 (1974)).  
 93. See, e.g., Fast & Furious Assertion, supra note 28, at 5; Census Assertion, supra note 69, 
at 6. 
 94. See, e.g., Census Assertion, supra note 69, at 6–7 (finding that the priority documents 
subpoenaed by the committee related to the decision to include the citizenship question on the 
census were not “necessary predicates to Congress’s enactment of legislation regarding the 
census” and thus did not meet the Senate Select standard). 
 95. See Attempted Exclusion of Agency Couns., supra note 3, at 2 (“We concluded that 
Congress may not compel an executive branch witness to appear without agency counsel and 
thereby compromise the President’s constitutional authority to control the disclosure of 
privileged information and to supervise the Executive Branch’s communications with 
congressional entities.”); Reporting Act of 2008, supra note 66, at 15 (citing Department of the 
Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 527 (1988), for the proposition that the President has authority to 
control the dissemination of classified information); Mexican Debt Disclosure Act, supra note 40, 
at 269 (“The President’s constitutional authority to control the disclosure of documents and 
information relating to diplomatic communications has been recognized since the beginning of 
the Republic.”). 
 96. See Executive Privilege Hearings, supra note 1, at 2 (statement of Sen. Sam J. Ervin, Jr., 
Chairman, S. Subcomm. on Separation of Powers) (quoting Letter from President John F. 
Kennedy, to John E. Moss, Chairman, Special Gov’t Info. Subcomm. of the Comm. on Gov’t 
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reaffirmed that policy,97 and the foundational Reagan memorandum 
on executive privilege, which has been adopted by each subsequent 
administration, stipulates that “executive privilege shall not be invoked 
without specific Presidential authorization.”98  
Congress has signaled approval of this limitation, as evidenced in 
proposed legislation that provided: “In no case shall an employee of 
the executive branch appearing before the Congress . . . assert 
executive privilege unless the employee present . . . a statement signed 
personally by the President requiring that the employee assert 
executive privilege.”99 That failed legislation sought to ensure that 
lower executive branch officials did not have the authority to assert 
privilege to stymie congressional requests for information. Any 
assertion would have needed to be made by the president and would 
have required an expenditure of his political capital. The limitation of 
the privilege to the president has not been the subject of controversy, 
and congressional committees currently accommodate that limitation 
by asking witnesses to consult with the White House to see if the 
president intends to assert privilege before testifying.100 
As articulated by Rehnquist and in the Reagan memorandum, the 
modern executive privilege doctrine originally envisioned a screening 
process during which lower executive branch officials would determine 
whether certain information potentially warranted an executive 
privilege claim—that is, whether the information, if disclosed, would 
cause identifiable harm to a specific national interest. In congressional 
testimony, Rehnquist explained that the president “expects the 
responsible heads of the agencies to whom [congressional] requests are 
addressed to make some sort of a tentative determination as to whether 
 
Operations (Mar. 7, 1962), http://www.johnemossfoundation.org/foi/from_jfk.htm 
[https://perma.cc/8DYM-MVW9]).  
 97. Id. at 2–3. 
 98. Reagan Memorandum, supra note 27, at 1.  
 99. Executive Privilege Hearings, supra note 1, at 7 (statement of Sen. Sam J. Ervin, Jr., 
Chairman, S. Subcomm. on Separation of Powers) (omission in original) (quoting S. 1125, 92d 
Cong. (1971)).  
 100. See, e.g., Letter from Jerrold Nadler, Chairman, House Comm. on the Judiciary, to 
Matthew Whitaker, Acting Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Just. 1 (Jan. 22, 2019) [hereinafter Nadler 
Letter], https://judiciary.house.gov/sites/democrats.judiciary.house.gov/files/documents/
1.22.2018%20letter%20to%20whitaker.pdf [https://perma.cc/9HD3-898J] (advising the acting 
attorney general that the committee would be questioning him about presidential 
communications in an upcoming hearing and requesting that he notify the committee in advance 
if the president planned to assert executive privilege). 
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some of the information requested might warrant a claim of executive 
privilege.”101 The Reagan memorandum directs that “[c]ongressional 
requests for information [] be complied with as promptly and as fully 
as possible, unless it is determined that compliance raises a substantial 
question of executive privilege.”102 Most importantly, it clarifies that a 
“‘substantial question of executive privilege’ exists if disclosure of the 
information requested might significantly impair the national security 
. . . , the deliberative processes of the Executive Branch, or other 
aspects of the performance of the Executive Branch’s constitutional 
duties.”103 Thus, both Rehnquist and Reagan described an initial 
agency analysis of whether an executive privilege claim may be 
appropriate based on concrete harm that could result from disclosure. 
That initial screening remained tied to the understanding of executive 
privilege as the president’s limited constitutional authority to intervene 
and forbid disclosure of specific information when concrete, identified 
harm would result. 
The current executive branch doctrine has expanded the 
underlying constitutional authority significantly, describing it not as 
the limited authority to prevent the disclosure of specific information 
the disclosure of which would cause identifiable harm but as an 
affirmative constitutional authority to control the dissemination of all 
information that potentially implicates one of the “components” of 
executive privilege.104 The executive branch has now conflated the 
broad scope of its various components of executive privilege with the 
situational “public interest” that historically cabined executive 
privilege assertions. As a result, its doctrine asserts that the president 
has the affirmative authority to control the dissemination of all 
information that potentially falls within the broad scope of these 
various components. Any attempt to undermine that authority—even 
if it is a largely benign statutory reporting requirement—is an 
unconstitutional interference with that affirmative, and absolute, 
presidential authority. The initial screening by lower executive branch 
officials looks at whether the subpoenaed information falls within the 
scope of any of the components of executive privilege, not at the 
 
 101. Executive Privilege Hearings, supra note 1, at 441 (statement of William H. Rehnquist, 
Assistant Att’y Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, United States Department of Justice). 
 102. Reagan Memorandum, supra note 27, at 1–2. 
 103. Id. 
 104. See Attempted Exclusion of Agency Couns., supra note 3, at 8 (concluding that the 
committee’s exclusion of agency counsel “unconstitutionally interferes with the President’s right 
to control the disclosure of privileged information” (emphasis added)). 
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potential harm caused by disclosure of specific information. In other 
words, current executive branch doctrine assumes that any disclosure 
of material falling within the scope of the various components would 
“significantly impair” the national interest. As a result, only the 
president can determine whether or not it may be disclosed to Congress 
or to the public. 
The theory has never been expounded fully in public documents, 
but it appears to derive from the executive branch’s view that the 
president has ultimate control over the dissemination of all national 
security information. In 1998, then-Deputy Assistant Attorney 
General at OLC Randolph Moss provided testimony to the House 
Intelligence Committee that analyzed the historical examples of 
presidents withholding national security information and concluded 
that a bill allowing whistleblowers in the intelligence community to 
provide classified information directly to Congress was 
unconstitutional.105 The Moss testimony, in a footnote, also recognized 
that “other constitutionally-based confidentiality interests can be 
implicated by employee disclosures to Congress.”106 In a previous 
Statement of Administration Policy on that same bill, the Clinton 
administration asserted that Congress could not “vest lower-ranking 
personnel in the Executive branch with a ‘right’ to furnish national 
security or other privileged information.”107  
In 2004, OLC Assistant Attorney General Jack Goldsmith relied 
on that language, as well as the developing doctrine of executive 
privilege and the expansion of its components, to conclude that the 
position that Congress may not vest executive branch employees with 
a right to provide information to Congress is “not limited to classified 
information, but extend[s] to all deliberative process or other 
information protected by executive privilege.”108 Although these 
opinions dealt principally with statutory reporting requirements and 
 
 105. Whistleblower Prots., supra note 74, at 92, 94–99. 
 106. Id. at 101 n.34. 
 107. OFF. OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFF. OF THE PRESIDENT, STATEMENT OF 
ADMINISTRATION POLICY: S. 1668 – DISCLOSURE TO CONGRESS ACT OF 1998 (1998) (emphasis 
added), https://clintonwhitehouse3.archives.gov/OMB/legislative/sap/105-2/S1668-s.html [https://
perma.cc/6T9J-4X4P]. Statements of Administration Policy or “SAPs” are formal statements of 
an administration’s position on pending legislation issued by the Office of Management and 
Budget on behalf of the Executive Office of the President. See generally MEGHAN M. STUESSY, 
CONG. RSCH. SERV., R44539, STATEMENTS OF ADMINISTRATION POLICY (2016) (explaining the 
history and evolution of SAPs). 
 108. Auth. of Agency Offs., supra note 3, at 81. 
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whistleblower rights, they have ultimately formed a cohesive doctrine 
that the president has the right “to control the disclosure of privileged 
information.”109 By “privileged information,” the executive branch 
means everything that potentially fits within one of the components. 
The executive branch routinely, in private correspondence, Statements 
of Administration Policy, and other communications, raises 
constitutional objections to proposed legislation that attempts to 
control the dissemination of information potentially protected by 
executive privilege.110 
II.  THE PRACTICE OF EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE: CONGRESSIONAL 
IMPOTENCE AND THE PROPHYLACTIC EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE 
The executive branch’s doctrine of executive privilege informs 
every aspect of congressional oversight even if its ubiquity is often 
unrecognized or unacknowledged. Both congressional oversight 
authority and executive privilege are implied constitutional authorities, 
with limited textual mooring and scant precedential definition. The 
historical interplay of these implicit authorities offers a prime example 
of the ways in which, in the absence of judicial resolution, the 
constitutional authorities of one branch evolve to remain an operative 
check on another branch’s asserted constitutional authority in a never-
ending game of one-upmanship. As Thomas Jefferson observed,  
The intention of the Constitution, that each branch should be 
independent of the others, is further manifested by the means it has 
furnished to each, to protect itself from enterprises of force attempted 
 
 109. Attempted Exclusion of Agency Couns., supra note 3, at 9. 
 110. See, e.g., OFF. OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFF. OF THE PRESIDENT, STATEMENT OF 
ADMINISTRATION POLICY: H.R. 4909 – NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL 
YEAR 2017 (2016), https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/statement-administration-
policy-hr-4909-national-defense-authorization-act-for-fiscal-year [https://perma.cc/LK6U-H8X9] 
(objecting to a requirement to report certain military information to Congress because it involved 
“sensitive national security information protected by executive privilege”); OFF. OF MGMT. & 
BUDGET, EXEC. OFF. OF THE PRESIDENT, STATEMENT OF ADMINISTRATION POLICY: H.R. 2596 
– INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FY 2016 (2015), https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/
documents/statement-administration-policy-hr-2596-intelligence-authorization-act-for-fy-2016 
[https://perma.cc/R666-5EUT] (noting that particular reporting requirements “would require 
burdensome and unnecessary reporting to Congress and could interfere with the President’s 
authority to protect sensitive national security information”); Presidential Statement on Signing 
the Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009, 1 PUB. PAPERS 689 (May 20, 2009) (noting 
the administration would construe a requirement that executive branch agencies provide 
information to a legislative entity “not to abrogate any constitutional privilege”). 
SHAUB IN PRINTER FINAL_9.22.20 (DO NOT DELETE) 9/22/2020  2:41 PM 
28  DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 70:1 
on them by the others, and to none has it given more effectual or 
diversified means than to the executive.111 
As Part II demonstrates, however, the balance has now shifted 
definitively to the executive branch’s favor, largely because of the 
doctrine set out in Part I. In practice, the executive branch doctrine has 
proved a difficult—potentially an impossible—“enterprise of force” 
for Congress to surmount if the president is willing to play 
constitutional hardball. The doctrine renders Congress virtually 
impotent to enforce information requests against the executive branch, 
despite the theoretical availability of mechanisms to force compliance.  
The executive branch doctrine uses an undifferentiated interest in 
confidentiality across the “components” of executive privilege to 
provide the executive branch the authority to delay responses and 
refuse requests for information without ever having to undertake what 
has historically been the core of the executive privilege inquiry: a 
determination of whether the disclosure of specific information would 
harm a specific public interest. Moreover, the executive branch has 
developed a number of “prophylactic” doctrines to protect the 
president’s asserted constitutional authority to control this 
information. Unlike an assertion of executive privilege itself, 
prophylactic doctrines are not qualified. No showing of need can 
overcome them. And any burden that Congress imposes on the 
president’s constitutional authority is per se unconstitutional under 
these prophylactic doctrines.  
The practical result is a new prophylactic executive privilege that 
provides the executive branch with the authority to ignore and 
countermand congressional subpoenas without the president ever 
asserting executive privilege and without any need to undertake the 
balancing inquiry at the heart of the privilege.  
A. The Ubiquity of Executive Privilege in Congressional Oversight 
Executive privilege is rarely mentioned in the course of 
congressional oversight. But the executive branch’s expansive doctrine 
of the privilege is the ultimate driver underlying almost every exchange 
between the two branches. Former executive branch and congressional 
lawyer Andrew McCanse Wright argues “that Congress and the 
Executive operate with fundamentally different views of the 
 
 111. 10 THE WORKS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 404 n.1 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1905). 
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Constitution when it comes to congressional oversight.”112 In his view, 
Congress relies on a litigation perspective, the hallmarks of which are 
a sense of hierarchy—with Congress above the executive branch—and 
entitlement.113 The executive branch, by contrast, relies on a 
transactional model, characterized by equality and accommodation.114 
He notes that Congress employs investigative and litigation terms such 
as “investigation,” “deposition,” “subpoena,” and “contempt,” and 
ultimately expects that “it is entitled to the same sort of interbranch 
submission” that the executive branch displays toward the judicial 
branch in the context of judicial proceedings.115 The executive branch, 
on the other hand, approaches oversight as a negotiation between 
coequal parties, undertaken without a neutral arbiter, and seeking to 
balance the interests of the two parties.116 At the core of the executive 
branch doctrine is the statement in United States v. AT&T117 that each 
branch has a “constitutional mandate” to accommodate the other 
branch’s interests.118 
Wright insightfully describes the two basic approaches to the 
oversight process. But there is an additional layer to the story that is 
not immediately apparent. These differing approaches originate in the 
differing constitutional doctrines of executive privilege. As Wright 
explains, when oversight disputes escalate—whether for political, 
institutional, or policy reasons—the language of constitutional conflict 
emerges and legal positions begin to solidify.119 But even before that, 
from the time an initial request arrives with a federal agency, the two 
 
 112. Constitutional Conflict, supra note 7, at 914. 
 113. Id. at 915–20. 
 114. Id. at 920–24. 
 115. Id. at 915, 918. 
 116. Id. at 921. 
 117. United States v. AT&T, 567 F.2d 121 (D.C. Cir. 1977).  
 118. Id. at 127. This quote from AT&T appears repeatedly in executive branch opinions and 
letters to Congress, including in almost every formal assertion of executive privilege. See, e.g., 
Attempted Exclusion of Agency Couns., supra note 3, at 7 (finding that applying Committee Rule 
15(e) to compel executive branch testimony would violate an “implicit constitutional mandate to 
seek optimal accommodation through a realistic evaluation of the needs of the conflicting 
branches” (quoting AT&T, 567 F.2d at 127)); Testimonial Immunity Before Cong. of the Former 
Couns. to the President, 43 Op. O.L.C., slip op. at 17 (May 20, 2019) [hereinafter McGahn 
Immunity Opinion] (concluding that applying a waiver of the former counsel’s immunity because 
of public statements “would severely hinder the ‘spirit of dynamic compromise’ and ‘implicit 
constitutional mandate to seek optimal accommodation’ that currently facilitates resolution of 
inter-branch disputes over information” (quoting AT&T, 567 F.2d at 127)). 
 119. Constitutional Conflict, supra note 7, at 929–30. 
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competing doctrines of executive privilege are, in reality, the primary 
impetus for the nature of the response and the differing approaches. 
To understand why, it is useful to separate requests sent to an 
agency or department—such as the Department of Justice or EPA—
from a request sent directly to the White House. Typically, a 
congressional request will seek a broad swath of information—
including internal emails, memoranda, and draft documents—about a 
particular subject. For example, subsequent to a letter seeking similar 
documents, the Republican chair of the House Committee on Science, 
Space and Technology sent a subpoena to the National Oceanic and 
Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) during the Obama 
administration demanding “[a]ll documents and communications 
between or among employees” of NOAA “referring or relating to” 
three different topics relevant to a recent climate change study.120 One 
of the initial letters to the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and 
Explosives (ATF) that represented the beginning of the investigation 
into Operation Fast & Furious and the death of a ATF border patrol 
agent121 sought a wide range of documents and information from 
ATF.122 The subsequent request and subpoena to Attorney General 
Eric Holder set out twenty-two categories of documents, many of 
which covered “[a]ll documents and communications” involving 
particular individuals or related to broad subject areas.123 The requests 
and subpoenas of the Democratic-controlled House to the Trump 
administration regarding the inclusion of the citizenship question on 
the census and the Mueller Report and underlying documents were 
similarly broad.124 
 
 120. Subpoena from Lamar Smith, Chairman, House Comm. on Sci., Space, & Tech., to 
Kathryn Sullivan, Adm’r, Nat’l Oceanic & Atmospheric Admin. 3 (Oct. 13, 2015), 
https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/2488946-10-13-15-subpoena-from-house-science-
committee.html [https://perma.cc/HQR2-LAE3]. 
 121. See Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform v. Holder, 979 F. Supp. 2d 1, 5–6 (D.D.C. 
2013) (providing background on Operation Fast & Furious and the congressional investigation). 
 122. See Letter from Darrell Issa, Chairman, House Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform, 
to Kenneth E. Melson, Acting Dir. of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, & Explosives 3 
(Mar. 16, 2011), https://republicans-oversight.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2012/08/March-16-
2011-Issa-to-Melson.pdf [https://perma.cc/5JZX-UBYN]. 
 123. See H.R. REP. NO. 112-546, at 15–21 (2012) (setting out the subpoena’s document 
requests). 
 124. See, e.g., Subpoena from Jerrold Nadler, Chairman, House Comm. on the Judiciary, to William 
P. Barr, Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Just., 3 (Apr. 18, 2019), https://int.nyt.com/data/documenthelper/776-
read-the-subpoena-mueller-report/8431536bd6552926c11e/optimized/full.pdf#page=1 [https://perma.cc/ 
SHAUB IN PRINTER FINAL_9.22.20 (DO NOT DELETE) 9/22/2020  2:41 PM 
2020] THE EXECUTIVE’S PRIVILEGE 31 
The agency oversight personnel, typically composed of members 
of the General Counsel’s Office and legislative affairs personnel, will 
review the request and determine what the scope of the request 
actually is in terms of real documents, emails, and information. If the 
congressional request potentially encompasses deliberative 
communication, which is almost always the case given the broad scope 
of the requests, or other confidential information, such as national 
security, law enforcement, or attorney-client information, the oversight 
personnel will often consult with OLC and the White House Counsel’s 
Office. They make them aware of the request and its potential to 
implicate information the executive branch considers to be protected 
by executive privilege, particularly when the subject area or the 
documents encompassed by the request are politically sensitive. 
The agency’s letter back to the committee or subcommittee will 
acknowledge the request, indicate a willingness to cooperate, and, if 
the request potentially touches on components of executive privilege, 
will state that the agency hopes to “accommodate” the oversight 
interests of the committee or subcommittee in a manner consistent 
with the executive branch’s “confidentiality interests” and the “implicit 
constitutional mandate” of AT&T to negotiate in good faith.125 Often, 
the precise language used in the letter has been reviewed or edited by 
OLC or the White House. 
The reason that the two models emerge at this stage is the direct 
result of the competing doctrines of executive privilege. The executive 
branch understands the executive to have the constitutional privilege 
to ultimately decline to produce those documents that implicate 
“confidentiality interests,” a euphemism for privilege—or, more 
accurately, the components it understands to comprise the doctrine of 
executive privilege. Thus, the executive branch begins the process by 
 
NB6D-EAVK] (seeking the complete unredacted Mueller Report, “[a]ll documents referenced in the 
Report,” and “[a]ll documents obtained and investigative materials created by the Special Counsel’s 
Office”); Letter from Elijah E. Cummings, Chairman, House Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform, 
to Wilbur L. Ross, Jr., Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Com. 2 (Jan. 8, 2019), 
https://oversight.house.gov/sites/democrats.oversight.house.gov/files/2019-01-08.EEC%20to%20Ross- 
DOC%20re%20Citizenship%20Question.pdf [https://perma.cc/LE67-W3JB] (requesting “[a]ll” 
documents and communications in six categories related to the inclusion of the citizenship question); 
see also Jonathan Shaub, What Is a ‘Protective’ Assertion of Executive Privilege?, LAWFARE (May 8, 
2019, 8:23 PM) [hereinafter ‘Protective’ Assertion], https://www.lawfareblog.com/what-protective-
assertion-executive-privilege [https://perma.cc/6LR3-6ZAQ] (describing the broad request for the 
Mueller Report documents). 
 125. United States v. AT&T, 567 F.2d 121, 127 (D.C. Cir. 1977). 
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noting the underlying existence of what it understands to be protected 
by executive privilege, but offers to accommodate Congress’s interests, 
recognizing, of course, that executive privilege is a last resort. This is 
the “accommodation” process,126 the “dance that takes place between 
legislative and executive interests over information access[.]”127 The 
“dance” begins with a congressional request that encompasses some 
information that would fall within the scope of the executive branch’s 
understanding of executive privilege. 
Congress, on the other hand, does not recognize any constitutional 
privilege to withhold that type of information, even if the president 
himself had already asserted such a privilege. Congress believes itself 
to be “entitled” to the information, in Wright’s words,128 not because 
of a model of oversight that places it in a superior constitutional status 
over the executive branch in information disputes but because of its 
constitutional doctrine of executive privilege. In its view, a 
congressional committee sending an oversight request—or demand—
is exercising a constitutional authority that takes precedence over 
common law privileges.129 And because all of the components of 
executive privilege—aside from the presidential communications 
privilege—are ultimately grounded in historical practice or common 
law, Congress’s oversight request takes precedence over those 
components.130 The hierarchical view that Professor Wright ascribes to 
Congress is ultimately not about Congress and the executive branch as 
a whole, but about the distinction between constitutional authority and 
common law privileges.  
That the competing notions of executive privilege ultimately drive 
the entire oversight process is confirmed by the way in which Congress 
approaches oversight of the president and the White House. After 
Nixon, Congress recognized that presidential communications enjoy 
presumptive protection and does not demand them as a right. For 
 
 126. See Barr Memorandum, supra note 27, at 157–61; Reagan Memorandum, supra note 27, 
at 1. 
 127. Devins, supra note 9, at 137. 
 128. Constitutional Conflict, supra note 7, at 916. 
 129. See ALISSA M. DOLAN, ELAINE L. HALCHIN, TODD GARVEY, WALTER J. OLESZEK & 
WENDY R. GINSBERG, CONG. RSCH. SERV., RL30240, CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT MANUAL 
45–49 (2014) (discussing the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform’s 
argument during the Fast and Furious investigation that “common law privilege cannot shield the 
disclosure of documents that are subject to a constitutionally-rooted subpoena”).  
 130. See id. at 45 (“Congress is generally not required to recognize common law privileges.”). 
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example, Trey Gowdy, chairman of the Benghazi Select Committee, 
not known for its favor toward the Obama administration, noted in an 
information request that he “was familiar with and would respect the 
Executive Privilege attached to certain communications with the 
President.”131 And the requests to Trump administration officials about 
presidential communications were similarly respectful of that privilege, 
even from members of the opposing party.132 The letters either 
expressly or implicitly acknowledged that Congress is not 
automatically “entitled” to presidential communications and must at 
least provide the executive branch an opportunity to assert executive 
privilege. 
Congress thus adopts the litigation model described by Wright 
only when it believes executive privilege is not potentially applicable. 
The executive branch similarly adopts its transactional approach only 
when it believes that executive privilege could potentially be 
applicable. But because of the broad scope of the various components, 
the executive branch understands executive privilege to be potentially 
applicable to almost every request. Accordingly, it almost exclusively 
employs the transactional model of negotiation. Conversely, because 
Congress understands executive privilege to apply only to a narrow set 
of presidential communications and not to other internal executive 
branch communications,133 it adopts the hierarchical model in all such 
interactions. The models are driven by the difference in constitutional 
doctrine about the scope of executive privilege, not the respective 
authorities of the two branches over information. 
Of course, a committee or subcommittee that makes it a priority 
to get specific information and responds quickly to letters may 
 
 131. Letter from Trey Gowdy, Chairman, House Select Comm. on Benghazi, to W. Neil 
Eggleston, White House Couns. 1 (June 7, 2016), https://archives-benghazi-republicans-
oversight.house.gov/sites/republicans.benghazi.house.gov/files/documents/App%20C%20Questi
ons%20to%20POTUS.pdf [https://perma.cc/X43K-LZQE]. 
 132. For example, the newly installed Democratic House Judiciary Chairman wrote to the 
acting attorney general on January 22, 2019, to advise him that the committee would be 
questioning him about presidential communications in an upcoming hearing and to request that 
he notify the committee in advance if the president planned to assert executive privilege. See 
Nadler Letter, supra note 100, at 1. The letter acknowledges that some of the “questions may 
conceivably implicate executive privilege.” Id. 
 133. See PRESIDENTIAL CLAIMS OF EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE, supra note 39, at 21–23; see also 
Fast & Furious Assertion, supra note 28, at 3–4, 8. 
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accelerate this process.134 But that requires knowledge of what 
documents or information exist as well as the use of political capital 
and the committee’s time. In current practice, the initial stages in all 
but the most routine oversight ultimately lead to frustration at the 
delay—particularly in divided government, when a lack of trust makes 
good-faith negotiations more difficult. Accordingly, Congress has 
turned to hardball, asserting its legal right to materials. In the current 
state of affairs, however, it lacks any authority to enforce those 
demands as both a legal and a practical matter. 
B. Congressional Impotence 
In the context of congressional requests for information from the 
executive branch, subpoenas and lawsuits were rare—almost 
nonexistent. In his 1996 work on congressional–executive information 
disputes, for example, Professor Neal Devins recognized the 
“‘burgeoning of congressional staff and oversight’” but noted that 
“[d]espite th[e] changing culture, however, Congress rarely makes use 
of its subpoena power.”135 Today, that is no longer true. Subpoenas are 
commonplace and, when issued to the executive branch, largely 
meaningless as a practical matter aside from the rhetorical force of the 
word “subpoena.”136 The same could be said of staff depositions, 
oversight of response to oversight, and civil litigation to enforce 
oversight requests. All of them were either rare or previously 
unknown. But each has developed as a mechanism by which Congress 
attempts to counteract the executive branch’s expanding doctrine of 
executive privilege. Ultimately, however, Congress lacks any real 
 
 134. See ‘Protective’ Assertion, supra note 124 (arguing that the House Judiciary Committee 
had erred in issuing a subpoena for a broad swath of documents that included law enforcement 
and classified information and then attempting to force rapid compliance). Congressional 
committees typically issue extremely broad document requests, however, which leads the 
executive branch to first provide the “low-hanging” fruit—public documents that are responsive 
to the subpoena. See H.R. REP. NO. 114-887, at 80 (2016) (noting that the Department of Health 
& Human Services turned over “several hundred pages of publicly available documents” in 
response to a subpoena); H.R. REP. NO. 112-546, at 4, 12, 30–31(2012) (criticizing the Department 
of Justice for turning over publicly available documents, some of which had already been provided 
to the committee). 
 135. Devins, supra note 9, at 114 (quoting Shane, supra note 9, at 463–64).  
 136. See Declaration of Paul P. Colborn, Special Counsel, Office of Legal Counsel, United 
States Department of Justice at 3–4, Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform v. Holder, 979 F. Supp. 
2d 1 (D.D.C. 2013) (No. 1:12-cv-1332) [hereinafter Colborn Declaration] (explaining that the 
executive branch does not adhere to subpoena return dates but simply continues to negotiate 
about the information request). 
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mechanism for enforcing its constitutional oversight authority over the 
executive branch. 
The development of these oversight tools—and accompanying 
constitutional doctrines about the authority of each branch—have 
resulted from an increasingly aggressive game of constitutional 
hardball. Congress, stymied by the executive branch’s doctrine of 
executive privilege, creates or repurposes new tools of enforcement. 
The executive branch, in turn, develops new constitutional doctrines to 
counter those tools. As a result, in current practice, the executive 
branch has essentially unchecked authority to withhold any piece or 
category of information it chooses from Congress.  
1. Congress’s Tools of Inquiry.  Whether through subpoenas or 
other actions, each house of Congress has long asserted the authority 
to request or compel the production of documents or testimony 
necessary to its function. In a series of cases, the Supreme Court has 
affirmed this implicit authority to demand information as “an 
indispensable ingredient” of Congress’s legislative powers.137 In 
McGrain v. Daugherty,138 the Court recognized Congress’s authority to 
conduct oversight and issue subpoenas, so it could efficiently . . . 
exercise a legislative function belonging to it under the 
Constitution.”139 And, in Barenblatt v. United States,140 the Court 
characterized the authority to compel a response to a congressional 
information request “as penetrating and far-reaching as the potential 
power to enact and appropriate under the Constitution.”141 Most 
recently, in Trump v. Mazars USA, LLP,142 the Supreme Court noted 
that the “congressional power to obtain information is ‘broad’ and 
‘indispensable.’”143 
 
 137. Eastland v. U.S. Servicemen’s Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 505 (1975). 
 138. McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135 (1927).  
 139. Id. at 160. 
 140. Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959).  
 141. Id. at 111. Similarly, the Court in Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178 (1957) stated:  
The power of the Congress to conduct investigations is inherent in the legislative 
process. That power is broad. It encompasses inquiries concerning the administration 
of existing laws as well as proposed or possibly needed statutes. It includes surveys of 
defects in our social, economic or political system for the purpose of enabling the 
Congress to remedy them. It comprehends probes into departments of the Federal 
Government to expose corruption, inefficiency or waste. 
Id. at 187. 
 142. Trump v. Mazars USA, LLP, 140 S. Ct. 2019 (2020). 
 143. Id. at 2031 (quoting Watkins, 354 U.S. at 187). 
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Initially, each house typically exercised this authority either by 
appointing an investigative committee and expressly authorizing it to 
summon the necessary persons, papers, and records144 or by passing a 
resolution—called a resolution of inquiry in the House145—that 
requested information from the president or directed agency heads to 
provide information.146 The first House rule that dealt expressly with 
requesting information from the executive branch was adopted in 1820 
and distinguished between information requests to the president and 
to agency heads.147 Passed in response to concerns that the House was 
not giving sufficient consideration to such requests before sending 
them,148 it required a one-day delay for any “proposition, requesting 
information from the President of the United States, or directing it to 
be furnished by the Secretary of either of the Executive Departments, 
or the Postmaster General.”149 Resolutions of inquiry receive 
privileged attention in the House and, for that reason, are still used 
today, typically by members of the minority party.150 The Senate passed 
a resolution establishing its first legislative inquiry in 1859, creating the 
Select Committee to Inquire into the Facts of the Recent Invasion and 
Seizure of the United States Armory at Harper’s Ferry and giving it 
the authority “to send for persons and papers.”151 
The early practice was for the body as a whole—either the House 
or Senate—to call for information directly or to create a temporary 
 
 144. See 3 ANNALS OF CONG. 493 (1792) (approving a resolution that established a committee 
to “inquire into the causes of the failure of the late expedition under Major General St. Clair” 
and empowered it “to call for such persons, papers, and records, as may be necessary to assist 
their inquiries”). 
 145. See CHRISTOPHER M. DAVIS, CONG. RSCH. SERV., RL31909, HOUSE RESOLUTIONS OF 
INQUIRY 1–4 (2009) [hereinafter HOUSE RESOLUTIONS OF INQUIRY] (discussing the history of 
resolutions of inquiry).  
 146. See 23 ANNALS OF CONG. 370 (1811) (proposing a resolution that requested the 
President “to cause to be laid before this House, as far as practicable, a list of the whole number 
of persons impressed, seized, and otherwise unlawfully taken from on board vessels sailing under 
the United States’ flag on the high seas or rivers”).  
 147. 37 ANNALS OF CONG. 607–08 (1820).  
 148. HOUSE RESOLUTIONS OF INQUIRY, supra note 145, at 2.  
 149. 37 ANNALS OF CONG. 607–08 (1820).  
 150. See, e.g., H.R. Res. 446, 115th Cong. (2017) (proposing a resolution of inquiry introduced 
by members of the minority party “requesting the President and directing the Attorney General 
to transmit, respectively, certain documents to the House of Representatives relating to the 
removal of former Federal Bureau of Investigation Director James Comey”). 
 151. CONG. GLOBE, 36th Cong., 1st Sess. 141 (1859); A History of Notable Senate 
Investigations, U.S. SENATE, https://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/briefing/
Investigations.htm [https://perma.cc/D9Z7-6WDC]. 
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committee to pursue a specific investigation and give that committee 
the authority to compel production of information. As the New Deal 
and World War II reshaped the United States and, more pertinently, 
empowered the executive branch, the dysfunction and relative 
weakness of Congress became apparent.152 The American Political 
Science Association established a Committee on Congress to study the 
legislative branch and propose reforms. The committee concluded that 
the decline of Congress was the result of “the technical nature of 
modern public problems” and identified, among Congress’s handicaps, 
the lack of ability to conduct oversight of executive administrative 
action.153 In 1942, Representative Everett Dirksen asserted in a speech 
entitled “What is Wrong with Congress?” that the legislative branch’s 
problem was that it had “failed to” equip itself to cope with “the 
growing power of the Executive and the growing power of the 
governmental bureaus.”154 Dirksen proposed that Congress “provide 
legislative tools to get the facts, the data, the information, and then 
control, supervise, and survey the operations of the Government.”155 
Numerous reform proposals emerged, most of which, in some manner, 
proposed increased legislative oversight of executive branch action.156 
The result of these reform efforts was the Legislative 
Reorganization Act of 1946, which, among other things, reduced the 
number of congressional committees—eliminating jurisdictional 
overlap and confusion—and also gave each standing Senate committee 
the authority to issue subpoenas.157 At that time, only two House 
committees had such authority—the Government Operations 
Committee and the Appropriations Committee. Over time, that 
subpoena authority has been distributed even further, not only to each 
 
 152. See 1 ROBERT C. BYRD, THE SENATE 1789–1989: ADDRESSES ON THE HISTORY OF THE 
UNITED STATES SENATE 537–40 (1988). 
 153. George B. Galloway, On Reforming Congress, in SPECIAL JOINT COMM. ON THE ORG. 
OF CONG., 79TH CONG., THE ORGANIZATION OF CONGRESS: SYMPOSIUM BY MEMBERS OF 
CONGRESS AND OTHERS 58–59 (Joint Comm. Print 1945). 
 154. 88 CONG. REC. 7696, 7697–7700 (1942) (statement of Rep. Everett Dirksen). 
 155. Id. at 7700. 
 156. BYRD, supra note 152, at 541.  
 157. Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-601, §§ 102, 121, 134(a), 60 Stat. 
812, 814–20, 822–23, 831 (1946); see also The Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, HIST., ART 
& ARCHIVES U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, https://history.house.gov/Historical-
Highlights/1901-1950/The-Legislative-Reorganization-Act-of-1946 [https://perma.cc/F46X-
USMT] (noting that when the legislation went into effect, “the reforms reduced the number of 
House committees from 48 to 19 and the number of Senate committees from 33 to 15”). 
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individual congressional committee but ultimately to the chairperson 
of the committee alone. The Rules of the House of Representatives 
presently give committees and subcommittees the authority to issue a 
subpoena for documents or testimony.158 Although the rules, by 
default, require the subpoena to be authorized by a majority of the 
committee or subcommittee, they also allow the delegation of that 
authority to the chairman.159 Previously, such delegation to issue a 
subpoena unilaterally was uncommon and, even where available, not 
used.160 But over the past decade, nearly every committee amended its 
rules to allow a chairperson to issue a subpoena unilaterally, some 
without requiring notice to the ranking member or minority.161 Those 
changes have allowed a chairperson’s staff, armed with an autopen of 
the chairperson’s signature, to issue a subpoena for broad swaths of 
information and documents to any executive branch official.  
The authority to issue a subpoena for a staff deposition follows a 
similar course. Historically, standing committees of the Senate and 
House have not been thought to have authority to compel someone to 
sit for a staff deposition,162 distinguished from an interview most 
prominently by the fact that it would be compelled, under oath, 
conducted by an attorney or staff member, and recorded as an official 
 
 158. RULES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 116th Cong., Rule XI, cl. 2 (m)(1)(B) 
(2019), https://rules.house.gov/sites/democrats.rules.house.gov/files/documents/116-House-
Rules-Clerk.pdf [https://perma.cc/YQU2-PJAN]. 
 159. Id. at XI, cl. 2 (m)(3)(A)(i). 
 160. See Henry A. Waxman, Opinion, Congressional Chairmen Shouldn’t Be Given Free Rein 
Over Subpoenas, WASH. POST (Feb. 5, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/a-
congressional-subpoena-is-too-powerful-to-be-issued-unilaterally/2015/02/05/a9d75160-
aca8-11e4-9c91-e9d2f9fde644_story.html [https://perma.cc/2F42-R9J2] (“In the past 60 years, 
only three chairmen have embraced issuing subpoenas without obtaining bipartisan or committee 
support: Sen. Joe McCarthy (R-Wis.), Rep. Dan Burton (R-Ind.) and Rep. Darrell Issa (R-
Calif.”). 
 161. See Andy Wright, New House Rules Promote Aggressive Congressional Oversight, JUST 
SEC. (Jan. 17, 2019), https://www.justsecurity.org/62269/house-rules-promote-aggressive-
congressional-oversight [https://perma.cc/HZ5H-GXD5] (noting that “successive new rules 
packages have continued to expand the number of committee chairs” who can issue subpoenas 
unilaterally and that the “trend toward unilateral, partisan subpoena power in the hands of 
committee chairs has continued its march, mirroring the increasingly polarized political 
environment”). 
 162. See JAY R. SHAMPANSKY, CONG. RSCH. SERV., 95-949 A, STAFF DEPOSITIONS IN 
CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATIONS 4–9 (1999) [hereinafter STAFF DEPOSITIONS IN 
CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATIONS] (noting that in 1999, “the Senate and the House . . . [were] 
of the view that standing committees lack specific authority under the rules of each chamber to 
compel attendance at staff depositions” (footnotes omitted)).  
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transcript.163 Instead, both houses of Congress had authorized various 
committees to compel staff depositions only in particular situations.164 
In 2007, however, after the Democrats regained control of the House 
during the Bush administration, they amended its rules to grant what 
is now the House Oversight and Government Reform Committee 
standing authority to compel an individual to sit for a deposition “by a 
member or counsel of the committee.”165 In 2010, after Republicans 
regained control of the House during the Obama administration, they 
temporarily expanded the staff-deposition authority to four additional 
committees, and then extended that authority to allow those 
committees to continue their investigations of the Obama 
administration.166 The House rules, in 2017, authorized the chair of 
every standing committee, other than the Administration and Rules 
committees, to order the taking of depositions even with no member 
present, if it occurred during a recess and was authorized by the 
committee.167 And when Democrats took control of the House in 2019, 
they continued to allow all committee chairs to issue subpoenas for 
staff depositions and entirely dispensed with the need to have a 
member present.168 
 
 163. CHRISTOPHER M. DAVIS, WALTER J. OLESZEK, BEN WILHELM, CLINTON T. BRASS, 
IDA A. BRUDNICK, MAEVE P. CAREY, SARAH J. ECKMAN, WILLIAM T. EGAR, KATHRYN A. 
FRANCIS, MARK J. OLESZEK, R. ERIC PETERSEN, JACOB R. STRAUS & MEGHAN M. STUESSY, 
CONG. RSCH. SERV., RL30240, CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT MANUAL 28 (2020); STAFF 
DEPOSITIONS IN CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATIONS, supra note 162, at 4–6 & nn.16–17. 
 164. STAFF DEPOSITIONS IN CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATIONS, supra note 162, at 8–10; see, 
e.g., Inquiry into the Matter of Billy Carter and Libya: Hearings Before the Subcomm. To 
Investigate the Activities of Individuals Representing the Ints. of Foreign Gov’ts of the S. Comm. 
on the Judiciary, Volume III, 96th Cong. 1708–10, 1718–27, 1741–43 (1980) (discussing issues 
related to Senate resolution authorizing depositions by staff members). After the 2008 election, 
the House authorized the House Committee on the Judiciary to issue subpoenas for staff 
depositions to investigate the firing of the U.S. Attorneys. See H.R. Res. 5, 111th Cong. 
§ 4(f)(2)(A) (2009). Those subpoenas had been the subject of President Bush’s claim of executive 
privilege and Harriet Miers’s claim of absolute immunity. Comm. on the Judiciary v. Miers, 558 
F. Supp. 2d 53, 56 (D.D.C. 2008).  
 165. H.R. Res. 6, 110th Cong. § 502 (2007). 
 166. H.R. Res. 5, 114th Cong. § 3(b) (2015) (granting staff deposition authority to the House 
Committees on (1) Energy & Commerce, (2) Financial Services, (3) Science, Space, & 
Technology, and (4) Ways & Means during the “first session” of the 114th Congress).  
 167. H.R. Res. 5, 115th Cong. § 3(b) (2017). 
 168. See H.R. Res. 6, 116th Cong. § 103(a)(1) (2019); see also JANE A. HUDIBURG, CONG. 
RSCH. SERV., R45731, HOUSE RULES CHANGES AFFECTING COMMITTEE PROCEDURE IN THE 
116TH CONGRESS (2019–2020), at 5 (2019) (“These provisions are identical to those of a separate 
order adopted in the 115th Congress, except the 116th Congress version does not include the 
requirement that ‘at least one member of the committee shall be present at each deposition’ 
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It is clear that there are relatively few limits—either external or 
internal—on the authority of congressional committees to compel 
individuals to provide information or testimony. So long as the 
committee’s request relates to an area in which Congress could 
potentially legislate, is not undertaken purely for harassment, and does 
not infringe on any constitutional rights, almost all agree that the 
committee’s authority is, under current doctrine, otherwise 
unrestricted.169 But when the executive branch believes a particular 
exercise of that authority interferes with its constitutional authorities, 
oversight disputes arise. At that point, the branches need some rule or 
procedure by which to resolve the dispute. Since there is no “law” to 
which to turn—meaning no precedential judicial decisions to which the 
branches must adhere—the “resolution” of the dispute turns on which 
branch has authority to enforce its constitutional doctrine.  
 
unless the witness or the committee waived the requirement.” (quoting H.R. Res. 5, 115th Cong. 
§ 3(b)(3) (2017))). 
 169. The scope of Congress’s oversight authority is also contested by the branches. The 
executive branch has on a number of occasions refused to comply with congressional subpoenas 
for information on the grounds that the information requests exceed Congress’s oversight 
authority because they are not in furtherance of any potential legislative function and concern 
exclusive presidential authorities. See, e.g., Assertion of Exec. Privilege with Respect to Clemency 
Decision, 23 Op. O.L.C. 1, 2 (1999) [hereinafter Clemency Assertion] (concluding that Congress 
lacked authority to conduct oversight of President’s Clinton’s pardons because Congress “may 
only investigate into those areas in which it may potentially legislate or appropriate [and] cannot 
inquire into matters which are within the exclusive province of one of the other branches of the 
Government” (quoting Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 111–12 (1959))); see also 
Assertion of Exec. Privilege Concerning the Dismissal & Replacement of U.S. Att’ys, 31 Op. 
O.L.C. 1, 3 (2007) (explaining that Congress had no legitimate oversight interest over the removal 
of U.S. Attorneys because the president had the exclusive constitutional authority to remove 
officers). The executive branch has also refused to comply with subpoenas on the grounds that 
the oversight was not “legitimate” either because it believed the legislative justification was a 
pretext for a political endeavor or because the request would infringe on the separation of powers. 
See Cong. Comm.’s Request for the President’s Tax Returns Under 26 U.S.C. § 6103(f), 43 Op. 
O.L.C. 1, 1–3 (2019) [hereinafter Request for Tax Returns] (concluding that the request for 
President Trump’s tax returns was pretextual and not in furtherance of a valid legislative 
purpose); Fast & Furious Assertion, supra note 28, at 3–4 (concluding that the Department of 
Justice could withhold even documents not covered by the deliberative process component of 
privilege because congressional oversight into the executive branch’s response to oversight itself 
was not legitimate); MAJORITY STAFF OF THE H. COMM. ON ENERGY & COMMERCE & 
MAJORITY STAFF OF THE H. COMM. ON WAYS & MEANS, 114TH CONG., JOINT CONGRESSIONAL 
INVESTIGATIVE REPORT INTO THE SOURCE OF FUNDING FOR THE ACA’S COST SHARING 
REDUCTION PROGRAM 94 (Joint Comm. Print 2016) (noting that the executive branch had 
objected to congressional oversight about the Affordable Care Act’s cost-sharing reduction 
payments because the House of Representatives had filed suit contesting the legality of those 
payments and “requesting interviews about agency action” then “raise[d] the appearance of 
utilizing oversight to accomplish inappropriate litigation objectives”).  
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2. Congress’s Lack of Enforcement Authority.  Congress’s ability 
to enforce its recognized authority to issue compulsory process relies 
almost wholly on the executive branch in modern practice. Where 
private individuals are concerned, that typically presents little obstacle. 
But where the executive branch is the noncompliant subject of 
Congress’s demands, that reliance becomes paramount. And the 
limitations of Congress’s enforcement powers become obvious.  
a. Subpoena Return Dates.  Initially, information disputes between 
Congress and the executive branch followed a pattern in which the 
subpoena was the final straw, and, if the executive branch determined 
it needed to assert executive privilege, it did so before the return date 
of the subpoena. President Reagan’s memorandum on executive 
privilege, for example, instructed department heads to ask the 
congressional committee to hold a subpoena in abeyance if it raised a 
substantial claim of executive privilege so that the president would 
have time to consider it.170 When Congress demanded information 
through compulsory process with a fixed date for compliance, the 
executive branch either complied, reached some agreement with the 
committee or subcommittee, or asserted its constitutional privilege by 
that date. In 1989, Assistant Attorney General William Barr stated that 
a subpoena would issue only when the accommodation “process breaks 
down,” and “it is necessary to consider asking the President to assert 
executive privilege” if further negotiation is not productive.171 
As subpoenas have become commonplace, however, the executive 
branch has given them less weight. The way the executive branch 
approaches the process is laid out in declarations filed by career DOJ 
officials in the Fast & Furious litigation,172 in particular, the declaration 
of Paul Colborn, who had served for twenty-seven years as the primary 
attorney at OLC in charge of giving the president and executive branch 
agencies advice about executive privilege and congressional 
oversight.173 As Colborn explained, officials who participate in the 
accommodation process negotiate with congressional staff “in an 
attempt to accommodate the proffered legislative interest as fully as 
possible, consistent with the institutional interests of the Executive, 
 
 170. Reagan Memorandum, supra note 27, at 2. 
 171. Barr Memorandum, supra note 27, at 162. 
 172. See, e.g., Colborn Declaration, supra note 136, at 2–4. 
 173. Id. at 1–2.  
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despite the often adversarial nature of congressional demands for 
information in the oversight context.”174 Each branch “leverage[s] its 
constitutional powers in negotiating with and working to accommodate 
the other Branch,” and the issuance of the subpoena, in his description, 
does not really alter that framework.175 Because subpoenas “are often 
quite broad and burdensome,” the executive branch is not able to reach 
a resolution of its potential privilege claims before the return date, nor 
does it need to assert privilege because the accommodation process 
continues beyond that date.176 
In other words, when an agency receives a subpoena with a return 
date, it continues to engage in the accommodation process in the same 
way it does when it receives a congressional oversight request. The 
agency provides some information, but withholds information that is 
potentially protected by executive privilege—for example, information 
that might fit within any of the components of privilege. The agency 
can then wait until the committee forces the issue and schedules a 
contempt vote. Only at this point does the executive branch decide 
whether to assert executive privilege. 
Subpoenas have thus become just another part of the political 
theater that is the oversight process—performance rhetoric that does 
not have any legal effect in practice. When the executive branch claims 
its confidentiality interests and refuses to comply with an information 
request, the committee issues a subpoena, accompanied by 
exhortations about its constitutional authority and the legal 
requirement that it is imposing on the executive branch. But the 
 
 174. Id. at 3.  
 175. Id. at 3–4. 
 176. Id. In full, Colborn’s statement illustrates the executive branch’s view that a 
congressional subpoena and its return date is largely meaningless. The executive branch simply 
continues to withhold the information it believes may be privileged and to negotiate with the 
committee:  
Congressional subpoenas typically include a “return date” by which the recipient is 
instructed to comply with the subpoena. When subpoenas are issued to the Executive 
Branch, however, the resulting process of negotiation and accommodation described 
above often continues beyond the subpoena’s return date. Indeed, the constitutionally 
mandated need to work through the accommodation process with congressional 
committees, combined with the fact that committee subpoenas . . . are often quite 
broad and burdensome, generally means that it is not possible for the Branches to reach 
a resolution by the subpoena’s return date. Because the Executive Branch treats 
assertions of Executive Privilege as a last resort, to be used only when other options 
have been exhausted, it will generally not be asserted by the return date but rather after 
a committee seeks to hold the subpoena recipient in contempt—an indication that 
Congress believes that the accommodation process has reached an impasse.  
Id.  
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executive branch continues on as if nothing has changed. Its 
“confidentiality interests” remain, undergirded by the possibility of an 
assertion of privilege, even if remote, and it continues to rely on them 
to refuse compliance with the subpoena. 
b. Contempt.  Congress attempts to enforce its subpoenas through 
contempt. The Supreme Court has long held that Congress has implicit 
constitutional authority to punish nonmembers by contempt.177 Joseph 
Story found it “obvious” that “unless such a power, to some extent, 
exists by implication, it is utterly impossible for either house to perform 
its constitutional functions.”178 But the scope of Congress’s authority to 
act as prosecutor and judge of contempt against it has never been 
definitively resolved, particularly in the modern era when individual 
rights have become more prominent.179 The English precedents 
support an almost unchecked legislative authority to try individuals for 
contempt.180 But it is not clear how much of that English practice is 
implicit in the Constitution and its specific grants of legislative 
authority to Congress.181  
Moreover, the scope of Congress’s inherent contempt authority 
against the executive branch is far from clear.182 Professor Josh Chafetz 
highlights three historical examples when the houses of Congress 
 
 177. See McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 175 (1927) (“Experience has taught that mere 
requests for such information often are unavailing, and also that information which is volunteered 
is not always accurate or complete; so some means of compulsion are essential to obtain what is 
needed.”); In re Chapman, 166 U.S. 661, 671–72 (1897) (“We grant that Congress could not divest 
itself, or either of its Houses, of the essential and inherent power to punish for contempt, in cases 
to which the power of either House properly extended . . . .”); Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. (6 
Wheat.) 204, 225–35 (1821). But see Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 196–98 (1881) (“But we 
do not concede that the Houses of Congress possess this general power of punishing for contempt. 
The cases in which they can do this are very limited.”).  
 178. 2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 
§ 842, at 305 (Bos., Hillard, Gray, & Co., Cambridge, Brown, Shattuck, & Co. 1833). 
 179. See Wright, supra note 4, at 449–51, 466–67. 
 180. See JOSH CHAFETZ, CONGRESS’S CONSTITUTION: LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY AND THE 
SEPARATION OF POWERS 153–69 (2017) [hereinafter CONGRESS’S CONSTITUTION] (cataloging 
the English precedents, which included the authority to hold even the monarch in contempt, and 
the early colonial legislatures’ continuation of that practice). 
 181. See id. at 171 (noting the lack of debate about the congressional house’s power to punish 
nonmembers at the Constitutional Convention); id. at 172 (recognizing that Thomas Jefferson 
noted constitutional arguments both for and against the power of contempt).  
 182. See id. at 181 (discussing Congress’s contempt authority over executive branch officials 
and arguing that there is no reason to think that authority is different from Congress’s authority 
over private nonmembers generally). 
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threatened or used their inherent contempt authority against executive 
branch officials.183 On the basis of English practice, those three 
examples, and the instances when a house of Congress found the 
president in breach of privilege for commenting negatively on 
congressional action, Chafetz concludes that there is no “reason to 
think that the houses’ general contempt power over outsiders must 
operate differently when the outsider in question happens to be a 
member of the executive branch” or “when the defense to the 
contempt charge is executive privilege, as opposed to something 
else.”184 But none of the three examples on which Chafetz relies 
involves a claim of privilege by the president, a direction to a lower 
executive branch official not to comply with a congressional 
information demand, or even acts taken by an executive branch official 
in his official capacity.185 Accordingly, the relevance and applicability 
of these historical examples to claims of executive privilege are far 
from clear.186 Therefore, even though the historical English practice 
 
 183. See id. at 176–79, 181–94. 
 184. Id. at 181. 
 185. Chafetz’s first example involves a letter written by an executive branch official alleging 
that a member of Congress was corrupt, and, in response, the House passing a resolution finding 
the official guilty of a gross violation of the privilege of the member. Id. at 175–76. Congress 
abolished the office held by that official shortly thereafter. Id. at 176. The second example did 
involve an arrest of an executive branch official, the Minister to China, for contempt. Id. at 176–
77. However, the official was accused of misappropriating large sums of money and refused to 
testify or provide documents based on his personal privilege against self-incrimination under the 
Fifth Amendment. Id. The House refused to recognize that privilege. Id. But the Supreme Court 
subsequently made clear that witnesses in congressional proceedings are entitled to invoke their 
Fifth Amendment rights. See Quinn v. United States, 115 U.S. 155, 161 (1955). The third example, 
which culminated in the Supreme Court’s decision in Marshall v. Gordon, 243 U.S. 521 (1917), 
again involved an executive branch official writing a defamatory letter about a member of 
Congress. CONGRESS’S CONSTITUTION, supra note 180, at 177–78. The executive branch official, 
a U.S. District Attorney, wrote and published a letter disparaging to members of House and the 
House as a whole, and the House sent the sergeant-at-arms to take him into custody because the 
letter violated its privileges, dignity, and honor of the House of Representatives. Id. at 178. The 
Supreme Court ultimately concluded that the House lacked power to arrest individuals for 
contempt based on “irritating and ill-tempered statements made in [a] letter.” Id. at 178–79 
(quoting Gordon, 243 U.S. at 546). The Court did not address the question of Congress’s authority 
to exercise inherent contempt against an executive branch official acting pursuant to his official 
duties. Id. The executive branch officials in these examples were not held in contempt for 
performing their official duties under the direction of the president or superior executive branch 
officer but in their personal interests. 
 186. As Professor Todd David Peterson argues, Chafetz’s “contention that there are historical 
precedents for the use of Congress’s inherent contempt power against officials who assert the 
President’s claim of executive privilege is incorrect.” Peterson, supra note 7, at 80. 
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allowed parliament to hold monarchs in contempt,187 the authority of 
Congress under the U.S. Constitution to punish executive branch 
officials for withholding executive branch information—particularly 
officials acting pursuant to directives from the president—has not been 
addressed by the courts or historical practice.188  
In practice, however, the question of Congress’s inherent 
contempt authority has been moot. Congress has not used its inherent 
contempt authority in almost a hundred years.189 Instead, when faced 
with recalcitrance, Congress has employed its authority under 
2 U.S.C. §§ 192 and 194 to refer individuals for criminal contempt of 
Congress. Congress enacted these criminal contempt provisions in 
1857 to solve the problem of an individual who refused to comply with 
a demand for information near the end of a congressional session.190 
The prevailing view, largely based on language from Anderson v. 
Dunn,191 was that a recalcitrant witness could be imprisoned by the 
House only until the end of the session.192  
 
 187. See CONGRESS’S CONSTITUTION, supra note 180, at 155, 168–69, 178–79.  
 188. In U.S. ex rel. Touhy v. Ragen, 340 U.S. 462 (1951), the Supreme Court held that a 
Department of Justice official following an order from the attorney aeneral not to disclose 
information in response to a judicial subpoena could not be found guilty of contempt because he 
was, as an inferior official, bound by the attorney general’s order and a statute gave the attorney 
general authority to issue such an order. Id. at 468–70. But the Touhy case expressly declined to 
decide whether the attorney general’s order itself was valid and declined to address any 
constitutional issue. Id. at 467, 469. And Congress amended the statute at issue in Touhy, the 
Housekeeping Act, as a result of the ruling in Touhy to provide that the “section does not 
authorize withholding information from the public or limiting the availability of records to the 
public.” See 5 U.S.C. § 301 (2018); Note, Discovery from the United States in Suits Between Private 
Litigants—The 1958 Amendment of the Federal Housekeeping Statute, 69 YALE L.J. 452, 454–56 
(1960). Accordingly, Touhy could provide a defense to any executive branch official charged with 
criminal contempt if, in withholding information, the person was following a presidential order. 
But it does not establish whether the president has authority to issue such an order or whether 
Congress may use inherent contempt to force executive branch compliance. See id. at 454–55 & 
n.21. 
 189. See TODD GARVEY, CONG. RSCH. SERV., RL34097, CONGRESS’S CONTEMPT POWER 
AND THE ENFORCEMENT OF CONGRESSIONAL SUBPOENAS: LAW, HISTORY, PRACTICE, AND 
PROCEDURE 12 (2017) [hereinafter CONGRESS’S CONTEMPT POWER]. 
 190. Id. at 19; see also CONG. GLOBE, 34th Cong., 3d Sess. 432 (1857) (statement of Rep. 
James Lawrence Orr) (noting the limited time remaining in the session and that the proposed 
legislation would force “recusant witnesses” to “suffer more than mere imprisonment from now 
to the end of the session”).  
 191. Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204 (1821).  
 192. CONGRESS’S CONTEMPT POWER, supra note 189, at 8, 19.  
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Chafetz and others discuss inherent contempt and criminal 
contempt under a single general heading of “contempt.”193 Both the 
inherent authority to hold an individual in contempt and the authority 
to pass a criminal law punishing individuals for noncompliance arise 
out of the same legislative authority—Congress’s power to require the 
production of information.194 The legislative history of the criminal 
contempt statute also demonstrates Congress’s desire to give itself 
“additional authority, and to impose additional penalties” on witnesses 
who refused to appear or answer questions.195 The two types of 
contempt are not the same, however.196 Inherent contempt is primarily 
coercive and can be remedied at any time by compliance, while 
criminal contempt is punitive and cannot be remedied.197  
The most important distinction between the two, for purposes of 
executive privilege, is their enforcement mechanisms. Because 
criminal contempt requires prosecution, its enforcement requires the 
participation of an executive branch official. And the executive branch 
has interpreted the seemingly mandatory “shall” in the criminal 
contempt statute—as both a matter of statutory construction and 
constitutional avoidance—to allow it to decline to prosecute executive 
 
 193. See, e.g., CONGRESS’S CONSTITUTION, supra note 180, at 181–95 (discussing contempt of 
Congress). 
 194. See, e.g., In re Chapman, 166 U.S. 661, 671 (1897) (“The refusal to answer pertinent 
questions in a matter of inquiry within the jurisdiction of the Senate, of course, constitutes a 
contempt of that body, and by the statute this is also made an offence against the United States.”); 
CONG. GLOBE, 34th Cong., 3d Sess. 427 (1857) (statement of Rep. John Wesley Davis) (stating 
that the criminal contempt provision “increases no power now existing in any committee, and 
confers no power to be exercised either by the committee or the House” but instead “makes a 
mere substitution of a judicial proceeding . . . in lieu of the irregular” and “inefficient” remedy of 
inherent contempt, which “depend[s] entirely on the accidental time of the duration of the 
Congress at which he may be called upon to testify”); id. at 429 (statement of Rep. Alexander 
Keith Marshall) (“The [criminal contempt] bill proposes to call the judicial arm to the aid of 
Congress in vindicating its integrity . . . .”); see also United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41, 42–43 
(1953) (overturning a conviction under § 192 because the committee to whom the defendant had 
refused to disclose information lacked authorization from the House to demand such 
information); United States v. Costello, 198 F.2d 200, 205 (2d Cir. 1952) (“A certification under 
[§ 194] means only that the Senate has elected to have the contempt punished as a misdemeanor; 
this method is but an alternative one for vindicating the authority of Congress.” (citing Jurney v. 
MacCracken, 294 U.S. 125, 151 (1935))).  
 195. CONG. GLOBE, 34th Cong., 3d Sess. 405 (1857) (statement of Rep. James Lawrence Orr). 
 196. See Marshall v. Gordon, 243 U.S. 521, 542 (1917). 
 197. See CONGRESS’S CONTEMPT POWER, supra note 189, at 4, 8 & n.65, 20 (explaining 
differences between inherent and criminal contempt). 
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branch officials who withhold information or refuse to appear under 
the direction of the president or other executive branch officials.198 
As subpoenas have become more common, committee letters 
have begun to cite and reference the contempt of Congress criminal 
statute as well as the criminal obstruction of justice statute to 
emphasize the legal compulsion on which the committee is relying.199 
Recognition that the statute is useless against the executive branch has 
led some to call for Congress to return to its inherent contempt 
authority as the next step in the arms race.200 Longtime congressional 
legal analyst Mort Rosenberg argues that Congress, stymied by the 
executive branch’s refusal to enforce a criminal contempt referral, may 
use its inherent contempt authority to impose a fine on executive 
 
 198. The Department of Justice’s longstanding position is that, once a referral for criminal 
contempt has been made, the Department may exercise its prosecutorial discretion in determining 
whether to initiate a prosecution and refer the matter to a grand jury. Prosecution for Contempt 
of Cong. of an Exec. Branch Off. Who Has Asserted a Claim of Exec. Privilege, 8 Op. O.L.C. 101, 
101–02 (1984) [hereinafter Prosecution for Contempt of Cong.]. Despite the statement in § 194 
that it “shall” be the duty of the U.S. Attorney “to bring the matter before the grand jury,” 2 
U.S.C. § 194 (2018), the 1984 opinion concluded that “as a matter of statutory construction 
strongly reinforced by constitutional separation of powers principles, we believe that the United 
States Attorney and the Attorney General, to whom the United States Attorney is responsible, 
retain their discretion not to refer a contempt of Congress citation to a grand jury.” Prosecution 
for Contempt of Cong., supra, at 128. That conclusion is consistent with the textual analysis in the 
D.C. Circuit’s opinion in Wilson v. United States, 369 F.2d 198 (D.C. Cir. 1966), which concluded 
that the Speaker of the House retained discretion not to refer a contempt report to the U.S. 
Attorney despite the same “seemingly mandatory language of § 194.” Prosecution for Contempt 
of Cong., supra, at 120–21; see also Wilson, 369 F.2d at 203–04. 
 199. See Constitutional Conflict, supra note 7, at 888 n.26 (collecting examples); Letter from 
Sean Duffy, Chairman, Subcomm. on Oversight & Investigations, House Comm. on Fin. Servs., 
to Jacob Lew, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Treasury 2 (Mar. 9, 2016), https://morningconsult.com/wp-
content/uploads/2016/03/2016-03-09-SPD-to-Lew-of-Treasury-re-Criminal-Obstruction-and-
Contempt-o....pdf [https://perma.cc/4HJR-WVYV] (“[T]he longstanding and persistent nature of 
Treasury’s refusal to comply with this Committee’s constitutionally authorized oversight may 
constitute contempt of Congress under 2 U.S.C. § 192 and obstruction of Congress under 18 
U.S.C. § 1505.” (footnote omitted)).  
 200. See, e.g., John Bresnahan & Kyle Cheney, Nadler Squeezed with Calls for ‘Inherent 
Contempt,’ POLITICO (May 12, 2019, 6:52 AM), https://www.politico.com/story/2019/05/12/jerry-
nadler-trump-subpeona-1317458 [https://perma.cc/2F7B-9MA6] (noting that House Judiciary 
Committee Chairman Jerry Nadler was facing pressure to use inherent contempt against 
recalcitrant administration officials); Philip Bump, The House Could Take Subpoena 
Enforcement into Its Own Hands. Will It Work?, WASH. POST (May 13, 2019, 4:46 PM), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/05/13/house-could-take-subpoena-enforcement-
into-its-own-hands-will-it-work [https://perma.cc/UQ7W-YUP5] (reporting that Representative 
Schiff stated the House Intelligence Committee was “looking through the history and studying 
the law to make sure [it was] on solid ground” in considering imposing a daily $25,000 fine on an 
executive branch official until he or she complied with the committee’s subpoena). 
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branch officials and automatically reduce their pay.201 In response, the 
executive branch has included a separate section in recent opinions 
supporting its refusal to turn over information or provide testimony, 
concluding that its officials cannot be constitutionally subjected to any 
type of inherent contempt.202  
Congress, faced with a defiant executive branch, likely does not 
have any mechanism by which to enforce inherent contempt—whether 
fine or arrest—even if it had the desire to do so. Every option would 
appear to require the participation of at least some executive branch 
officials. For example, security personnel would have to allow an 
executive branch official such as the attorney general or White House 
counsel to be taken into custody, and treasury officials who would have 
to participate in the garnishment of wages to pay a fine.203 Any 
statutory authority on which the congressional committee or sergeant-
at-arms could rely to seek cooperation of executive branch officials 
would be, in the executive branch’s view, overridden by the attorney 
general’s constitutional opinion. In other words, if the president and 
attorney general declared that—as a constitutional matter—an 
executive branch official defying a congressional subpoena could not 
legally be arrested or fined, it is unclear whether Congress would have 
a realistic mechanism for overcoming that declaration and imposing its 
punishment.  
c. Judicial Resolution.  Another recent development in the arms 
race has been the House’s attempt to involve the judiciary. 
Recognizing that the executive branch does not criminally prosecute 
an executive branch official held in contempt if there has been an 
executive privilege claim, the House has sought to compel compliance 
 
 201. MORTON ROSENBERG, THE CONSTITUTION PROJECT, WHEN CONGRESS COMES 
CALLING: A STUDY ON THE PRINCIPLES, PRACTICES, AND PRAGMATICS OF LEGISLATIVE 
INQUIRY 24–25 (2017). 
 202. See, e.g., McGahn Immunity Opinion, supra note 118, at 20 (“We . . . believe that 
Congress could not lawfully exercise any inherent contempt authority against Mr. McGahn for 
asserting immunity.”). 
 203. Kia Rahnama, for example, proposes in a recent article that Congress use monetary fines 
and wage garnishments to enforce its subpoenas when faced with executive branch refusals to 
comply. Kia Rahnama, Restoring Effective Congressional Oversight: Reform Proposals for the 
Enforcement of Congressional Subpoenas, 45 J. LEGIS. 235, 237 (2018). But Rahnama’s analysis 
is limited to the authority Congress would have to impose the fines. It fails to recognize that the 
executive branch would regard such attempts as unconstitutional, and the White House would 
instruct executive branch officials to block any efforts to enforce or collect inherent contempt 
sanctions. 
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with subpoenas through civil contempt.204 The first attempt by a single 
house of Congress to enforce subpoenas issued to executive branch 
officials through the courts concerned President George W. Bush’s 
assertion of privilege and immunity in the U.S. Attorneys matter.205 
Now, seeking judicial resolution is the usual course. The House 
authorized a civil suit at the same time it referred Attorney General 
Holder for criminal contempt in the Fast & Furious matter, recognizing 
he would not be prosecuted.206 Recently, the House authorized a 
committee chairman to proceed directly to the courts to enforce a 
subpoena without requiring the full body’s authorization.207 Relying on 
these authorities, congressional committees have filed several suits 
against Trump administration officials even without a full House 
finding contempt.208 
 
 204. CONGRESS’S CONTEMPT POWER, supra note 189, at 26–30 (discussing civil enforcement 
actions in the House). 
 205. Id.; see Comm. on the Judiciary v. Miers, 558 F. Supp. 2d 53, 56 (D.D.C. 2008) (“[T]he 
aspect of this lawsuit that is unprecedented is the notion that Ms. Miers is absolutely immune 
from compelled congressional process.”). 
 206. See H.R. Res. 711, 112th Cong. (2012) (referring Attorney General Holder for 
prosecution for criminal contempt under 2 U.S.C. §§ 192 and 194); H.R. Res. 706, 112th Cong. 
(2012) (authorizing the Chairman of the House Oversight and Government Reform Committee 
“to initiate or intervene in judicial proceedings in any Federal court of competent jurisdiction, on 
behalf of the [c]ommittee . . . to seek declaratory judgments affirming the duty of [Attorney 
General Holder] to comply with any subpoena” in the Fast & Furious matter). 
 207. H.R. Res. 430, 116th Cong. (2019) (providing that the chair of the House Judiciary 
Committee may initiate or intervene in any judicial proceeding to enforce subpoenas and that 
other committee chairs may do so if authorized by the Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group, whose 
approval constitutes “the equivalent of a vote of the full House of Representatives”).  
 208. See, e.g., In re Application of Comm. on the Judiciary, 414 F. Supp. 3d 129 (D.D.C. 2019); 
Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Comm. on Ways & Means, v. U.S. Dep’t of 
Treasury, No. 19-cv-1974 (D.D.C. July 2, 2019). These steps are significant because now, for the 
first time, a congressional committee may, without any action by the full house, utilize delegated 
authority to (1) issue a subpoena, (2) hold a noncompliant executive in contempt, and (3) seek 
judicial enforcement of the subpoena. In enacting the criminal contempt provision, Congress 
expressly foreclosed such an option, requiring in the procedures enacted in 2 U.S.C. § 194 that 
either the full house vote on contempt or, when in recess, the Speaker to consider it. In Wilson v. 
United States, for example, the D.C. Circuit overturned several convictions under § 192 because 
“the decision by the Committee to cite appellants for contempt was not given the additional 
consideration within the legislative branch that is contemplated by the governing statute, 2 U.S.C. 
§ 194.” Wilson v. United States, 369 F.2d 198, 199 (D.C. Cir. 1966). The individuals had refused 
to answer questions before the House Committee on Un-American Activities, and the Committee 
had reported the facts of refusal to the Speaker of the House while Congress was not in session. 
Id. at 199–200. The Speaker then certified the Committee’s report of contempt to the U.S. 
Attorney after being advised that he had no discretion under § 194 to decide not to do so. Id. The 
court rejected the contention that the Speaker had a mandatory duty to certify the committee’s 
contempt report to the U.S. Attorney, noting that “[i]t has been the consistent legislative 
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The executive branch has contested the justiciability of these suits, 
arguing that the House or a committee of the House lacks standing 
under the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Raines v. Byrd.209 The first 
three district court judges to address the executive branch’s argument 
rejected it.210 As a result, those judges adjudicated the merits of the 
constitutional dispute between Congress and the executive branch. In 
the first, Judge John Bates rejected White House Counsel Harriet 
Miers’s claim of absolute immunity from congressional testimony.211 In 
the second, arising out of the Fast & Furious investigation, Judge Amy 
Berman Jackson refused to accept the executive branch’s broad 
congressional work-product doctrine but agreed that deliberative 
process was protected by executive privilege, rejecting the House’s 
assertion that executive privilege was limited to presidential 
 
course . . . that the committee’s report is subject to further consideration on the merits by the 
House involved.” Id. at 201. The Wilson court collected the historical practice under §§ 192 and 
194. It found that “the committee involved is subject to an appropriate legislative surveillance on 
the merits of contempt citations.” and “where alleged contempts are committed while Congress 
was in session, the Speaker may not certify to the United States Attorney the statements of fact 
prepared by the Committee until the report of alleged contempt has been acted upon by the 
House as a whole.” Id. at 201–02. When Congress is not in session, the Court concluded, the 
Speaker retained discretion not to certify a committee report of contempt, citing the “time-
honored practice, since 1857, under which a ‘check’ on hasty action by a committee is provided 
through House or Senate consideration of a resolution authorizing the presiding officer to make 
the certification set forth in the statute.” Id. at 203. “The Congressional practice reflects a 
conclusion that it is inherently unfair to permit the allegedly insulted committee to provide the 
sole legislative determination whether to initiate proceedings to prosecute for contempt.” Id. 
Under the court’s construction of §§ 192 and 194,  
prosecution would not be begun without the additional scrutiny within the legislative 
branch, a scrutiny that would at least embrace examining the sufficiency of the 
statement of facts of alleged contempts, and consideration whether the incident 
constitutes the kind of willful contumacy contemplated by the statute, or perhaps 
whether the matter is sufficiently dubious so that no contempt action should be begun 
in the absence of approval by the entire house. 
Id. at 204. Because the defendants’ committee contempt reports had not been given the additional 
legislative scrutiny contemplated by § 194, the court overturned their convictions under § 192. Id. 
at 205. 
 209. Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811 (1997); see Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform v. Holder, 
No. 12-1332, 2013 WL 11241275, at *1–2 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 18, 2013) (refusing to certify an 
interlocutory appeal despite DOJ’s reliance on Raines); Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform v. 
Holder, 979 F. Supp. 2d 1, 12–13 (D.D.C. 2013) (noting DOJ’s argument that the executive 
privilege claim was unreviewable, which “rest[ed] almost entirely on one case: Raines v. Byrd”); 
Miers, 558 F. Supp. 2d at 66 (noting DOJ’s reliance on Raines to argue that the Committee lacked 
standing). 
 210. See Comm. on the Judiciary v. McGahn, 415 F. Supp. 3d 148, 197–98 (D.D.C. 2019), aff’d 
en banc, No. 19-5331, 2020 WL 4556761 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 7, 2020); Holder, 979 F. Supp. 2d at 12–
13; Miers, 558 F. Supp. 2d at 66.  
 211. See Miers, 558 F. Supp. 2d at 99–107 (discussing the absolute immunity claim). 
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communications.212 She concluded, however, that the Department of 
Justice had to comply with the subpoena because the deliberative 
process privilege had been overcome.213 And, most recently, Judge 
Kentanji Brown Jackson held that former White House counsel Don 
McGahn was not absolutely immune from compelled testimony, 
largely echoing Judge Bates’s previous opinion.214 
All of these cases were appealed, but the first two ultimately 
settled after an election that transferred the presidency from one party 
to the other.215 In the third, the initial panel opinion agreed with the 
executive branch that the court had no jurisdiction to entertain the 
interbranch dispute.216 But that decision was subsequently reversed by 
the D.C. Circuit en banc, which agreed with the district court that 
congressional suits seeking compliance with a subpoena were 
justiciable but declined to reach the merits of McGahn’s immunity.217 
The McGahn litigation remains pending after almost a year of 
litigation and may ultimately be rendered moot by the 2020 election.218 
The central problem with litigation as a mechanism for 
enforcement is the time involved. The House authorized the Fast & 
Furious lawsuit on the same day it held Attorney General Holder in 
contempt, June 28, 2012, and filed a complaint less than two months 
later, on August 13, 2012.219 But a final, appealable district court 
decision was not issued until three and a half years later.220 The House 
 
 212. Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform v. Lynch, 156 F. Supp. 3d 101, 109, 119 (D.D.C. 
2016). 
 213. Id. at 120–21. 
 214. McGahn, 415 F. Supp. 3d at 214–15.  
 215. See Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform v. Barr, No. 16-5078, 2019 WL 2158212, at *1 
(D.C. Cir. May 14, 2019) (dismissing appeal after settlement); Comm. on the Judiciary v. Miers, 
No. 08-5357, 2009 WL 3568649, at *1 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 14, 2009) (same). 
 216. See Comm. on the Judiciary v. McGahn, 951 F.3d 510, 522 (D.C. Cir.), rev’d en banc, No. 
19-5331, 2020 WL 4556761 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 7, 2020). 
 217. See McGahn, 2020 WL 4556761, at *8. 
 218. See, e.g., Comm. on Judiciary v. McGahn, No. 19-5331, 2019 WL 6999926, at *1 (D.C. 
Cir. Dec. 18, 2019) (per curiam) (ordering the parties to file supplemental briefs addressing 
“whether the articles of impeachment render this case moot and whether expedited consideration 
remains necessary” and ordering the House committee to address “whether it still seeks to compel 
[McGahn]’s testimony and, if so, whether it seeks to compel such testimony in furtherance of its 
impeachment inquiry or as a matter of legislative oversight”). 
 219. Complaint at 11, 41, Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform v. Holder, 979 F. Supp. 2d 1 
(D.D.C. 2013) (No. 1:12-cv-1332), 2012 WL 3264300. 
 220. Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform v. Lynch, 156 F. Supp. 3d 101 (D.D.C. 2016). In 
the Fast & Furious matter, the parties agreed to some delays, and a congressional committee 
could certainly move with more haste. But a district court would still likely have to resolve 
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had to pass a resolution after subsequent elections reauthorizing the 
subpoena and lawsuit.221 If it had not, the subpoena would have 
expired, mooting the suit.222 In the dispute over information related to 
the firing of the U.S. Attorneys, the House held Miers and White 
House Chief of Staff Josh Bolten in contempt on February 14, 2008223 
and filed suit on March 10, 2008.224 The district court decided the 
question of absolute immunity relatively quickly, issuing an opinion on 
July 31, 2008, but did not resolve the underlying claim of privilege.225 
And, after a September argument, the D.C. Circuit stayed the district 
court’s decision on immunity on October 6, 2008, and refused to 
expedite the case or give any opinion on the merits given the pending 
election and weighty issues involved.226 Thus, even the threshold 
question of absolute immunity in Committee on the Judiciary v. Miers227 
took a number of months to make it to the appellate court, and the 
courts never really had time to address the merits of the privilege claim 
or balance the interests of the two branches.228 Although the McGahn 
litigation was expedited, it remains pending over a year after it was 
initiated and took long enough that the House cited the delay as reason 
 
threshold issues, such as standing, from which an interlocutory appeal could be certified, as the 
Justice Department requested in the Fast & Furious matter. See Holder, 979 F. Supp. 2d at 12–13 
(noting DOJ’s argument that the executive privilege claim was unreviewable); Comm. on 
Oversight & Gov’t Reform v. Holder, No. 12-1332, 2013 WL 11241275, at *1–2 (D.D.C. Nov. 18, 
2013) (refusing to certify an interlocutory appeal). 
 221. See H.R. Res. 5, 114th Cong. § 3(f)(1) (2015); H.R. Res. 5, 113th Cong. § 4(a)(2) (2013). 
 222. See Comm. on the Judiciary v. Miers, 542 F.3d 909, 911 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (per curiam) 
(granting a stay pending appeal and noting that “this controversy will not be fully and finally 
resolved by the Judicial Branch—including resolution by a panel and possible rehearing by this 
court en banc and by the Supreme Court—before the 110th Congress ends on January 3, 2009” 
at which time “the 110th House of Representatives will cease to exist as a legal entity, and the 
subpoenas it has issued will expire”). 
 223. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 22–23, Comm. on the Judiciary v. 
Miers, 558 F. Supp. 2d 53 (D.D.C. 2008) (No. 1:08-cv-409), 2008 WL 2150290. 
 224. Id. at 1, 36. 
 225. Miers, 558 F. Supp. 2d at 53, 107. 
 226. Miers, 542 F.3d at 909; Docket Sheet, Miers, 542 F.3d 909 (No. 08-5357).  
 227. Comm. on the Judiciary v. Miers, 542 F.3d 909, 911 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (per curiam). 
 228. Courts may also be hesitant to wade into the controversy. The D.C. Circuit twice 
abstained in AT&T litigation, urging the parties to reach a settlement, see United States v. AT&T, 
567 F.2d 121, 130–33 (1977); United States v. AT&T, 551 F.2d 384, 394–95 (1976), and denied a 
motion to expedite the appeal in the Miers litigation, see Miers, 542 F.3d at 911. In the Miers case, 
the D.C. Circuit reasoned that “even if expedited, this controversy will not be fully and finally 
resolved by the Judicial Branch—including resolution by a panel and possible rehearing by this 
court en banc and by the Supreme Court—before the 110th Congress ends.” Miers, 542 F.3d at 
911. 
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for not going to court to force the testimony of a witness who refused 
to comply with subpoenas during the impeachment inquiry.229 The 
House instead passed an additional article of impeachment against 
Trump for obstruction of its impeachment inquiry.230 
Each house of Congress has, of course, always wielded other 
mechanisms of coercing the executive branch to comply with its 
demands. Most prominently, the Senate can refuse to act on a 
confirmation until a particular document or set of documents have 
been disclosed.231 Or the House can attempt to use its appropriation 
power to force disclosure.232 Chafetz, for one, urges Congress to 
reinvigorate such tools along with its inherent power to arrest 
individuals and hold them until they comply with the subpoena.233 In 
his view, “judicial resolution of these questions is simply not suited to 
political time frames,” so Congress should stop attempting to use the 
courts to enforce subpoenas.234 
Chafetz is correct that judicial resolution takes too long to be an 
effective means of enforcement. But his optimistic view of Congress’s 
 
 229. H.R. REP. NO. 116-346, at 156 (2019). 
 230. Id. at 132–56. 
 231. For example, a group of Senators put President Obama’s nomination of David Barron 
to the First Circuit on hold until the administration agreed to release a 2010 OLC memo 
authorizing a drone strike of a U.S. citizen. See Zeke J. Miller & Massimo Calabresi, Inside the 
Obama Administration Fight Over the Drone Memo, TIME (May 13, 2014, 4:42 PM), https://
time.com/97613/obama-drone-memo-david-barron [https://perma.cc/4U9H-JC7E]; Benjamin 
Wittes, David Barron, Targeted Killing, and Rand Paul’s Wrongheaded Oped, LAWFARE (May 
12, 2014, 8:10 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/david-barron-targeted-killing-and-rand-pauls-
wrongheaded-oped [https://perma.cc/5R4A-LR8G]. 
 232. For example, § 714 of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2010 prohibits “the payment 
of the salary of any officer or employee of the Federal Government who . . . prohibits or prevents, 
or attempts or threatens to prohibit or prevent, any other [Federal] officer or employee . . . from 
having direct oral or written communication or contact with any Member, committee or 
subcommittee of the Congress.” Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-117, 
§ 714, 123 Stat. 3034, 3208 (2010); see also Constitutional Conflict, supra note 7, at 931 (“Congress 
may use legislative authorizations and appropriations as leverage against the Executive Branch 
to obtain requested information.”). Some have proposed that Congress enact a rider similar to 
§ 714 “disallowing the use of any appropriation to pay the salary of a federal official held in 
contempt of Congress.” H.R. REP. NO. 114-848, at 402 (2016); see also Contempt Act, H.R. 4447, 
113th Cong. § 2 (2014) (a bill that would prohibit payment of compensation to an officer or 
employee of the Federal government who has been held in contempt of Congress by the House 
or Senate). 
 233. Josh Chafetz, Congress Can’t Rely on the Courts To Enforce Its Subpoenas. Don’t Panic., 
WASH. POST (Mar. 2, 2020, 12:08 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2020/03/02/
congress-cant-rely-courts-enforce-its-subpoenas-dont-panic [https://perma.cc/8BW5-ASSF]. 
 234. Id. 
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other authorities to enforce its subpoenas fails to account for the limits 
on those authorities and the means by which the executive branch can 
combat them. Only the Senate has a role in confirmations, and, in 
recent decades, the most aggressive oversight has been conducted by 
the House. Further, the use of the appropriations authority requires 
the buy-in of the entire Congress, not just a single committee, 
subcommittee, or motivated chairperson pursuing a particular 
investigation. Moreover, the president retains veto power over any 
legislative enforcement. Even when Congress succeeds in passing 
appropriations laws that are contingent on the sharing of information, 
the executive branch has raised constitutional objections to those laws 
and indicated it would not comply.235 
Shutting down the government over what the executive branch 
would characterize as an assertion of a well-recognized, historically 
grounded constitutional authority may not, in reality, be a viable 
option. As Chafetz notes, Congress often suffers the political fallout 
from a shutdown, and few oversight disputes rise to a level that the 
House would be willing to risk that political blowback.236 Similarly, 
impeachment solely for noncompliance with subpoenas would not only 
be potentially politically costly, it would be unprecedented. Although 
an obstruction of a congressional inquiry formed part of the articles of 
impeachment against Nixon, Clinton, and Trump, that charge was a 
secondary one, complementing a primary act alleged to be a high crime 
or misdemeanor.237 An assertion of executive privilege, standing alone, 
is highly unlikely to be the principal grounds for impeachment. And, as 
noted, inherent contempt raises all kinds of practical problems that 
make it an unrealistic option, as the House acknowledged in the 
litigation involving McGahn.238 
 
 235. See generally Auth. of Agency Offs., supra note 3 (advising the Department of Health 
and Human Services that its officials have authority to prohibit employees from complying with 
Congressional requests for information). 
 236. See CONGRESS’S CONSTITUTION, supra note 180, at 68–70.  
 237. See H.R. Res. 755, 116th Cong. (2019) (impeaching President Trump for Abuse of Power 
and Obstruction of Congress); H.R. REP. NO. 105-830, pt. 1, at 2–5 (1998) (announcing articles of 
impeachment against President Clinton for perjury, obstruction of justice, and abuse of power); 
H.R. REP. NO. 93-1305, at 1–4 (1974) (announcing articles of impeachment against President 
Nixon for obstruction of justice, abuse of power, and contempt of Congress). 
 238. During oral arguments in the litigation over the subpoena to former White House 
Counsel Don McGahn, counsel for the House of Representatives rejected the contention that 
inherent contempt is a practical option, noting that the House “do[es]n’t have the sergeant at 
arms go out and arrest people, and maybe have a gun battle with [the Attorney General’s] security 
SHAUB IN PRINTER FINAL_9.22.20 (DO NOT DELETE) 9/22/2020  2:41 PM 
2020] THE EXECUTIVE’S PRIVILEGE 55 
In short, the few mechanisms that Congress can use on its own to 
enforce compliance with a subpoena—principally, refusing to 
appropriate money without compliance, inherent contempt, or 
impeachment—are extreme measures that would likely incur 
substantial political costs and, even then, may not work. Accordingly, 
though Congress does theoretically have stand-alone powers to fight 
the executive branch’s sweeping doctrine of executive privilege, those 
powers are, in practice, rarely viable options. They run aground on the 
reality recognized by Rehnquist: the executive branch has the 
information and, thus, a “headstart.”239   
C. Prophylactic Executive Privilege 
The executive branch now uses a variety of procedures and 
constitutional doctrines to negate congressional demands for 
information without ever asserting executive privilege or considering 
any specific, identifiable harm. These procedures and doctrines are 
justified not by concrete harm from disclosure but by the need to 
protect executive privilege, the president’s prerogative to control all 
information that fits within the components of executive privilege. This 
Article refers to the use of these procedures and doctrines as the 
prophylactic executive privilege.240 And, to the extent one considers 
executive privilege to mean the president’s constitutional authority to 
withhold information from Congress, the prophylactic executive 
privilege is executive privilege in current practice. 
The Reagan memorandum initially advised department heads to 
request that a congressional committee “hold its request for the 
information in abeyance” while the president is considering a claim of 
privilege.241 But it also clarified that such a request “itself does not 
 
detail.” Oral Argument at 52:44, In re Comm. on the Judiciary, 951 F.3d 589 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (No. 
19-5288), https://www.cadc.uscourts.gov/recordings/recordings2019.nsf/F443323EF0BE1B56852
584E40066ECE0/$file/19-5288.mp3 [https://perma.cc/KU55-KT6G].  
 239. Rehnquist Memorandum, supra note 21, at 6. 
 240. See generally Jonathan Shaub, The Prophylactic Executive Privilege, LAWFARE (June 14, 
2019, 5:18 PM) [hereinafter Prophylactic Executive Privilege], https://www.lawfareblog.com/
prophylactic-executive-privilege [https://perma.cc/PZ9N-ZT6X] (increasing reliance on protective 
assertions “either in combination with or instead of formal assertions of executive privilege . . . will 
establish a prophylactic layer of constitutional protection that extends well beyond the boundaries 
of executive privilege and dispenses with a core part of the executive privilege analysis—balancing 
congressional interests”). 
 241. Reagan Memorandum, supra note 27, at 2. 
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constitute a claim of privilege.”242 Instead, that request should have 
been made only when information raised a “substantial question of 
executive privilege,” a term it defined quite narrowly. The 
memorandum delegated to agency officials the task of determining 
whether the release of specific information requested might be harmful 
to national interests, warranting presidential consideration.243  
Today, this is no longer true. Lower executive branch officials do 
not consider identifiable harm that may result from the disclosure of 
specific information. Rather, they assess only whether the requested 
information falls within one of the components of executive privilege, 
relying on the need to protect the president’s prerogative to assert 
privilege to refuse to provide information. Subtly, the need to protect 
the president’s prerogative has become privilege itself, the only 
rationale necessary to refuse to comply with a congressional demand 
for information. 
Lower executive branch officials refuse to disclose information by 
shielding themselves in the president’s prerogative to make the final 
privilege decision and the broad scope of the components of 
privilege.244 The “scope” of executive privilege is no longer determined 
by the public interest with respect to a specific piece of information. It 
is determined by the initial scope, before any balancing occurs, of 
“components” that protect certain generalized confidentiality interests 
against undifferentiated institutional harms. But despite the qualified 
nature of both executive privilege and the common law privileges on 
which the components are based, the executive branch’s “privilege” of 
allowing the president to control the dissemination of such information 
is absolute.  
In short, the executive branch’s current use of executive privilege 
to block congressional inquiry bears little relation to a situational 
 
 242. Id.  
 243. Id. at 1–2. 
 244. Examining unforthcoming congressional testimony by Attorney General Jeff Sessions, 
Heidi Kitrosser has called this phenomenon the “shadow effect” of executive privilege, defining 
it as the “impact on oversight of the implicit or explicit threat that [executive privilege] might be 
invoked at some point.” Heidi Kitrosser, The Shadow of Executive Privilege, 15 FORUM 547, 548 
(2017). As she notes, declining to provide information to Congress because executive privilege 
could be used to withhold the information “can help to shield the executive from political and 
legal accountability” and allows the executive branch to “bypass[] both the substantive questions 
asked [by Congress] as well as any serious engagement with the merits of the executive privilege 
claim.” Id. Kitrosser’s insightful observations recognize that executive privilege can “cast strong 
shadows” even when there is no formal assertion of privilege or even no mention of the term. Id. 
at 547–48, 551.  
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balancing of specific harm from disclosure against Congress’s need for 
the information. What was formerly a doctrine about the president’s 
authority to prevent the disclosure of specific pieces of information has 
become a doctrine almost entirely about prophylaxis. The new 
prophylactic executive privilege prohibits, as a constitutional matter, 
the release of any information potentially covered by the executive 
branch’s view of executive privilege. And the executive branch has 
added an additional layer of protection for the prophylaxis itself, 
concluding that the privilege prohibits not just disclosure itself but also 
any burden on the executive branch’s authority to monitor the release 
of such information. Accordingly, executive branch officials claim the 
authority to direct all current and former employees and officials not 
to disclose any information in response to a congressional subpoena 
and, in some circumstances, to refuse to appear altogether in response 
to a congressional subpoena. 
This new concept of executive privilege has three central pillars 
that the executive branch has used, in combination, to vastly expand its 
authority vis-à-vis Congress. First, the president has the sole right to 
assert privilege and will not consider such an assertion until Congress 
decides to hold an official in contempt. Second, the Constitution gives 
the president the affirmative power to control the dissemination of all 
information that fits within any of the components of executive 
privilege and, accordingly, the authority to issue directives to any 
current or former member of the executive branch about the disclosure 
or dissemination of that information. Third, if there is even a chance 
that information may be disclosed without the president’s 
authorization, the executive branch can utilize a series of prophylactic 
doctrines to ignore or countermand a congressional subpoena without 
any need to consider Congress’s need for or interest in the information. 
Each of these pillars, and the doctrines that have arisen from them, are 
justified—in the executive branch’s view—by the same premise: the 
need to “protect” the president’s authority to assert executive 
privilege. That “protection” has largely become the primary 
justification for refusing to comply with congressional oversight 
demands. In other words, the prophylactic executive privilege has, in 
today’s practice, become executive privilege itself. 
1. Protecting the President’s Prerogative: Executive Privilege as a 
“Last Resort.”  The seeds of the prophylactic executive privilege can 
be found in the Supreme Court’s decision in Cheney v. United States 
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District Court.245 In that case, two organizations sued the National 
Energy Policy Development Group, a group established by President 
George W. Bush to develop energy policy, and its members, including 
Vice President Dick Cheney, alleging that the group had failed to 
comply with the requirements of the Federal Advisory Committee 
Act.246 The district court permitted the suit to move forward against 
Cheney and the other defendants and allowed for limited discovery 
about the nature of the committee.247 The executive branch sought 
mandamus from the court of appeals, asking it to vacate the discovery 
orders because they implicated material potentially covered by 
executive privilege, but the court of appeals declined to issue the writ 
of mandamus.248 Even though it recognized the discovery requests were 
overly broad, the court of appeals reasoned that, under Nixon, the 
executive branch had to first assert privilege and do so “with 
particularity” in response to the discovery requests.249  
The Supreme Court vacated the court of appeals’ decision, 
however, and held that it had “labored under the mistaken assumption 
that the assertion of executive privilege is a necessary precondition to 
the Government’s separation-of-powers objections.”250 It recognized 
that Nixon had held that the president could not “through the assertion 
of a ‘broad [and] undifferentiated’ need for confidentiality” withhold 
information but had to invoke privilege with specificity and 
particularized objections.251 But Cheney held that principle applied 
only after the party seeking the information had “satisfied his burden 
of showing the propriety of the requests.”252 And, in language that 
would be quoted innumerable times by the executive branch in 
oversight disputes,253 the Court characterized executive privilege as “an 
extraordinary assertion of power ‘not to be lightly invoked,’” and one 
that sets “coequal branches of the Government . . . on a collision 
 
 245. Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court, 542 U.S. 367 (2004).  
 246. Id. at 373. 
 247. Id. at 376–77. 
 248. Id. 
 249. In re Cheney, 334 F.3d 1096, 1104 (D.C. Cir. 2003), vacated, 542 U.S. 367 (2004). 
 250. Cheney, 542 U.S. at 391–92.  
 251. Id. at 388 (quoting United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 706–07 (1974)). 
 252. Id.  
 253. See, e.g., Letter from Stephen E. Boyd, Assistant Att’y Gen., Off. of Legis. Affs., U.S. 
Dep’t of Just., to Jerrold Nadler, Chairman, House Comm. on the Judiciary 3 (Feb. 7, 2019), 
https://www.politico.com/f/?id=00000168-c91f-d364-a97d-ef9f540d0001 [https://perma.cc/U75T-
4K8S]. 
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course” and “should be avoided whenever possible.”254 Instead of 
requiring the executive branch to assert executive privilege with 
particularity, the district court should have shaped its discovery orders 
to accommodate the executive branch’s interests that are protected by 
privilege without requiring the executive branch to assert privilege 
over any specific piece of information.255 
In some ways, Cheney echoes the longstanding executive branch 
position that executive privilege “will be asserted only in the most 
compelling circumstances” and only as a last resort when disclosure 
disputes cannot be resolved through “good faith negotiations” between 
the branches.256 But the premise of that position in Cheney is that the 
party requesting discovery must initially show “the propriety of [its] 
requests” for the information before the privilege becomes relevant, a 
step the district court had skipped even though it acknowledged that 
the requests were “overly broad.”257 Congress would undoubtedly 
contend—and there would likely be little disagreement in most 
circumstances—that its act of issuing a subpoena for information 
related to a subject on which it could legislate is sufficient to 
demonstrate the “propriety” of the requests.  
The executive branch, however, views a congressional oversight 
request or subpoena in the same way it—and ultimately the Court—
viewed the discovery demands in Cheney: as overly broad and 
potentially, with respect to some information at least, not within 
Congress’s authority. If a committee requests a large swath of 
nonpublic documents, including emails, then some of those documents 
will undoubtedly implicate one of the components of executive 
privilege. As a result, the executive branch responds by citing its 
“confidentiality interests” and initiating the constitutionally 
“mandated” accommodation process. If information is not classified, 
then the executive branch has no way to prevent Congress from 
releasing it or even posting it on the internet. As a result, if the 
information is politically damaging, even if mostly benign, the 
executive branch will not hand it over initially, whether it falls within 
one of the components of privilege or not.  
 
 254. Cheney, 542 U.S. at 389–90 (quoting United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 7 (1953)). 
 255. Id. 
 256. Reagan Memorandum, supra note 27, at 1. 
 257. Cheney, 542 U.S. at 376–77, 388.  
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The fact that some of the information covered by the subpoena 
would fall within the executive branch’s broad scope of privilege is 
sufficient to initiate the accommodation process. Consider, for 
example, the subpoenas issued for information related to the Obama 
administration’s decision to fund the cost-sharing reduction payments 
from a permanent appropriation after Congress did not specifically 
appropriate money for the payments.258 Some of the information 
requested was factual, such as the names of individuals who attended 
certain meetings or the dates and times of those meetings, and was the 
type of information that would be disclosed on a privilege log. It is 
almost certainly not covered by the deliberative process privilege or 
the presidential communications privilege.259 But, because some of the 
information requested did fall within the scope of the deliberative 
process component, the executive branch engaged in the 
accommodation process and refused to disclose the names as well as a 
substantial amount of other information.260 And the dispute ultimately 
petered out after the next election when the inquiry was no longer 
politically salient. 
The executive branch uses its doctrine of executive privilege and, 
in particular, its stringent balancing test, to place Congress in a catch-
22. As an oversight dispute develops, the congressional committee uses 
its tools to attempt to force compliance—subpoenas, depositions, 
political statements or hearings, contempt threats, contempt votes, 
impeachment threats, etc. If the committee moves too quickly with 
respect to a large swath of documents, the executive branch may claim 
that the committee is not following the “constitutional mandate” of 
AT&T. When there are relatively few specific documents at issue, the 
executive branch can offer accommodations, such as an oral briefing or 
an opportunity to review the documents in camera but not take 
possession of them. In this way, the “balancing” always favors the 
executive branch. If the committee continues to push and the president 
ultimately makes a formal assertion of privilege, the opinion 
supporting privilege asserts that those specific documents are not 
necessary to the committee’s legislative function because other 
information is available and because the relevant executive branch 
 
 258. See H.R. REP. NO. 114-887, at 79 (2016) (describing the oversight dispute).  
 259. See MAJORITY STAFF OF THE H. COMM. ON ENERGY & COMMERCE & MAJORITY STAFF 
OF THE H. COMM. ON WAYS & MEANS, 114TH CONG., JOINT CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATIVE 
REPORT INTO THE SOURCE OF FUNDING FOR THE ACA’S COST SHARING REDUCTION 
PROGRAM 8–9, 12 (Joint Comm. Print 2016). 
 260. Id. at 131–45. 
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entity has provided—or is willing to provide—information orally or 
through in camera review.  
Under the executive branch’s doctrine, the only situation where 
the executive branch could be forced to comply with a congressional 
oversight subpoena would be if a congressional committee had a 
legitimate oversight interest, in the executive branch’s view, for a 
specific document or set of documents that do not arguably fall within 
any of the components of executive privilege. And that circumstance is 
extremely rare. Usually, the executive branch can either claim that it 
needs time to review a broad request to consider executive privilege—
and chastise the committee for not engaging in a good-faith 
accommodation process if it attempts to move more quickly—or it can 
assert that the committee has no need for specific documents that are 
the subject of a narrow request because other documents exist. The fact 
that the executive branch can play hardball does not mean that it will, 
particularly if the politics are not favorable. But under current 
executive branch doctrine, it believes it has the authority to do so. 
2. Protecting the President’s Prerogative: Absolute Authority To 
Control the Dissemination of Information.  The prophylactic executive 
privilege results from an amalgamation of various broad evidentiary 
privileges as components of a singular executive privilege and the 
centralization in the president of control over information. To be sure, 
each component protects interests in confidentiality that courts and the 
government have long recognized. They represent longstanding, 
venerated areas in which presidents have consistently, since the 
country’s founding in some cases, determined that withholding certain 
information from Congress was necessary to the public interest. But 
executive privilege historically protected only the precise information 
selected by the president that would cause identifiable damage to the 
public interest. And restricting formal assertions of “executive 
privilege” to the president is largely uncontroversial. But when the 
doctrine of executive privilege is conflated with the broad scope of its 
various evidentiary components—not with specific information within 
those areas that may cause identifiable harm—the resulting doctrine is 
that only the president may authorize the release of any information 
falling within those broad categories.  
The prophylactic executive privilege is thus grounded not in 
concrete damage that would result from the disclosure of subpoenaed 
information but in harm to the president’s absolute authority to control 
the dissemination of information. The institutional interests that 
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evidentiary privileges, such as the attorney-client and the deliberative 
process privilege, are designed to safeguard could—and should—be 
protected by those privileges in the oversight process. That is 
particularly true in an environment in which politics drive most 
oversight inquiries. Under the executive branch’s current doctrine, 
however, any information that falls within the scope of a component of 
executive privilege threatens constitutional harm so grave it can be 
withheld unless it is critically necessary for Congress to legislate. It is 
hard to conceive of information that could satisfy that exacting 
standard. 
Unlike any other privilege, the doctrine pairs a vast scope with an 
almost insurmountable balancing test. The combination of the 
president’s unilateral authority to control information, the expansion 
of the types of protected information and the undifferentiated 
confidentiality interests often eliminate the need to assert privilege. 
Accordingly, the current doctrine often obviates any need to consider 
Congress’s interests at all, let alone balance them against the executive 
branch’s confidentiality interests. 
3. Protecting the President’s Prerogative: Prophylactic Doctrines.  
Congress has attempted to counteract these protective measures in a 
number of ways, typically by threatening contempt and attempting to 
force an actual assertion of privilege or by forcing a lower executive 
branch official to answer questions on the spot as part of testimony or 
a deposition. In response, the executive branch has developed 
additional constitutional doctrines that give the president more 
authority to countermand or negate congressional subpoenas. These 
doctrines include (1) the testimonial immunity of senior presidential 
advisers, (2) the potential for a “protective” assertion of executive 
privilege, and, most recently, (3) the deposition-counsel requirement. 
These doctrines are a unique form of prophylactic executive privilege 
because they assert additional authority to protect against any 
congressional practice that threatens to prevent the executive branch 
from protecting the president’s prerogative. 
a. Testimonial Immunity.  The first—and original—prophylactic 
doctrine is the executive branch’s constitutional doctrine of testimonial 
immunity. Developed over the past fifty years, the doctrine holds that 
the president’s senior advisers are absolutely immune from compelled 
congressional testimony, even absent an assertion of executive 
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privilege by the president.261 This privilege is absolute, not subject to 
balancing of any kind.262 And it applies to both current and former 
advisers to the current president.263 In the past, the Department of 
Justice has described this immunity as an exercise or a facet of 
executive privilege. Attorney General Janet Reno advised President 
Bill Clinton, for example, that he could assert “[e]xecutive privilege . . . 
in response to a congressional subpoena seeking testimony by the 
Counsel to the President concerning the performance of official duties 
on the basis that the Counsel serves as an immediate adviser to the 
President and is therefore immune from compelled congressional 
testimony.”264 An internal 1982 memorandum from the head of OLC 
to the Associate Attorney General notes that a “congressional demand 
for testimony from a close adviser to the President directly implicates 
a basic concern underlying the Executive privilege.”265 But, in the 
recent disputes over the testimony of senior advisers that resulted in 
official claims of immunity—and in the legal opinions justifying those 
assertions—the doctrine has been described as “distinct from, and 
broader than, executive privilege.”266  
The basic rationale for the doctrine is that the president is 
absolutely immune from a congressional subpoena to testify, and, 
because compelled testimony of a senior adviser would implicate the 
same separation of powers concerns as compelled testimony of the 
president, those advisers share the president’s immunity.267 
Additionally, the compelled testimony of close presidential advisers 
would involve the core of the presidential communications component 
of executive privilege and could also force a close presidential aide to 
spend time preparing for testimony and testifying, thereby interfering 
with her ability to carry out her duties assisting the president.268  
 
 261. See McGahn Immunity Opinion, supra note 118, at 7–12 (collecting historical examples). 
 262. Id. at 4–5. 
 263. Id. at 15. 
 264. Clemency Assertion, supra note 169, at 4.  
 265. Memorandum from Theodore B. Olson, Assistant Att’y Gen., Off. of Legal Couns., U.S. 
Dep’t of Just., to Rudolph W. Giuliani, Assoc. Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Just., Congressional 
Demand for Deposition of Counsel to the President Fred F. Fielding 1 (July 23, 1982), 
https://www.justice.gov/olc/page/file/1225996/download [https://perma.cc/2Q6N-4FRF]. 
 266. McGahn Immunity Opinion, supra note 118, at 4.  
 267. Id. at 4–7. 
 268. Id. 
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The doctrine of absolute immunity for senior presidential advisers 
is the earliest form of prophylaxis, and its development demonstrates 
the way a policy designed to protect the underlying privilege becomes 
a stand-alone constitutional doctrine. Originally articulated as a 
“tentative” and “sketchy” doctrine by then-Assistant Attorney 
General Rehnquist, testimonial immunity adhered closely to the need 
to protect the confidentiality of presidential communications.269 In 
testimony given the same year he wrote his foundational memorandum 
on immunity, Rehnquist described the same historical examples 
addressed in the memorandum as “instances in which Presidential 
advisers have failed to appear before Congressional committees on the 
ground that the only information they could furnish resulted from 
conversations with, or advice given to, the President.” He supported 
the doctrine by noting that “[s]ubpoenas have been quashed [in judicial 
proceedings] where it appeared that all the testimony to be elicited 
from a witness would be privileged.”270 Rehnquist urged Congress to 
“distinguish” between senior presidential advisers and agency officials, 
arguing the “former should not be required to appear at all, since all of 
their official responsibilities would be subject to a claim of privilege.”271 
In short, because almost all of the information a senior presidential 
adviser could testify to about his or her official duties would be 
sensitive information, the adviser would not appear at all to protect 
that information. 
But as Congress has gotten more aggressive in seeking to compel 
testimony from close presidential advisers—usually for political gain—
the executive branch’s theory has grown well beyond a policy designed 
to protect the confidentiality of presidential communications, and has 
become an absolute immunity based on the status of the individual and 
formal separation of powers principles.272 The executive branch has 
developed the immunity doctrine into an absolute position that 
authorizes the president to direct all current and former senior advisers 
to refuse to comply with a congressional subpoena if the requested 
testimony relates to the advisers’ “official duties,” even if much of the 
 
 269. Rehnquist Memorandum, supra note 21, at 5–7.  
 270. Executive Privilege Hearings, supra note 1, at 435, 437 (statement of William H. 
Rehnquist, Assistant Att’y Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, United States Department of Justice). 
 271. Id. at 437. 
 272. See McGahn Immunity Opinion, supra note 118, at 3–7; Immunity of the Assistant to the 
President & Dir. of the Off. of Pol. Strategy & Outreach from Cong. Subpoena, 38 Op. O.L.C., 
slip op. at 1–3 (July 15, 2014).  
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relevant information has already been made public and the “official 
duties” are entirely unrelated to advising the president or to 
presidential communications.273  
The executive branch’s assertion that the president has the 
authority to direct a former official not to comply with a congressional 
subpoena based on the doctrine of immunity illuminates its 
fundamental theoretical understanding of executive privilege as an 
affirmative constitutional authority. OLC has never publicly provided 
a rationale to support such an authority over private citizens. It can 
only be explained as a direct consequence of the executive branch’s 
doctrine that executive privilege provides the president an affirmative, 
absolute authority to control the disclosure of information to 
Congress.274 And the fact the president has constitutional authority to 
combat any congressional action threatens that authority. 
b. Protective Assertion of Executive Privilege.  The second 
prophylactic doctrine is the concept of a “protective” assertion of 
executive privilege. If a congressional committee insists on a rapid 
response to an information demand, the president can utilize a 
“protective assertion” of executive privilege, which allows the 
executive branch to immunize the official responsible for withholding 
the information without the need for an actual assertion of executive 
privilege, any balancing, or review of particular documents.275 Instead, 
the executive branch claims that the president has the authority to 
 
 273. See Testimonial Immunity Before Cong. of the Assistant to the President & Senior 
Couns. to the President, 43 Op. O.L.C., slip op. at 3 (July 12, 2019) (concluding that Kellyanne 
Conway was immune from a subpoena seeking her testimony about Hatch Act violations reported 
by the Office of Special Counsel because her public press statements were part of her official 
duties).  
 274. See Jonathan Shaub, The Little-Noticed Way the McGahn Litigation Could Shape 
Congressional Oversight, LAWFARE (Aug. 23, 2019, 11:54 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/
little-noticed-way-mcgahn-litigation-could-shape-congressional-oversight [https://perma.cc/
EUL7-W2MA]; Jonathan Shaub, Testimonial Immunity, Executive Privilege and the President’s 
Authority over Former Officials, LAWFARE (May 22, 2019, 6:34 PM), https://
www.lawfareblog.com/testimonial-immunity-executive-privilege-and-presidents-authority-over-
former-officials [https://perma.cc/D5MQ-23KL]. 
 275. See White House Couns. Assertion, supra note 66, at 1; Letter from William P. Barr, 
Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Just., to President Donald J. Trump 2 (May 8, 2019), https://int.nyt.com/
data/documenthelper/819-barr-trump-letter-privilege/fe8c83dc6778bfe4bb74/optimized/full.pdf#page=1 
[https://perma.cc/L5DU-UXK3] (requesting that the President make a “preliminary, protective 
assertion of executive privilege designed to ensure [his] ability to make a final assertion, if 
necessary, over some or all of the subpoenaed materials”); ‘Protective’ Assertion, supra note 124.  
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make a protective assertion of executive privilege to ensure the 
executive branch has an opportunity to review the documents to 
determine if they fit within the scope of executive privilege. 
President Clinton was the first to use this tactic, making a 
protective assertion of privilege over a collection of documents from 
the White House Counsel’s Office that had been subpoenaed by a 
congressional committee.276 The opinion claimed that the protective 
assertion was necessary because of the “deadline imposed” by the 
committee and “the volume of documents that must be specifically and 
individually reviewed for possible assertion of privilege and the need 
under the directive to consult with the Attorney General.”277 The 
protective assertion was “designed to ensure [the president’s] ability to 
make a final decision . . . as to which specific documents [were] 
deserving of a conclusive claim of executive privilege.”278 Clinton’s 
protective assertion was, accordingly, followed by a formal assertion in 
a matter of weeks. The opinion supporting this assertion undertook a 
balancing inquiry and ultimately withheld only selected documents.279  
In response to committees moving more quickly to use contempt 
to force the president to take the politically accountable step of 
formally declaring privilege, the executive branch watered down the 
idea of a protective assertion of privilege.280 President Trump, relying 
on the Clinton precedent, made a protective assertion of privilege on 
two separate occasions. The first assertion was invoked in response to 
a subpoena for a large set of documents related to the investigation of 
Special Counsel Robert Mueller.281 The second assertion was invoked 
against a much smaller set of documents related to the Commerce 
Department’s decision to include a citizenship question on the U.S. 
 
 276. White House Couns. Assertion, supra note 66, at 1; see also Prophylactic Executive 
Privilege, supra note 240 (“The first [protective assertion] was by President Clinton.”).  
 277. White House Couns. Assertion, supra note 66, at 1.  
 278. Id. 
 279. See id. at 2 (outlining a formal assertion on May 23, 1996 over certain documents out of 
the set over which President Clinton made a protective assertion on May 8, 1996). 
 280. See Prophylactic Executive Privilege, supra note 240.  
 281. Letter from Stephen E. Boyd, Assistant Att’y Gen., Off. of Legis. Affs., U.S. Dep’t of 
Just., to Jerrold Nadler, Chairman, House Comm. on the Judiciary 1 (May 8, 2019), 
https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/5993527/Chairman-Nadler-Letter-8-May-2019.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/YWU8-M6KU] (advising the committee “that the President has asserted 
executive privilege over the entirety of the subpoenaed materials” and the “this protective 
assertion of executive privilege ensures the President’s ability to make a final decision whether to 
assert privilege following a full review of these materials”). 
SHAUB IN PRINTER FINAL_9.22.20 (DO NOT DELETE) 9/22/2020  2:41 PM 
2020] THE EXECUTIVE’S PRIVILEGE 67 
Census.282 President Trump’s protective assertions, however, have not 
been followed up by formal assertions.283 Instead, as happened in the 
evolution of the subpoena, the protective assertions appear to have 
become simply another phase in the ongoing negotiations. A protective 
assertion of privilege has become another tool the executive branch 
may use to assert a prophylactic form of executive privilege and avoid 
the balancing inquiry that is at the heart of the privilege.284 The 
executive branch’s noncompliance with the relevant subpoenas was 
justified solely by the need to protect the president’s underlying 
authority, and that need requires no balancing of congressional 
interests. 
A protective assertion of privilege, like a formal assertion, informs 
the committee that the executive branch official will not comply with 
the congressional subpoena—and will not be prosecuted for contempt 
for that noncompliance—because the president needs more time to 
review the documents to determine if any of them warrant an actual 
assertion of executive privilege. But, unlike a formal assertion of 
privilege, a protective assertion dispenses with any need to analyze the 
specific information or to weigh the executive branch’s confidentiality 
interests against the congressional need for that information.285 It 
establishes an absolute shield that prevents the inquiry from even 
reaching the situational, qualified balancing that applies to a formal 
assertion of executive privilege. If the congressional subpoena is for 
only a single document or a small set of documents, or if the committee 
narrows its subpoena to only require production of a small set of 
“priority documents,” then a protective assertion is not possible.286 But, 
in those cases, the balancing necessary for a formal assertion is much 
 
 282. Boyd-Cummings Letter, supra note 69, at 2.  
 283. President Trump’s protective assertion over the census documents was accompanied by 
a formal assertion over a specific set of “priority” documents that the committee had identified. 
See id.; see also Prophylactic Executive Privilege, supra note 240. But the protective assertion—
which was justified by the need to review the rest of the documents to consider a formal claim of 
privilege—was never followed by a formal assertion over any subset of those documents. 
Prophylactic Executive Privilege, supra note 240.  
 284. See Julie Hirschfeld Davis & Charlie Savage, Census Fight Grows as House Panel Backs 
Contempt and Trump Asserts Privilege, N.Y. TIMES (June 12, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/
2019/06/12/us/politics/us-census-2020-trump.html [https://perma.cc/KY8Q-YHEH] (describing 
the ongoing negotiations over documents related to the inclusion of a citizenship question on the 
2020 census); Nicholas Fandos, Accord Opens Up Key Documents in Mueller Files, N.Y. TIMES, 
June 11, 2019, at A1 (discussing the negotiations over documents related to the Mueller report). 
 285. See Prophylactic Executive Privilege, supra note 240. 
 286. See id. (noting that a protective assertion of executive privilege was not a possibility for 
the president over the “priority documents” identified and subpoenaed by the committee).  
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easier. It is almost impossible to establish a “demonstrable need” for a 
few specific documents, particularly when Congress has no idea what 
is in those documents. 
c. Deposition-Counsel Requirement.  The third—and most 
recent—prophylactic doctrine established by the executive branch is 
the purportedly constitutional requirement that executive branch 
officials be accompanied by agency counsel at congressional 
depositions. As the House of Representatives expanded the number of 
committees able to issue subpoenas for staff depositions, various 
committees started to use this authority to attempt to question agency 
officials in person after subpoenas for documents went unanswered. 
OLC, relying on scattered suggestions in past executive branch writings 
over the years, issued a formal opinion concluding that executive 
branch officials have the absolute authority to direct an inferior official 
not to comply with a congressional subpoena seeking a deposition if 
agency counsel is excluded, as it would be under the House rules.287 
The opinion rests on the premise that any burden on the president’s 
authority to control the dissemination of information is 
unconstitutional—and may be countermanded by a presidential 
directive, without any need to analyze or balance congressional 
interest.288  
Therefore, this prophylactic doctrine, like the others, is absolute, 
despite the fact that the underlying authority the privilege is 
purportedly necessary to protect—the president’s authority to control 
the dissemination of information—is qualified. Of course, the lack of 
agency counsel would not definitively result in the disclosure of any 
potentially privileged information. OLC had formerly concluded that 
an agency could pay private counsel to accompany the executive 
branch employee or official and that private counsel could work with 
the agency to ensure the individual did not disclose any privileged 
 
 287. See Attempted Exclusion of Agency Couns., supra note 3, at 13 (“[We] further advised 
that the subpoenas that required [executive branch employees] to appear without agency counsel, 
over the Executive Branch’s objections, exceeded the Committee’s lawful authority and therefore 
lacked legal effect.”). 
 288. See id. at 2 (concluding that Congress could “not compel an executive branch witness to 
appear without agency counsel” as it would “compromise the President’s constitutional authority 
to control the disclosure of privileged information and to supervise the Executive Branch’s 
communications with congressional entities”).  
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information.289 But OLC then went further, concluding that even the 
possibility of an inadvertent disclosure or failure of private counsel to 
protect anything potentially privileged was an unconstitutional burden 
on the president’s prerogative.290  
*   *   * 
These prophylactic doctrines are justified by the need to “protect” 
the president’s absolute authority to control the wide swath of 
information covered by the components of executive privilege. They 
are absolute. They require no balancing or inquiry into Congress’s 
interests, needs, or constitutional authority. And they cannot be 
described as policies or practices designed to ensure the president can 
consider executive privilege when necessary. Rather, these doctrines 
are, to the executive branch, constitutional requirements that Congress 
cannot countermand by statute or by any other means. The immunity 
of senior advisers, protective assertions of privilege, and the 
deposition-counsel requirement shield executive branch officials from 
any punishment for refusing congressional information demands.  
The president retains the authority to formally assert executive 
privilege over specific documents and information because of the 
concrete, identifiable harm they may cause to particular interests or 
even their institutional harm. But he almost never has to take that step. 
President Trump has asserted boldly that he would “fight ‘all the 
subpoenas,’” and his administration’s refusal to engage in the 
accommodation process in many instances291 led to a spate of 
commentary that the administration was distorting executive privilege 
or acting unlawfully.292 And he was impeached for obstructing the 
House’s impeachment inquiry by refusing to comply with the House’s 
 
 289. See Auth. of the Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs. To Pay for Priv. Couns. To Represent 
an Emp. Before Cong. Comms., 41 Op. O.L.C., slip op. at 1 (Jan. 18, 2017) (“An agency may thus 
retain and pay for such counsel if it has both statutory authority and an available appropriation 
to do so.”).  
 290. Attempted Exclusion of Agency Couns., supra note 3, at 17–18. 
 291. See Jeremy Diamond & Allie Malloy, Trump at War with Democrats: ‘We’re Fighting All 
the Subpoenas,’ CNN (Apr. 24, 2019, 3:40 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2019/04/24/politics/donald-
trump-fight-subpoenas-don-mcgahn-ridiculous/index.html [https://perma.cc/D4TC-LL8X].  
 292. See, e.g., John E. Bies, Constitutional Hardball and Congress’s Oversight Authority, 
LAWFARE (Apr. 27, 2019, 10:00 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/constitutional-hardball-and-
congresss-oversight-authority [https://perma.cc/46AV-9HJU].  
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subpoenas.293 Yet he only formally asserted executive privilege once, 
over a small number of census documents.294 Similarly, the Republican-
controlled House lambasted the Obama administration’s failure to 
comply with its subpoenas.295 But President Obama only formally 
asserted the privilege once.296  
The practices and doctrines on which the executive branch 
currently relies to fetter congressional oversight are almost wholly 
prophylactic ones, designed to protect the president’s asserted 
authority to control the dissemination of information. And they are 
justified, as a matter of constitutional theory, as necessary to protect 
that affirmative constitutional authority. To the extent “executive 
privilege” is used to refer to the president’s authority to withhold 
information from Congress, these prophylactic measures are executive 
privilege. And they render Congress unable to conduct oversight and 
even unable to compel evidence when considering impeachment. The 
conflation of executive privilege with undifferentiated “components,” 
which encompass an enormous amount of information and the 
centralization of information control in the president, has led to an 
imbalance between the branches. Redressing that imbalance requires 
establishing a theoretical account of executive privilege that recognizes 
the legitimate confidentiality interests and information needs of the 
two branches but prevents the executive branch from relying on 
prophylaxis to render its interests superior. The following section sets 
out one such theoretical framework, the Executive’s privilege.  
III.  THE EXECUTIVE’S PRIVILEGE 
Current thought accepts the existence “of two implied powers 
under the Constitution” that serve to counteract each other—
 
 293. H.R. Res. 766, 116th Cong. art. II (2019) (“Donald J. Trump has directed the 
unprecedented, categorical, and indiscriminate defiance of subpoenas issued by the House of 
Representatives pursuant to its ‘sole Power of Impeachment.’”). 
 294. See Boyd-Cummings Letter, supra note 69, at 2 (notifying Chairman Cummings that the 
president asserted his executive privilege over census documents). 
 295. See, e.g., Lamar Smith, Ed Royce, Jeff Miller, Trey Gowdy, Jeb Hensarling & Jason 
Chaffetz, Mr. Obama, Don’t Let Secrecy Be Your Legacy: Republican Chairmen, USA TODAY 
(Feb. 9, 2016, 1:05 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2016/02/09/obama-
administration-least-transparent-epa-state-doj-clinton-benghazi-column/80050428 [https://perma.cc/ 
ASR9-QEZY]. 
 296. See PRESIDENTIAL CLAIMS OF EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE, supra note 39, at 27–28; Fast & 
Furious Assertion, supra note 28, at 8 (concluding that the president “may properly assert 
executive privilege over the documents at issue” and “request[ing] that [he] do so”). 
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congressional oversight and executive privilege.297 As Rehnquist 
explained, “The Constitution does not expressly confer upon the 
executive any such privilege, any more than it expressly confers upon 
Congress the right to use compulsory process in the aid of its legislative 
function.”298 Congress understands executive privilege to extend no 
further than the facts of Nixon, which provided a qualified privilege 
against only the production of presidential communications, a category 
that Congress defines narrowly.299 And it understands its own implied 
authority to demand information from the executive branch in support 
of its constitutional functions as virtually unlimited. The executive 
branch, as described, understands executive privilege as an implied, 
affirmative constitutional authority that allows the president to control 
the dissemination of a broad scope of information.300 Executive 
privilege, it believes, applies equally to oversight, impeachment, and 
legislation, a position adopted by OLC in the context of the 
impeachment of President Trump.301 
But instead of inferring countervailing constitutional authorities 
to maintain a particular constitutional balance, the simpler—and more 
methodologically sound—position is that neither implied authority 
exists, at least as conceived by each respective branch. That is, 
Congress lacks the oversight authority to compel the president to 
disclose information, and the president has no affirmative authority to 
control the dissemination of information within and outside of the 
executive branch. Instead, the best understanding of executive 
privilege is not as an evidentiary privilege or affirmative constitutional 
authority, but as a true “privilege” in the constitutional sense,302 a 
 
 297. Peterson, supra note 7, at 81. 
 298. Executive Privilege Hearings, supra note 1, at 429 (statement of William H. Rehnquist, 
Assistant Att’y Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, United States Department of Justice). 
 299. See PRESIDENTIAL CLAIMS OF EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE, supra note 39, at 22; see also 
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Plaintiff ’s Motion for Summary Judgment 
at 19–20, Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform v. Holder, 979 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2013) (No. 
1:12-cv-1332); Wright, supra note 4, at 444. 
 300. See supra Part I. 
 301. See, e.g., Exclusion of Agency Couns. from Cong. Depositions in the Impeachment 
Context, 43 Op. O.L.C., slip op. at 2–3 (Nov. 1, 2019) [hereinafter Depositions in the 
Impeachment Context]. In the memorandum, OLC did acknowledge that the showing of need 
Congress has to make to overcome a privilege assertion may be different in the impeachment 
context. See id. at 3 n.1. But it did not have to address that question because the prophylactic 
deposition-counsel requirement eliminated the need for any balancing of interests. Id. 
 302. See supra note 14 and accompanying text. 
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presidential immunity from compelled process for purposes of 
oversight—the Executive’s privilege.  
The Executive’s privilege is a limitation on Congress’s implied 
oversight authority—or more accurately, a refusal to infer 
congressional oversight authority to issue compelled process to the 
president because of the significant separation of powers concerns that 
inference would engender. Given the Constitution’s specific checks 
and balances between the two branches, as well as historical practice 
dating to George Washington, it would represent a significant, 
additional interpretive step to infer congressional authority to compel 
the president to provide information in furtherance of legislative or 
oversight authority.  
The Executive’s privilege, however, applies only to congressional 
oversight authority.303 History makes clear that there is no such 
limitation on Congress’s impeachment authority. Nor would the 
Executive’s privilege be relevant to Congress’s express authority to 
draft and pass legislation that is “necessary and proper” to the 
fulfillment of its constitutional duties.304 
Executive privilege is not an affirmative authority to control the 
dissemination of particular categories of information, as the executive 
branch currently understands it. It is a lack of congressional oversight 
authority to compel the president to disclose information. The 
president must make the factual showing necessary to invoke such a 
privilege, however. In the words of Rehnquist, executive privilege, as 
historically understood, requires “a demonstrable justification that 
executive withholding will further the public interest” and cannot be 
based solely on undifferentiated confidentiality interests.305 The 
current impotence of Congress in oversight disputes results directly 
from the executive branch’s creation of a freestanding affirmative 
presidential authority to control information. Eliminating that 
freestanding constitutional authority would restore some balance to 
the branches and radically alter the practice of oversight.306 And it 
would provide a shared theoretical and constitutional foundation on 
 
 303. See infra Part III.B. 
 304. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. 
 305. Executive Privilege Hearings, supra note 1, at 431 (statement of William H. Rehnquist, 
Assistant Att’y Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, United States Department of Justice). 
 306. Other reforms, including legislation, could try to balance the legitimate confidentiality 
interests of the executive branch with the legislative and oversight interests of Congress. Such 
reforms are only possible, however, if there is a shared constitutional understanding of executive 
privilege and if the current prophylactic executive privilege is eliminated. 
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the basis of which individual privilege disputes could be negotiated and 
litigated instead of each branch retreating to its own, diametrically 
opposed constitutional theory. Most scholarship on executive privilege 
ultimately rejects this pursuit and concludes that it is either futile or 
unwise to attempt to resolve the longstanding constitutional dispute 
between the branches. Rozell, for example, decides that “[t]here is no 
need for any precise definition of the constitutional boundaries 
surrounding executive privilege” and that “[s]uch a power cannot be 
subject to precise definition.” But the “do nothing” approach is no 
longer possible given the development of the prophylactic executive 
privilege, at least if one believes congressional oversight has some 
inherent value. Although it may not be possible to choose in advance 
whether the Constitution dictates that the executive branch or 
Congress should win in any individual dispute, finding a common 
constitutional ground is possible—and necessary. 
A. The Executive’s Privilege as Immunity from Congressional 
Oversight Process 
Where the president is the subject of congressional oversight and 
inquiry, executive privilege should not be understood as a doctrine 
about an affirmative, implied constitutional authority belonging to the 
president. It is not an affirmative “privilege” that the president may 
exercise. Instead, it is an immunity belonging to the president, a 
limitation on Congress’s implied constitutional authority. Although 
Congress may investigate, call for information, and issue compulsory 
process generally in support of its oversight authority, the president is 
privileged against such process. Or, in other words, Congress’s general, 
implied oversight powers of inquiry do not encompass the president. 
1. An Immunity Grounded in Historical Practice.  The 
comprehensive histories of “executive privilege” that others have 
undertaken provide substantial support for this view. As just a few 
early examples illustrate, President George Washington’s Cabinet, 
which, at the time, included Alexander Hamilton, Henry Knox, 
Edmund Randolph, and Thomas Jefferson, was “of one mind,” that, 
although a House investigative committee could call for papers, “the 
Executive ought to communicate such papers as the public good would 
permit, [and] ought to refuse those the disclosure of which would injure 
the public.” Neither a committee nor the House “ha[s] a right to call 
on the head of a dep[artment], who [and] whose papers were under the 
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[president] alone, but that the comm[ittee should] instruct their 
chairman to move the [H]ouse to address the President.”307  
In 1794, the Senate initially “direct[ed]” Secretary of State 
Edmund Randolph to disclose diplomatic correspondence, but then 
amended the motion to address the president and to “request” rather 
than “direct” that the president disclose the correspondence.308 House 
resolutions of inquiry continue to make that distinction today, directing 
lower executive officials to provide information but merely requesting 
that the president do so.309 In response to the Senate’s amended 
resolution addressing the president in 1794, Attorney General William 
Bradford concluded it was “the duty of the Executive to withhold such 
parts of the said correspondence as in the judgment of the Executive 
shall be deemed unsafe and improper to be disclosed.”310 The Senate 
resolution did not include, as others had, an express exception allowing 
the president to withhold parts of the requested information, but 
Bradford reasoned that  
[e]very call of this nature, where the correspondence is secret and no 
specific object pointed at, must be presumed to proceed upon the idea 
that the papers requested are proper to be communicated[;] & it could 
scarcely be supposed, even if the words were stronger[,] that the 
Senate intended to include any Letters[,] the disclosure of which 
might endanger national honour or individual safety.311  
Similarly, as president, Thomas Jefferson responded to a House 
resolution requesting information about the conspiracy against the 
United States involving Vice President Aaron Burr by providing all 
information relevant to Burr but withholding other names.312 As 
Jefferson explained, “[i]n this state of the evidence, delivered 
sometimes, too, under the restriction of private confidence, neither 
safety nor justice will permit the exposing names, except that of the 
 
 307. Thomas Jefferson, Anas (Apr. 18, 1793), reprinted in 1 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS 
JEFFERSON 189–90 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., N.Y., G.P. Putnam’s Sons 1892).  
 308. See Abraham D. Sofaer, Executive Privilege: An Historical Note, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 
1318, 1319 (1975). 
 309. See HOUSE RESOLUTIONS OF INQUIRY, supra note 145, at 1–2.  
 310. Sofaer, supra note 308, at 1320. 
 311. Walter Dellinger & H. Jefferson Powell, The Attorney General’s First Separation of 
Powers Opinion, 13 CONST. COMMENT. 309, 316 (1996) (reprinting Bradford’s opinion in full). 
 312. Hist. of Refusals I, supra note 34, at 754–55. 
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principal actor, whose guilt is placed beyond question.”313 And 
President James Monroe refused to provide information about 
particular charges against a naval officer, reasoning that “the 
publication of those documents might tend to excite prejudices which 
might operate to the injury of” the ongoing investigations of the 
charges against the officer.314 
President Andrew Jackson, faced with an information request, 
opined that the  
executive is a coordinate and independent branch of the Government 
equally with the Senate, and I have yet to learn under what 
constitutional authority that branch of the Legislature has a right to 
require of me an account of any communication, either verbally or in 
writing, made to the heads of Departments acting as a Cabinet 
council.315  
And after the Senate called for papers from an executive branch 
official in the Bureau of Corporations relating to President Theodore 
Roosevelt’s decision not to use the Sherman Act to block an 
acquisition, the president “ordered [the official] in writing to turn over 
to [him] all the papers in the case” and informed a senator that “[t]he 
only way the Senate or the committee can get those papers now is 
through my impeachment.”316 
The history of presidents withholding documents from Congress 
is replete with similar statements and refusals to turn over information, 
each based on the identified, concrete harm the disclosure of particular 
information would cause.317 And even skeptics of executive privilege 
recognize this history, though they interpret it differently318 and more 
narrowly. They construe historical resolutions “requesting,” rather 
than demanding, information from the president as examples in which 
Congress did not use its full constitutional authority, rather than 
historical recognition of the Executive’s privilege against compelled 
 
 313. Thomas Jefferson, Message to the Senate and House of Representatives (Jan. 22, 1807), 
in 1 MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS, supra note 43, at 400.  
 314. James Monroe, Message to the House of Representatives (Jan. 10, 1825), in 2 MESSAGES 
AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS, supra note 43, at 847. 
 315. Andrew Jackson, Special Recorded Message to Senate (Dec. 12, 1833), in 3 MESSAGES 
AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS, supra note 43, at 1255. 
 316. Cox, supra note 2, at 1403–04 & n.72. 
 317. See EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE, supra note 5, at 29–44 (collecting the historical examples). 
 318. See RECLAIMING ACCOUNTABILITY, supra note 16, at 88–91. 
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congressional process.319 These historical examples can be—and have 
been—interpreted in a variety of ways, particularly as to the scope of 
the president’s authority to withhold information and the types of 
information over which he may exercise that authority.  
But these historical examples establish, quite clearly, that the 
Framers and subsequent presidents believed—as the executive branch 
does now—that Congress’s oversight authority to demand information 
from the president is not unlimited and that the president has some 
inherent discretion about when to comply with those demands based 
on identified, concrete harms that disclosure could engender. This 
historical gloss is particularly vital here because there is no 
constitutional text to rely on and no Supreme Court precedent 
addressing executive privilege in the context of congressional 
oversight.320 Moreover, each branch uses historical practice as the 
foundation for making its constitutional arguments and explaining the 
doctrine of executive privilege.321 And the Supreme Court has affirmed 
that “longstanding practice” should be “‘a consideration of great 
weight’ in cases concerning ‘the allocation of power between [the] two 
elected branches of Government.’”322 Understanding the nature of that 
historical practice is thus paramount in determining the validity of the 
executive branch’s more recent constitutional doctrine. 
Recognizing that the only constitutional “privilege” in the context 
of congressional oversight is the Executive’s privilege against 
compelled congressional process is consistent with this historical 
practice, but also eliminates the affirmative presidential authority that 
 
 319. See, e.g., id.; Cox, supra note 2, at 1397 (eliminating a number of historical examples from 
the list of historical claims of privilege “upon the ground that the congressional request explicitly 
stated that the President should decide whether furnishing the papers would be in the public 
interest” because, in such situations, “there was no need for a claim of constitutional right”). 
 320. See NLRB v. Noel Canning, 573 U.S. 513, 526 (2014) (“We have not previously 
interpreted the Clause, and, when doing so for the first time in more than 200 years, we must 
hesitate to upset the compromises and working arrangements that the elected branches of 
Government themselves have reached.”); Curtis A. Bradley & Trevor W. Morrison, Historical 
Gloss and the Separation of Powers, 126 HARV. L. REV. 411, 417–18 (2012) (highlighting the 
significance of gloss for interpreting the separation of powers, a subject on which the Constitution 
provides little guidance). 
 321. See Hist. of Refusals I, supra note 34, at 751; Hist. of Refusals II, supra note 34, at 783, 
796; TODD GARVEY & ALISSA M. DOLAN, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R42670, PRESIDENTIAL CLAIMS 
OF EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE: HISTORY, LAW, PRACTICE, AND RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 1 (2012) 
(discussing the various judicial precedents and dating the doctrine to 1792). 
 322. Trump v. Mazars USA, LLP, 140 S. Ct. 2019, 2031 (2020) (alteration in original) (quoting 
Noel Canning, 573 U.S. at 524–26). 
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underlies the executive branch’s current prophylactic doctrine. Some 
scholars would go farther and assert that the president has no 
constitutional authority to withhold information at all.323 They argue 
based on history, theory, and structuralism that the executive privilege 
is a “myth” and the executive branch must yield to congressional 
demands.324 In that conception, this kind of complete congressional 
access furthers transparency and democracy and is more in line with 
the Constitution’s design and elevation of the people above the 
monarchy.325  
But rejecting the existence of executive privilege entirely goes too 
far. History largely refutes that view,326 and the Supreme Court 
recognized the existence of constitutional confidentiality interests in 
Nixon.327 As a practical matter, in the information age in which so much 
discussion, debate, and correspondence occurs in archivable, 
searchable digital files, a constitutional structure that allows a single, 
politically motivated subcommittee chairman, or even a single house 
of Congress, to unilaterally require the president to turn over any 
information is troubling. The deliberations of the Department of 
Justice over ongoing litigation could be publicly disclosed to the 
litigation opponent by a single unfriendly legislator. All of the evidence 
and sources in a criminal investigation could be laid bare before its 
completion. Preliminary agency deliberations concerning 
administrative actions that were not favored by a particular committee 
chairman could be disclosed to members of that industry, spurring 
market changes, litigation, or political and financial pressure on the 
agency’s decision-making.  
 
 323. See, e.g., Secrecy and Separated Powers, supra note 10, at 493–96 (“This Article concludes 
that there is no such thing as a constitutionally based executive privilege, and courts—in the face 
of executive privilege claims—should order compliance with any statutorily authorized demands 
for executive branch information.”). 
 324. See generally BERGER, supra note 5 (arguing that the president does not have any 
constitutional authority to refuse to provide information and that the historical examples on 
which the executive branch and scholars have relied do not support any such privilege). 
 325. See Aziz Huq, ‘Executive Privilege’ is a New Concept Built on a Shaky Legal Foundation, 
WASH. POST (May 10, 2019, 10:07 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/executive-
privilege-is-a-new-concept-built-on-a-shaky-legal-foundation/2019/05/10/fa92b82e-7292-11e9-
9eb4-0828f5389013_story.html [https://perma.cc/HEX2-YYDN] (arguing that executive privilege 
“is a late, dubious addition to constitutional law” and that “democracy and the rule of law are ill-
served by the concept”).  
 326. EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE, supra note 5, at 195–208; see also supra text accompanying notes 
312–26. 
 327. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 705–06 (1974). 
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None of these require bad faith on the part of the committee. 
Heightened political instincts would suffice, and institutional ignorance 
may exacerbate the problem. When deciding what to release, members 
of Congress and their staff may not understand the sensitivity of the 
information sought or may not trust the executive branch’s descriptions 
of the need to maintain its confidentiality. Possibly, the material could 
be so politically helpful that the member is willing to accept whatever 
damage it may cause. Carelessness, of course, can also result in 
unwarranted disclosure, particularly with so many moving parts and 
people in the legislative process.  
Most people acknowledge the need for some secrecy—at least 
temporarily—in the operation of the executive branch. But the 
question of how to protect those legitimate confidentiality interests 
without allowing the executive branch to use them as cover for 
wrongdoing or for political gain has proven an intractable one. The 
crux of the disagreement is over what law to apply. 
Recognizing the Executive’s privilege for what it is, an immunity 
from compelled congressional oversight process, provides a 
mechanism for resolving that disagreement. Concluding that Congress 
lacks absolute authority to compel the president to provide 
information does not empower the president so long as that 
recognition is coupled with the historical requirement that executive 
privilege is a contingent, fact-specific decision. This recognition would 
prevent the executive branch from employing prophylactic executive 
privilege without taking Congress’s interests into account and would 
eliminate its ability to rely on broad, undifferentiated confidentiality 
interests. 
2. A Contingent Immunity.  The Executive’s privilege, as 
historically understood and practiced, is a contingent immunity, one 
dependent on the president’s personal decision that the disclosure of 
the specific information requested—in whatever form that disclosure 
has been requested and with whatever accompanying limitations on 
further, or public, disclosure are available—would cause concrete, 
identified harm. As Professor Heidi Kitrosser describes the early 
historical examples of the Executive’s privilege, “each claim was 
made[,] explained openly . . . [and] defended in a fact-specific 
manner.”328 The President would determine that the release of specific 
 
 328. See RECLAIMING ACCOUNTABILITY, supra note 16, at 90. 
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information would cause identifiable damage and explain that 
decision. The exercise of the Executive’s privilege was thus largely a 
factual determination based on the specific information sought.329  
Early assertions of executive privilege in the post-Watergate era, 
as the executive branch doctrine began to develop, followed this 
historical, situational model quite closely. In 1984, for example, OLC 
concluded that documents could be withheld pursuant to executive 
privilege because “disclosure of the . . . investigative documents 
w[ould] substantially interfere with the Department’s ongoing criminal 
investigation in that case.”330 The opinion discussed the principles that 
support a general confidentiality interest in open law enforcement files, 
but also went further to analyze the “[s]pecific [a]pplication” of those 
principles to the investigation at issue.331 And it drew from a statement 
prepared by the lead trial attorney on the investigation that “outline[d] 
the specific ways in which release of prosecutive or investigative 
memoranda would interfere with the ongoing investigation.”332 
Similarly, a 1981 opinion by Attorney General William French 
Smith supporting an assertion of executive privilege explained that 
OLC and the attorney general had reviewed the documents and 
concluded that they “relate[d] to sensitive foreign policy 
considerations” or were “of a highly deliberative nature and involve[d] 
an ongoing decisional process of considerable sensitivity” involving 
Canada.333 The opinion identified concrete harm as the basis for the 
assertion:  
Because the policy options considered in many of these documents 
[we]re still under review in the Executive Branch, disclosure to the 
Subcommittee at th[at] present time could [have] distort[ed] that 
decisional process by causing the Executive Branch officials to modify 
 
 329. See Rex E. Lee, Executive Privilege, Congressional Subpoena Power, and Judicial 
Review: Three Branches, Three Powers, and Some Relationships, 1978 BYU L. REV. 231, 251 
(1978) (“[E]xecutive privilege . . . permit[s] the President to withhold information whose 
dissemination, in his considered view, would be sufficiently detrimental to the public 
interest . . . .”); Shalev Roisman, Presidential Factfinding, 72 VAND. L. REV. 825, 836 (2019). 
 330. Cong. Subpoenas of Dep’t of Just. Investigative Files, 8 Op. O.L.C. 252, 254 (1984).  
 331. Id. at 266. 
 332. Id. 
 333. Assertion of Exec. Privilege in Response to a Cong. Subpoena, 5 Op. O.L.C. 27–29, 32 
(1981). 
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policy positions they would otherwise espouse because of actual, 
threatened, or anticipated congressional reaction.334  
The opinion then continued, citing Nixon, to also rely on the damage 
to “future Executive Branch deliberations” if disclosure were 
permitted.335 
The historical emphasis on situational, fact-specific claims of 
privilege is illustrated by Chief Justice John Marshall’s opinion in the 
Burr trial, in which he stated that the court would respect a specific 
presidential determination “that in his judgment the public interest 
required certain parts of [the subpoenaed letter] to be kept secret” but 
that it would not simply accept “no reason whatever for withholding 
the paper” other than an assertion that it was confidential.336 His 
opinion, like the early claims of privilege, required a reason specific to 
the identified information to justify withholding it, not a general interest 
in confidentiality of the type of information or a generalized interest in 
confidentiality itself.337 The initial writings on privilege in the modern, 
post-Watergate era reflected this same principle, including Rehnquist’s 
formulation that there must be a “demonstrable justification” that “the 
disclosure of particular matters sought would be harmful” to a specific 
national interest.338 
Moreover, restoring identified, concrete harm deriving from the 
disclosure of specific information as the exclusive criterion for the 
invocation of the Executive’s privilege would narrow the scope of 
information potentially encompassed by the Executive’s privilege and 
eliminate the implied “constitutionalization” of the oversight process 
that has rendered Congress virtually impotent. The focus on the effect 
of disclosure would also restore the inquiry to a situational balancing, 
weighing potential harm from the disclosure of particular documents 
against the congressional need for them.  
Executive branch agencies would no longer be reviewing 
subpoenaed information to see if it would potentially fall within a 
particular component and then claiming that all of that material would 
have to await a presidential decision on privilege or waiver. Instead, 
 
 334. Id. at 29. 
 335. Id. 
 336. United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 187, 192 (C.C. Va. 1807). 
 337. Id.  
 338. Executive Privilege Hearings, supra note 1, at 431 (statement of William H. Rehnquist, 
Assistant Att’y Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, United States Department of Justice). 
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the review would be for the Executive’s privilege, which would entail 
the identification of specific information the disclosure of which would 
cause concrete, identified harm. Only that information would 
necessitate presidential review if the congressional committee 
continued to push for it. Generalized, undifferentiated interests in 
potential harm would not be a valid basis for the exercise of—or review 
of—the Executive’s privilege.339 As Archibald Cox explained, after 
cataloguing the history of putative privilege assertions, “nothing 
appears which even approaches a solid historical practice of 
recognizing claims of executive privilege based upon an 
undifferentiated need for preserving the secrecy of internal 
communications within the Executive Branch.”340  
Separating the Executive’s privilege—a constitutional 
immunity—from the various components and undifferentiated 
confidentiality interests also more closely aligns the privilege with the 
needs of the executive branch. There are categories of information that 
do not have historical analogues and may not be protected by the 
existing common law privileges on which the components of executive 
privilege are based. If the Executive’s privilege is confined to the 
recognized components, then such information cannot be protected no 
matter its potential detrimental impact. For example, the Department 
of Health and Human Services resisted oversight requests sent to a 
third-party contractor who had conducted cybersecurity tests of the 
website healthcare.gov. The department was worried that if these 
reports were turned over to Congress, they could be released publicly 
or otherwise fall into the wrong hands.341 The public release of the 
information would have provided hackers and others a “roadmap” to 
attack the website, a specific harm that the executive branch had valid 
 
 339. This does not mean that there could not be other mechanisms, including legislation, for 
recognizing undifferentiated, generalized confidentiality interests in particular information, just 
as there are such mechanisms in judicial proceedings. The primary point is that those interests 
should not be constitutionalized by subsuming them within the doctrine of executive privilege.  
 340. Cox, supra note 2, at 1404. 
 341. See Letter from Kathryn H. Ruemmler, Couns. to the President, to John Boehner, 
Speaker, U.S. House of Representatives 1 (Dec. 15, 2013), https://oversight.house.gov/sites/ 
democrats.oversight.house.gov/files/migrated/uploads/White%20House%20Counsel%20to%20
Boehner%2012-15-13.pdf [https://perma.cc/C27M-2T7F] (“It is the view of cybersecurity experts 
from across the Administration that these documents, if further disclosed, would provide 
information to potential hackers that increases the risk they could penetrate healthcare.gov, the 
Federal Data Services Hub, and other Federal IT systems.”).  
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reasons to guard against.342 But the subpoenaed information did not fit 
into any existing “component” of executive privilege. 
In another instance, the Department of Treasury initially resisted 
providing documents to Congress about the executive branch’s 
contingency plans if Congress failed to raise the debt limit and 
instructed the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (“FRBNY”), a 
quasi-public entity, to do the same.343 The Treasury and FRBNY 
ultimately turned the documents over, but emphasized that public 
disclosure could cause “serious harm” because the documents 
contained “potentially market sensitive and operationally sensitive 
material,” serious confidentiality interests that do not fit neatly within 
the components of privilege.344 Whether these specific claims were 
valid or not is irrelevant. And these controversies did not escalate to a 
constitutional confrontation over the information. But federal agencies 
undoubtedly have information that is not classified and may not fit into 
the existing components of privilege. The public disclosure of that 
information could potentially be very harmful, so harmful that the risks 
of handing it over to a congressional committee may be hard to justify, 
particularly if the agency can brief the committee privately or allow it 
to review the documents without taking possession. Although the 
agency may convey these concerns about disclosure to the 
congressional committee or subcommittee, there is no guarantee the 
documents, once handed over, would be kept confidential. The 
disclosure of such sensitive information—either purposefully, 
accidentally, or as a result of breaches of information security—would 
not be surprising. 
Today, executive privilege is based upon an absolute, 
undifferentiated need to preserve and protect the president’s authority 
to control all information that potentially implicates a range of 
generalized, undifferentiated confidentiality interests. The situational 
inquiry that formed the core of the historical Executive’s privilege no 
 
 342. Id. 
 343. See STAFF OF H. COMM. ON FIN. SERVS., SUBCOMM. ON OVERSIGHT & INVESTIGATIONS, 
114TH CONG., STAFF REPORT: THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION’S DEBT CEILING SUBTERFUGE: 
SUBPOENAED DOCUMENTS REVEAL TREASURY MISLED PUBLIC IN ATTEMPT TO “MAXIMIZE 
PRESSURE ON CONGRESS,” 19–23 (Feb. 1, 2016), https://republicans-financialservices.house.gov/ 
uploadedfiles/debt_ceiling_report_final_01292015.pdf [https://perma.cc/96Q2-GYJG] (describing 
the oversight dispute and characterizing the Treasury Department as actively obstructing the 
committee’s investigation). 
 344. See id. at 293 (quoting a letter from the Treasury Department to the committee regarding 
its response to the committee’s subpoenas).  
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longer exists. Recognizing the Executive’s privilege as a presidential 
immunity that may be invoked only where the president identifies 
specific, concrete harm from the disclosure of specific documents 
would be both more consistent with historical practice and more 
reflective of the appropriate constitutional balance between the 
branches.  
B. The Executive’s Privilege and Impeachment 
Understanding the Executive’s privilege as an immunity that 
limits Congress’s implied oversight authority also has other significant 
consequences for the balance of power between the branches. 
Importantly, it would eliminate executive privilege from the context of 
impeachment.345  
The executive branch concluded otherwise during the House of 
Representatives’ impeachment inquiry into President Trump.346 
President Trump never asserted executive privilege formally during 
the House impeachment inquiry or the Senate trial, nor did OLC 
undertake any balancing inquiry or address whether that balancing 
inquiry is different in impeachment than for traditional oversight.347 
Instead, Trump relied on prophylactic doctrines such as testimonial 
immunity and the deposition-counsel requirement. On the basis of 
OLC opinions concluding that these doctrines applied equally to 
impeachment, Trump directed executive branch officials not to comply 
with the House’s subpoenas.348 OLC reasoned that because executive 
 
 345. By the same reasoning, understanding the Executive’s privilege as a limit on Congress’s 
oversight authority would also have significant implications for the application of executive 
privilege to legislation, since the power to pass any legislation is an explicit one provided for in 
the Constitution, not an implied authority. OLC has concluded that the two are identical, 
reasoning that a statute requiring the executive branch to provide tax returns to a congressional 
committee must be interpreted as consistent with Congress’s implied oversight authority. Request 
for Tax Returns, supra note 169, at 1.  
 346. See, e.g., Depositions in the Impeachment Context, supra note 301, at 2–3 (“We believe 
that a congressional committee must likewise make a showing of need that is sufficient to 
overcome the privilege in connection with an impeachment inquiry.”).  
 347. Jonathan Shaub, Obstruction of Congress, Impeachment and Constitutional Conflict, 
LAWFARE (Jan. 10, 2020, 2:56 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/obstruction-congress-
impeachment-and-constitutional-conflict [https://perma.cc/U6UK-UG5H]. 
 348. See Depositions in the Impeachment Context, supra note 301, at 4–5 (concluding that 
executive branch officials have the constitutional authority to refuse to comply with deposition 
subpoenas issued as part of the House’s impeachment inquiry if agency counsel is not permitted 
to attend); Letter from Steven A. Engel, Assistant Att’y Gen., Off. of Legal Couns., U.S. Dep’t 
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privilege still theoretically applies—before undertaking any balancing 
with respect to the president’s authority to withhold specific 
information—the prophylactic doctrines designed to protect the 
president’s affirmative privilege to control information continue to 
apply as well.349  
But if understood properly as an immunity from oversight 
demands, the Executive’s privilege has no application to compulsory 
process issued pursuant to Congress’s impeachment authority. As 
Raoul Berger notes, with respect to the English parliamentary practice 
on which the Framers modeled the House’s impeachment authority, 
“Just as there exists no executive limit on the parliamentary power to 
impeach, so there can be no executive limit on the power of Parliament 
to inquire whether executive conduct amounts to impeachable 
misconduct.”350  
The constitutional authority of Congress to conduct legislative 
oversight, whatever its limits, is distinct from the respective 
constitutional authorities of the House and Senate relative to 
impeachment.351 In inferring authority for Congress to pursue 
oversight, including by compulsory process, the Supreme Court has 
made clear that the foundation of the authority is legislative.352 For 
example, in Senate Select, the D.C. Circuit concluded that “[w]hile fact-
finding by a legislative committee is undeniably a part of its task, 
legislative judgments normally depend more on the predicted 
consequences of proposed legislative actions and their political 
acceptability, than on precise reconstruction of past events.”353 And the 
Supreme Court specified that Congress’s implied oversight authorities 
 
of Just., to Pat A. Cipollone, White House Couns. 1–2 (Nov. 3, 2019) [hereinafter Eisenberg 
Immunity Letter], https://www.justsecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/ukraine-Clearinghouse 
-olc-letter-opinion-immunity-of-deputy-nsa-counsel-2019.11.3.pdf [https://perma.cc/UGZ8-39A3]  
(advising the White House that presidential advisers who had been subpoenaed to testify as part 
of the impeachment inquiry were immune from those subpoenas).  
 349. Depositions in the Impeachment Context, supra note 301, at 2–3. 
 350. BERGER, supra note 5, at 26–27. 
 351. See Trump v. Mazars USA, LLP, 940 F.3d 710, 754–67 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (Rao, J., 
dissenting) (collecting historical examples and discussing the distinction between the two 
constitutional authorities), vacated and remanded, 140 S. Ct. 2019 (2020). 
 352. See, e.g., Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 187 (1957) (“The power of the Congress 
to conduct investigations is inherent in the legislative process. That power is broad.”). 
 353. Senate Select Comm. on Presidential Campaign Activities v. Nixon, 498 F.2d 725, 732 
(D.C. Cir. 1974) (en banc); see also Barr Memorandum, supra note 27, at 159 (“Congress will 
seldom have any legitimate legislative interest in knowing the precise predecisional positions and 
statements of particular executive branch officials.”). 
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may be exercised only with respect to a subject “on which legislation 
could be had”354 and that “the power to investigate must not be 
confused with any of the powers of law enforcement.”355 When 
exercising its oversight authority, Congress is not “a law enforcement 
or trial agency.”356  
But impeachment reflects a separate constitutional authority, a 
judicial power that represents an exception to the otherwise solely 
legislative authority granted by the Constitution.357 The Constitution 
grants the House of Representatives “the sole [p]ower of 
[i]mpeachment.”358 The House acts as “a prosecutorial body in an 
impeachment context,” similar to the role of a grand jury.359 And the 
Senate sits as a court in judgment over the House charges, deciding 
whether to convict and remove the official from office.360 Any implied 
authorities the House and Senate have in fulfillment of those 
respective prosecutorial and judicial roles in impeachment are thus 
distinct from the bodies’ implied oversight authorities.361  
 
 354. McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 177 (1927).  
 355. Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S. 155, 161 (1955).  
 356. Watkins, 354 U.S. at 187. 
 357. See Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 190–91 (1880) (noting the importance of having 
the functions of each branch of government separated and clearly defined, with notable and 
explicit exceptions including impeachment); Hayburn’s Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409, 413 (1792) 
(quoting a 1792 letter from the North Carolina circuit court to the president claiming that “no 
judicial power of any kind appears to be vested [in the legislature], but the important one relative 
to impeachments”). 
 358. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 5. 
 359. Keith E. Whittington, Must the House Vote To Authorize an Impeachment Inquiry?, 
LAWFARE (Oct. 9, 2019, 3:10 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/must-house-vote-authorize-
impeachment-inquiry [https://perma.cc/3AKP-DFCM]; see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 65, at 397 
(Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (noting impeachment transforms the House 
into a “national inquest”). 
 360. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cls. 6, 7; see also 1 THOMAS JEFFERSON, A MANUAL OF 
PARLIAMENTARY PRACTICE FOR THE USE OF THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES § 53.16 
(Washington, Gov’t Printing Off. 1993) (1801) (“This [Senate] trial, though it varies in external 
ceremony, yet differs not in essentials from criminal prosecutions before inferior courts.”).  
 361. Of course, that leaves open the question of which branch gets to determine whether a 
demand for information is an oversight demand or an impeachment demand. OLC concluded 
that subpoenas issued by House committees prior to the full House voting to authorize an 
impeachment inquiry were not issued pursuant to congressional impeachment authority and need 
not be complied with. See House Comms.’ Auth. To Investigate for Impeachment, 43 Op. O.L.C., 
slip op. at 2–3 (Jan. 19, 2020) (arguing that House committees have no authority to issue 
subpoenas in the impeachment context except once a formal impeachment has been approved by 
the full House). The Trump administration thus adopted a blanket refusal to comply with any 
information demands from the House of Representatives in part because it questioned whether 
the inquiries were in fact an impeachment inquiry. See Letter from Pat A. Cipollone, Couns. to 
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Moreover, any limitations on that impeachment authority—such 
as a presidential immunity—must also be inferred from that authority 
and general principles of separation of powers. Understanding 
executive privilege as an affirmative presidential authority to control 
information, as the executive branch does, locates the source of power 
in Article II of the Constitution and allows the executive to claim that 
authority no matter what power Congress or one of its houses is 
exercising. Understanding executive privilege as an immunity specific 
to Congress’s implied oversight authority, as this Article proposes, 
locates the privilege in the specific grant of power to Congress in 
Article I of the Constitution, which prevents the automatic extension 
of executive privilege to impeachment.  
Consistent with the theoretical understanding of the Executive’s 
privilege as an oversight immunity without application to 
impeachment, presidents and others have recognized throughout the 
history of the country that their ability to withhold information from 
Congress disappears in the context of impeachment. In the same initial 
debates that occurred regarding Washington’s authority to withhold 
information requested by Congress, he and his advisers agreed that the 
president would not have such authority during impeachment.362 As 
President James K. Polk put it, acting pursuant to its impeachment 
authority, the House could “penetrate into the most secret recesses of 
the Executive Departments[,] . . . command the attendance of any and 
every agent of the Government, and compel them to produce all 
papers, public or private, official or unofficial.”363 President Theodore 
 
the President, to Nancy Pelosi, Speaker, U.S. House of Representatives 2–3 (Oct. 8, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/10/08/us/politics/white-house-letter-impeachment.
html [https://perma.cc/CP5V-TJEA] (noting that the president would not turn over papers under 
requests for documents by the House in its informal impeachment inquiry).  
 362. See 4 ANNALS OF CONG. 760–62 (1796) (statement of President George Washington) 
(noting that the only authority the House had to request a treaty document was through 
impeachment, “which the resolution ha[d] not expressed”); Jean Galbraith & Michel Paradis, 
George Washington’s Advisors Agreed: Impeachment Did Away with Executive Privilege, JUST 
SEC. (Oct. 25, 2019), https://www.justsecurity.org/66713/george-washingtons-advisors-agreed-
impeachment-did-away-with-executive-privilege [https://perma.cc/36CS-YMKS] (noting that 
George Washington’s advisers had expressed opinions that a formal inquiry was required before 
documents could be subpoenaed by the president); Jean Galbraith & Michel Paradis, Opinion, 
Impeachment Trumps Executive Privilege. Ask George Washington, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 22, 2019, 
6:41 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/impeachment-trumps-executive-privilege-ask-george-
washington-11571784069 [https://perma.cc/99QR-HPZR] (same).  
 363. James Polk, Message to the House of Representatives (Apr. 20, 1846), in 6 MESSAGES 
AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS, supra note 43, at 2284.  
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Roosevelt indicated that the only way Congress would get the papers 
provided him by the Bureau of Corporations was “through [his] 
impeachment.”364 As one of the Framers of the Constitution, James 
Wilson, described in an essay on the British Parliament, the House of 
Commons has “the character of grand inquisitors of the realm” and 
“[t]he proudest ministers of the proudest monarchs have trembled at 
the[] censures” of the House of Commons and “have appeared at the 
bar of the house, to give an account of their conduct, and ask pardon 
for their faults.”365 A number of other statements by presidents 
similarly distinguish between Congress’s oversight authority and its 
impeachment authority, recognizing that there is no executive privilege 
against demands for information in furtherance of the latter.366 
Even some of the foundational materials on which the executive 
branch relies for its doctrine of executive privilege make clear that 
impeachment is different. Attorney General Jackson’s 1941 
memorandum on the confidentiality of law-enforcement files367 
remains368 the seminal document on which the executive branch 
 
 364. Cox, supra note 2, at 1403–04 & n.72. 
 365. James Wilson, On the Legislative Authority of the British Parliament, in 2 THE WORKS 
OF JAMES WILSON 520 (James DeWitt Andrews ed., Chi., Callaghan & Co. 1896). 
 366. President Cleveland, for example, withheld papers from the Senate in 1886 related to his 
suspension of the U.S. Attorney for Alabama, noting that the Senate had no right to the papers 
“save through the judicial process of trial on impeachment.” Grover Cleveland, Message to the 
Senate (Mar. 1, 1886), in 8 MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS, supra note 43, at 378–
79. President Jackson similarly opined that “where there is the slightest reason to suspect 
corruption or abuse of trust, no obstacle which I can remove, shall be interposed to prevent the 
fullest scrutiny by all legal means. The offices of all the Departments will be opened to you, and 
every proper facility furnished for this purpose.” Letter from President Andrew Jackson, to 
Henry A. Wise, Chairman, Select Comm. on Investigations of Abuses & Frauds of the Exec. 
Dep’ts, House of Representatives (Jan. 26, 1837), https://www.loc.gov/resource/
maj.01097_0261_0274/?sp=1&st=text [https://perma.cc/N4AQ-LPH2]. And President Grant 
noted the House’s authority to “require as a right in its demand upon the Executive” all 
information necessary to an impeachment inquiry. Ulysses S. Grant, Message to the House of 
Representatives (May 4, 1876), in 7 MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS, supra note 43, 
at 362. 
 367. See Jackson Memorandum, supra note 44, at 46 (“It is the position of this Department, 
restated now with the approval of and at the direction of the President, that all investigative 
reports are confidential documents of the executive department of the Government . . . .”). 
 368. See, e.g., Rod J. Rosenstein, Deputy Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Just., Remarks at the Bar 
Association of Montgomery County’s Law Day Celebration (May 4, 2008), 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/deputy-attorney-general-rod-j-rosenstein-delivers-remarks-
bar-association-montgomery [https://perma.cc/D9C4-ZG53] (quoting at length from Jackson’s 
memorandum to support the “bedrock principle . . . that [the Department] do[es] not discuss 
investigations”). 
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relies369 to withhold such information from Congress. But at the end of 
the analysis, Jackson noted, “where the public interest has seemed to 
justify it, information as to particular situations has been supplied to 
congressional committees.”370 And he then identified one such 
situation: “[P]ertinent information would be supplied in impeachment 
proceedings . . . for the good of the administration of justice.”371 
The only formal assertion of executive privilege in an 
impeachment inquiry occurred in June 1974, when President Nixon 
refused to turn over the Watergate tapes to the House during its formal 
impeachment investigation.372 Nixon argued that 
[i]f the Institution of an impeachment inquiry against a President 
were permitted to override all restraints of separation of powers, this 
would spell the end of the doctrine of separation of powers; it would 
be an open invitation to future Congresses to use an impeachment 
inquiry, however frivolously, as a device to assert their own 
supremacy over the executive, and to reduce executive confidentiality 
to a nullity.373  
President Trump never formally asserted privilege, either during 
the House impeachment investigation or his Senate trial. Instead, he 
relied solely on the potential applicability of privilege and asserted 
prophylactic doctrines—testimonial immunity and the deposition-
counsel requirement—to reject demands for information, and he 
instructed officials not to comply with congressional subpoenas based 
on his constitutional authority to control information.374  
Nixon’s assertion in 1974 reflected his administration’s view of 
executive privilege as an absolute authority to withhold information 
from Congress, the courts, and the public that is unreviewable in 
court.375 That conception of an absolute privilege against Congress and 
 
 369. See Linder Letter, supra note 41, at 3–4 (discussing Jackson’s position). 
 370. Jackson Memorandum, supra note 44, at 51.  
 371. Id. (emphasis added). 
 372. See Philip Shabecoff, President Defies House Subpoena for More Tapes, N.Y. TIMES, 
June 11, 1974, at A1, A30 (noting that Nixon had invoked executive privilege as a defense to 
releasing the tapes). 
 373. Text of Letter to Rodino from President Refusing To Furnish Subpoenaed Evidence, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 11, 1974, at A30 [hereinafter Letter to Rodino]. 
 374. See Depositions in the Impeachment Context, supra note 301, at 4–5; Eisenberg 
Immunity Letter, supra note 348, at 1–2.  
 375. As Nixon wrote in his letter, “[t]his is the key issue in my insistence that the executive 
must remain the final arbiter of demands on its confidentiality, just as the legislative and judicial 
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the courts was rejected unanimously in Nixon, the reasoning of which 
makes clear that a specific need for information in the course of judicial 
proceedings overcomes any generalized confidentiality interests.376 
President Nixon’s determination that privilege was available in 
impeachment, supported by the views of Attorney General 
Kleindienst, is a historical outlier. In an appendix to a lengthy 1974 
OLC memorandum on impeachment precedents, the office collected 
historical statements about Congress’s authority to demand 
information in impeachment.377 Kleindienst’s contention that the 
privilege applied—and, indeed, remained within the absolute 
discretion of the president—is an extreme outlier in that collection.378 
No other historical precedent in that collection or elsewhere supports 
the authority of the president to withhold information that is relevant 
in an impeachment inquiry, particularly not based on generalized 
confidentiality interests. 
Understanding the Executive’s privilege as a limit on oversight 
authority rather than an affirmative presidential authority or an 
evidentiary privilege thus accounts for the historical understanding 
that Congress’s demands for information pursuant to its impeachment 
authority are distinct from its oversight demands. As an 1843 House 
Report stated, “The House of Representatives has the power of 
impeachment . . . a power which implies the right of inquiry on the part 
of the House to the fullest and most unlimited extent.”379 Different 
 
branches must remain the final arbiters of demands on their confidentiality.” Letter to Rodino, 
supra note 373, at A30. 
 376. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 713 (1974). 
 377. See generally OFF. OF LEGAL COUNS., DEP’T OF JUST., LEGAL ASPECTS OF 
IMPEACHMENT: AN OVERVIEW, app. III (1974) (collecting statements). 
 378. Id. app. III at 10–13.  
 379. 3 ASHER C. HINDS, HINDS’ PRECEDENTS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 183 
(1907). In the Mazars litigation over President Trump’s personal financial records, the D.C. 
Circuit concluded that the House had the power to investigate misconduct pursuant to its 
legislative authority and to “choose to move from legislative investigation to impeachment” when 
it wanted to do so. Trump v. Mazars USA, LLP, 940 F.3d 710, 737 (D.C. Cir. 2019), vacated and 
remanded, 140 S. Ct. 2019 (2020). In their arguments to the Supreme Court, the House relied 
solely on its legislative authority, not its impeachment authority. Ultimately, the Court upheld the 
House’s authority to seek the records pursuant to its legislative authority but remanded for the 
lower courts to apply a heightened scrutiny to the subpoenas since they sought information from 
the President. Mazars, 140 S. Ct. at 2034–36; id. at 2037 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (noting the House 
had not relied on its impeachment authority). However, a subpoena issued by a committee 
pursuant to a House rule allowing for a subpoena in furtherance of the committee’s legislative 
functions could arguably be considered not in furtherance of the House’s impeachment authority. 
The OLC relied on this conclusion to advise the White House that it need not comply with 
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inferences about Congress’s authority to demand information thus 
arise from its distinct legislative and impeachment authorities. 
During the Trump impeachment inquiry, OLC asserted that the 
testimonial immunity doctrine prohibited a deputy White House 
counsel from complying with a House subpoena because “the 
commencement of an impeachment inquiry only heightens the need to 
safeguard the separation of powers.”380 During the Nixon 
impeachment inquiry, Berger took the opposite view, arguing that the 
impeachment power “constitutes a deliberate breach in the doctrine of 
separation of powers.”381 In his view, that meant that “no arguments 
drawn from that doctrine (such as executive privilege) may apply to the 
preliminary inquiry by the House or the subsequent trial by the 
Senate.”382  
The better argument, however, is that impeachment is not a 
“deliberate breach” of the separation of powers but a deliberate 
exception to the separation of powers—a separate, purposeful grant of 
investigative and judicial authority to Congress. That judicial power is 
not limited by doctrines derived from the separation of powers that 
limit Congress’s legislative authority. And the Executive’s privilege is 
best understood—both as a matter of constitutional interpretation and 
historical practice—as a limit only on Congress’s implied authorities in 
furtherance of its legislative functions. No argument drawn from a limit 
on oversight should be applied to limit Congress’s separate authority 
to consider and try impeachments. That does not, of course, foreclose 
arguments that there should be limits on Congress’s impeachment 
authority or procedures established to protect certain information 
from public disclosure. But those arguments have to begin explicitly 
with the nature and historical understanding of impeachment. And 
they have to contend with a wealth of history that suggests that 
Congress’s powers of inquiry are at their zenith in the course of 
considering or trying impeachment. 
 
subpoenas from House committees issued prior to the full House vote to authorize an 
impeachment inquiry and on which a former official relied in a declaration judgment action 
seeking to determine whether he must comply with a subpoena for testimony issued prior to the 
full House vote. Complaint at 11–14, Kupperman v. U.S. House of Representatives, No. 1:19-cv-
3224 (D.D.C. Oct. 25, 2019).  
 380. Kyle Cheney & Andrew Desiderio, White House Officials Spurn Demand To Testify in 
Impeachment Probe, POLITICO (Nov. 4, 2019, 10:02 AM), https://www.politico.com/news/
2019/11/04/white-house-officials-testify-impeachment-065318 [https://perma.cc/G3SH-45K3].  
 381. Raoul Berger, Impeachment: An Instrument of Regeneration, HARPER’S MAG., Jan. 
1974, at A14. 
 382. Id. 
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CONCLUSION 
Congress and the executive branch have long had contrary 
constitutional understandings of executive privilege. The judiciary has 
never resolved this dispute. Despite the prevailing view that resolution 
is neither possible nor advisable, this Article proposes that it is now 
necessary. The constitutional doctrine that the executive branch has 
developed allows it to nullify oversight and, as demonstrated by the 
impeachment proceedings against President Trump, even nullify 
Congress’s authority to gather information when considering 
impeachment.  
Almost every argument about the nature and existence of 
executive privilege is grounded in and relies on historical practice. This 
Article is no different. First principles of constitutional interpretation 
must be paired with that history. Executive privilege is typically 
described as an implicit constitutional authority, just as the 
countervailing congressional legislative oversight authority has been 
described as an implicit constitutional authority by the Supreme Court. 
Rather than inferring an affirmative constitutional authority belonging 
to the president that counteracts Congress’s implicit authority, the 
better interpretational practice defines Congress’s authority in a 
manner that accounts for historical practice. 
That definition is the Executive’s privilege, an immunity from 
compulsory process issued by Congress in the exercise of its legislative 
oversight authority. That immunity is contingent, and it applies only 
where the president both determines the release of that information 
would cause concrete, identifiable harm to the national interest and 
explains the basis for that determination. Understanding executive 
privilege as this narrow immunity accords with history and curbs the 
prophylactic practices and constitutional doctrines on which the 
executive branch now relies to thwart congressional demands for 
information. The definition also makes clear that the doctrine of 
executive privilege does not apply to impeachment. Establishing this 
theoretical foundation is both possible and advisable. And it would go 
a long way toward restoring the constitutional balance between the 
branches in information disputes. 
